Bøger i RUTGERS LECTURES IN PHILOSOPHY SERIES serien

This book develops a new theory of vagueness, based on the idea that vagueness is a global rather than a local phenomenon. This leads to a new semantics for vagueness and a new logic. Kit fine then applies this theory to traditional philosophical puzzles including the sorites paradox, the problem of personal identity and to the transparency of mental phenomenon.

In the third volume in the Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy series, distinguished philosopher Robert Stalnaker here offers a defense of an ontology of propositions, and of some logical resources for representing them. He offers an austere formulation of a theory of propositions in a first-order extensional logic, but then uses the commitments of this theory to justify an enrichment to modal logic as an appropriate framework for regimented languages that are constructedto represent any of our scientific and philosophical commitments. His book adopts a self-consciously neo-Quinean methodology, and argues that the theory that is developed helps to motivate and clarify Quine''s naturalistic metaphysical picture.