Analytisk filosofi og logisk positivisme

The book discusses recent developments in philosophy with regards to how historical events can be explained causally and introduces perspectives from the philosophy of science into the philosophy of history. The book covers the main approaches to causal explanation in history and makes clear the main issues and concepts that are associated with such explanations. For example, the book discusses historical contingency and narratives, among other issues. The book is directed to philosophers of science, philosophers of history, historians, historically oriented social scientists, and everyone who is interested in how we make sense of the past.

This book presents both a historical overview of the absorption of Heidegger's thought into English-language philosophical schools as well as a philosophical discussion of his thought provided by contemporary scholars. The text describes the ways in which a philosophical methodology and worldview seemingly so inhospitable to Anglophone academia has managed to find an unlikely home.This volume is roughly divided into two types of contributions: discussions of Heidegger's reception in the English-speaking world, and outstanding examples of English-language Heidegger scholarship. The first type includes both historiographical accounts of the encounters between Heidegger's thought and the Anglo-American world, as well as their philosophical expositions and critiques. The second group of chapters reveal the latest contemporary scholarship by contemporary Heideggerians writing in English. It is moreover the first volume to bring together thinkers from both genealogies of Anglo-American Heideggerianism appealing to students and researchers working in both of these camps.

Bertrand Russell: The Colours of Pacifism analyzes the tenacious commitment of one of the twentieth century¿s most extraordinary intellectuals to the cause of civilization, progress, and human rights. Through his active and pragmatic pacifism, Russell sought to confront the problems stemming from the unstable and dramatic political conditions of his age: the beginning of the Great War, the establishment of the League of Nations, the rise of totalitarian regimes, the outbreak of the Second World War, the dawn of the Atomic Age, the escalation of the Cold War, the weakness of the United Nations, and the need for world government. His reflections on the subject of peace, which constitute the main focus of this book, led him into dialogue with some of the greatest figures of his time, including Romain Rolland, Albert Einstein, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Leon Trotsky, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Nikita Khrushchev, and John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Shining new light on a lifelong preoccupation in Russell¿s work and thinking, this essay is a landmark study that will appeal to students, scholars, and anyone curious about the philosopher¿s engagement with the world around him.

Analytic Philosophy began in the first decades of the 20th century at Cambridge with Bertrand Russell, in Vienna with the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists, and in Berlin with Hans Reichenbach's Society for Empirical Philosophy. While the story of the rise of this intellectual movement is chronicled in a number of recent and not so recent books, these treatments largely focus on the story of the ideas. Largely missing are the figures themselves, their lives and personalities. Those are saved in the memories of the people who knew them. Analytic Logic/Synthetic Lives is a collection of eleven edited transcripts of oral history interviews collected over twenty years with those who had such memories - the widows, spouses, classmates, and students of these towering figures of 20th century analytic thought. The primary and secondary scholarly literature on the history of early analytic philosophy is plentiful, but the same is not true when it comes to the personal side of these figures. This volume fills that hole by collecting personal remembrances from those who knew them best.

"A comprehensive, systematic, and historical collection of essays on Rudolf Carnap's philosophy and legacy, written by leading international experts. This volume provides a redressing of Carnap's place in the history of analytic philosophy, through his approach to metaphysics, values, politics, epistemology and philosophy of science"--

This book explores the relevance of Sartre's work for various areas in contemporary philosophy, including the imagination, philosophy of language, skepticism, social ontology, logic, film, practical rationality, emotions, and psychoanalysis.

I was encouraged to read in the Introduction that it treated philosophy of medicine as part of the philosophy of science. But I was a little sceptical on reading that as such it is comprehensive. Couldn't a comprehensive account be written only by an amazing polymath? But it turns out that you are that amazing polymath. You seem to have read everything and succeeded in producing an encyclopedia of all the issues. It will establish itself as an essential guide to the field.Professor Jonathan Glover

This book is a collection of 15 essays on important themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as linguistic normativity, the concepts of understanding, reasons, and knowledge, questions of value in aesthetics, ethics, and religion.

This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology.

This text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative metatheory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provides a new interpretation of Carnap¿s conception of analyticity, allowing for a refutation of the Quinean argument for the incompatibility of naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In doing so, the relevance and potential importance of their scientific meta-theory for contemporary questions in the philosophy of science is demonstrated.This text appeals to students and researchers working on Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, as well as proponents of naturalized epistemology.

The essays collected in this volume and authored by Sami Pihlström emphasize that our relation to the world we live in and seek to represent and get to know better through our practices of conceptualization and inquiry is irreducibly valuational. There is no way of even approaching, let alone resolving, the philosophical issue of realism without drawing due attention to the ways in which human values are inextricably entangled with even the most purely ¿factual¿ projects of inquiry we engage in.This entanglement of the factual and the normative is, as explicitly argued in Chapter 7 but implicitly suggested in all the other chapters as well, both pragmatic (practice-embedded and practice-involving) and transcendental (operating at the level of the necessary conditions for the possibility of our representing and cognizing the world in general). The author claims we need to carefully examine the complex relations of realism, value, and transcendental arguments at the intersection of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. This book does so by offering case-studies of various important neopragmatists and philosophers close to the pragmatist tradition, including Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Joseph Margolis, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It appeals to scholars and advanced graduate students focusing on pragmatism and analytic philosophy.

This book repairs and revives the Theory of Knowledge research program of Russell¿s Principia era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the program¿s agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of Principia Mathematica, it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a priori logic of Principia is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in The Problems of Philosophy, the program¿s acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular logical forms to address problems of direction and compositionality. With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo, ScientificMethod in Philosophy became the sequel to Problems. Chapter 2 explains Russell¿s feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein¿s demand that logic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919 neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4¿6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about Principia. Studies of modality and entailment are viable while Principia remains a universal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians.

This book remedies the absence in the history of analytic philosophy of a detailed examination of G. E. Moore¿s philosophical views as they developed between 1894 and 1902. This period saw the inauguration of analytic philosophy through the work of Moore and Bertrand Russell. Moore¿s early views are examined in detail through unpublished archival material, including surviving letters, diaries, notes of lectures attended, papers for Cambridge societies, and drafts of early work, in order to revise the established view that the origin of analytic philosophy at Cambridge was an abrupt split from F. H. Bradley¿s Absolute Idealism. Traditional accounts of this period have highlighted the anti-psychologism of Frege¿s logic but have not explored the impact of this movement more broadly. Anti-psychologism was a key feature of the work of Moore¿s teachers on the nature of the mind and its objects, in their interpretation of Kant, and in ethics. Moore¿s teachers G.F. Stout and James Ward weresignificant contributors to the late 19th century debates in mental science and the developing new science of psychology. Henry Sidgwick¿s criticisms of Kant and Bradley and his leading work in ethics were key influences on Moore. Moore¿s Trinity Fellowship Dissertations are essential historical evidence of the development of Moore's new theory of judgment, a theory whose defining role in the origins of analytic philosophy cannot be overstated. Moore¿s study of Kant in his dissertations ultimately formed the groundwork for his Principia Ethica (1903), which evolved from ideas that manifested in Moore¿s earliest Apostles¿ papers, developed through his dissertations, and were refined through his Elements of Ethics lectures (1898-99). This monumental work of early twentieth century ethics is thus shown to be the culmination of Moore¿s early philosophical development.

Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), begründete nicht nur die moderne Logik, sondern auch die Sprachphilosophie. Er erweiterte die funktionale Analyse der Sätze zu einer Systematik des gesamten sprachlichen Bedeutens und Ausdrucks, indem er zwischen den Zeichen selbst, dem Sinn und der Bedeutung der Zeichen unterschied. Dieser Band versammelt Kommentare und Analysen zu den drei klassischen Aufsätzen Funktion und Begriff (1891), Über Sinn und Bedeutung und Über Begriff und Gegenstand (beide 1892). Er verschafft dadurch einen fundierten Überblick sowohl zu den Kernproblemen wie auch den Hintergründen von Freges bis heute kontrovers diskutiertem Ansatz. Dabei wird die enge Verzahntheit zwischen dem logischen Hintergrund und Freges logizistischem Anliegen einerseits und den Vorschlägen zur Deutung einer ganzen Reihe von sprachlichen Erscheinungen erkennbar. Dazu gehören Fragen nach dem Wesen von Begriff und Gegenstand bzw. Prädikaten und Eigennamen als den Grundelementen jeder Aussage überhaupt - aber auch Erläuterungen zu indirekter Rede und fiktionalem Diskurs. Der vorliegende Band bietet dazu informierte Kommentare und Analysen.

In this illuminating guide to the criteria of rational theorizing, Michael Shepanski identifies, defends and applies W. V. Quine's epistemic norms - the norms that best explain Quine's decisions to accept some theories and not others.Parts I and II set out the doctrines of this epistemology, demonstrating their potential for philosophical application. Part III is a case study in which Shepanski develops a theory of the propositional attitudes by the method of formalizing inferences to behaviour. He presents critiques of popular alternative views, including foundationalism, the centrality of knowledge and Quine's own epistemological naturalism.By reassessing Quine's normative epistemology, Shepanski advances our understanding of Quine's philosophy whilst providing a guide for our own theorizing.

Reconstructing the philosophical project of William James, Alexis Dianda deploys a concept of experience that avoids both foundationalist epistemology and an account of the subject rooted in immediately given objects of consciousness. In doing so, Dianda rethinks the role of experience as well as the aims and resources of pragmatic philosophy.

Léon Brunschvicg's contribution to philosophical thought in fin-de-siècle France receives full explication in the first English-language study on his work. Arguing that Brunschvicg is crucial to understanding the philosophical schools which took root in 20th-century France, Pietro Terzi locates Brunschvicg alongside his contemporary Henri Bergson, as well as the range of thinkers he taught and influenced, including Lévinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. Brunschvicg's deep engagement with debates concerning spiritualism and rationalism, neo-Kantian philosophy, and the role of mathematics in philosophy made him the perfect supervisor for a whole host of nascent philosophical ideas which were forming in the work of his students. Terzi outlines Brunchvicg's defence of neo-Kantian judgement, historical analysis and the inextricability of the natural and humanist sciences to any rigorous system of philosophy, with wide-ranging implications for contemporary scholarship.