Bøger i Synthese Library serien

The aim of this thematically unified anthology is to track the history of epistemic logic, to consider some important applications of these logics of knowledge and belief in a variety of fields, and finally to discuss future directions of research with particular emphasis on 'active agenthood' and multi-modal systems.

This volume contains papers on truth, logic, semantics, and history of logic and philosophy. Jan Wolenski is professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland.

Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory - the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory - is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy.

Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory - the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory - is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy.

Bruno de Finetti (1906-1985) is known worldwide as the founder (together with F.P. Ramsey) of the modern personal probability. This book contains the transcription of a course on the foundations of probability given by him in 1979 in Rome.

The philosophical thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein continues to have a profound influence that transcends barriers between philosophical disciplines and reaches beyond philosophy itself.

There is an interweaving of biographical and philosophical themes, not only in Peter Geach's philosophical autobiography, but also in the introductions he has contributed to each section.

In fact, perhaps the most significant sources of new activity have been the applied areas of Linguistics and Computer Science (including Artificial Intelligence), where many intriguing new ideas have appeared presenting further challenges to temporal logic.

Though specific Kantian doctrines fell into disrepute earlier in this century, the past twenty-five years have seen a surge of interest in and respect for Kant's philosophy of mathematics among both Kant scholars and philosophers of mathematics.

Although he is primarily known for his expertise in the field of Kantian philosophy, Werkie's published scholarship has spanned a wide range of subjects for more than fifty years: his first book, A Philosophy of Science, appeared in 1940;

This volume contains a selection of papers presented at a Seminar on Intensional Logic held at the University of Amsterdam during the period September 1990-May 1991.

Scientific research is viewed as a deliberate activity and the logic of discovery consists of strategies and arguments whereby the best objectives (questions) and optimal means for achieving these objectives (heuristics) are chosen.

The present collection of papers derives from a philosophy conference organised in the Sicilian town of M ussomeli in September 1991.

And then even if one was thinking, one might not be really thinking of the cat being on the mat, but only that one wishes there was a cat, and wonders whether if there was it would be on the mat, and yet the subjective impression was that one was thinking: "The cat is on the mat" (the same picture might stand for both the thoughts mentioned).

Quantifiers: Logics, Models and Computation is the first concentrated effort to give a systematic presentation of the main research results on the subject, since the modern concept was formulated in the late '50s and early '60s.

For a long time it has been belived that elementary logic also called first-order logic was an ade quate theory of logical forms of natural language sentences.

This book is a study in the logic of questions (sometimes called erotetic logic). In other words, there are inferential thought processes - we shall call them erotetic inferences - in which questions play the roles of conclusions or conclusions and premises.

Doing Worlds with Words throws light on the problem of meaning as the meeting point of linguistics, logic and philosophy, and critically assesses the possibilities and limitations of elucidating the nature of meaning by means of formal logic, model theory and model-theoretical semantics.

Philosophers of science have produced a variety of definitions for the notion of one sentence, theory or hypothesis being closer to the truth, more verisimilar, or more truthlike than another one.

The work of which this is an English translation appeared originally in French as Precis de logique mathematique.

The papers are grouped around the unifying topic of Hempel's own interests in logic and philosophy of science, the great majority dealing with issues on inductive logic and the theory of scientific explanatio- problems to which Hempel has devoted the bulk of his outstandingly fruitful efforts.

Games, Norms, and Reasons: Logic at the Crossroads provides an overview of modern logic focusing on its relationships with other disciplines, including new interfaces with rational choice theory, epistemology, game theory and informatics.

Proof, Computation and Agency: Logic at the Crossroads provides an overview of modern logic and its relationship with other disciplines. As a highlight, several articles pursue an inspiring paradigm called 'social software', which studies patterns of social interaction using techniques from logic and computer science.

In this book, the author defends a unified externalists account of propositional attitudes and reference, and formalizes this view within possible world semantics.

According to a view assumed by many scientists and philosophers of science and standardly found in science textbooks, it is controlled ex perience which provides the basis for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable theories in science: acceptable theories are those which can pass empirical tests.

The traditional stum bling block for Bayesians has been to fmd objective probability inputs to conditionalize upon. To be sure, if we could agree on the correct probabilistic representation of 'ignorance' (or absence of pertinent data), then all probabilities obtained by applying Bayes' rule to an 'informationless' prior would be objective.