Bøger af Leslie Terebessy

The umma is experiencing trauma. The umma is experiencing trauma because it exchanged the Book of Allah for books of traditions, resulting in sectarianism. To follow tradition rather than revelation is to treat persons as superior to Allah. Which person is a better guide than Allah? It is evident that the state of the umma changed. Allah said He does not alter the state of people until they change what is in themselves (Q, 13: 11). The umma used to be on top of the world. At present it finds itself nearer to the other end. The umma went from hero to zero. Why? The Book of Allah was not enough for the umma. It wanted more. So it turned to the ways of its forefathers. It turned from revelation to follow tradition. That is the chief cause of the umma's downfall. The reorientation from revelation to tradition was triggered by an enchantment with tradition. The turn was assisted by the repression of reason. The repression of reason enabled tradition to mount a coup d'état, to usurp the place of revelation. The "coup" corrupted knowledge and triggered turmoil in the umma. The turn from revelation to tradition was backed by the assertion that tradition, too, was revelation. This rested upon problematic exegesis, which asserts that everything the prophet uttered was "revelation" from Allah. From then, matters went from bad to worse. Jurists did not pause at merely treating tradition as revelation (wahy). They further treat tradition as tanzil, what Allah "sent down." But traditions are not the words of Allah. They are not even the words of the prophet. Traditions are paraphrases of paraphrases of what Muhammad allegedly said or did. They are not verbatim. Traditions are hearsay. To treat the words of mere persons as "revelation" is an expression of cavalier exegesis, exhibiting a failure to differentiate the rulings of Allah from reports of persons. The traditional ulama persisted in the promotion of tradition at the expense of revelation until tradition surpassed revelation. It was treated as a "judge" of revelation. This represented a reversal of the relationship between revelation and tradition. Revelation was subordinated to tradition. The Book of Allah was subordinated to books of traditions. This was a breakdown of rationality. Reversing the relationship between revelation and tradition harmed the umma enormously. Turning to tradition from revelation was tantamount to a relapse into shirk, following the way of the forefathers rather than the Book of Allah. Allah prohibited "adding" to revelation in chapter 69: 44-46 of the Book. Those who do not judge by what He "sent down" are referred to in the Book as unbelievers, rebels, and wrongdoers (5: 44-45, 47). The prophet prohibited the recording of his sayings, too. But hawkish rulers, in defiance of the prophet's prohibition of the recording of his traditions, asked ulama to record the traditions. The effects would be troubling. The Mongols erased the Abbasids when Abbasid rulers acted in keeping with the tradition according to which "the blood of the kafir is halal for the believers." Encouraged by this tradition, the Abbasids murdered a group of Mongol traders, as well as three ambassadors dispatched by Genghis Khan to ask for justice. This brazen defiance of the Book of Allah resulted in the deaths of a million persons in the reprisals that followed. Anti-rationalism also resulted in the deaths of five thousand philosophers, murdered by Musa al-Hadi in 786, during the mihna (inquisition). This was a "reign of terror," a persecution of intellectuals by the adherents of traditions. But there was barely a whimper expressed at this atrocity. Anti-rationalism plunged Muslims into stupefaction and, due to the resulting backwardness, rendered the umma vulnerable to external assaults.

Islam is the third of the three Abrahamic faiths. They share the heritage of monotheism. But Muslims are perceived with concern. They experience tensions not just with non-Muslims, but also with Muslims of related persuasions. The RAND Corporation Report highlights a range of challenges of the umma. These challenges stem from the politicisation of religion. Hawkish ulama re-interpreted Islam to justify unlawful wars of territorial expansion of the empire. Hawkish jurists reinvented Islam as Islamism, as a religion of war rather than peace. They misinterpreted the teaching of Islam by recourse to tradition and the teaching of abrogation. Revelation was "interpreted" to endorse practices that are against Islam. These encompass treating the refusal to pay zakat as deserving the death penalty. It also includes waging wars of aggression to "propagate" Islam by the sword. The Book of Allah refrains from treating apostasy as a crime punishable by death. The prophet did not take any person's life for apostasy, either. Prescribing the death penalty for apostasy required by-passing revelation. Recourse to tradition enabled politicised ulama to produce "traditional Islam." Recourse to the teaching of the "abrogation" of the verses of reconciliation by verse 9:5 enabled hawkish ulama to re-interpret Islam as a manifesto for war and a justification for territorial expansion. Replacing the rulings in the Book of Allah required the treatment of tradition as "revelation" and therefore as a "second" root of the law. But treating tradition as "revelation" (wahy) is not enough to derive religious rulings from tradition. For religious rulings require being derived from what Allah "sent down" (tanzil). This is clear from verses 44, 45 and 47 of chapter 5 of the Book of Allah. By contrast, wahy (inspiration) could be provided by evil beings, too. By deriving rulings of the sharia from tradition, jurists treated traditions not merely as wahy (inspiration) but as tanzil or what Allah "sent down." But enacting law in religion is the exclusive prerogative of Allah. Treating tradition as a root of legislation defies the teaching of the Book of Allah. For the Book teaches that we are to "judge" exclusively by tanzil, (what Allah sent down). But Allah sent down the Book of Allah; he did not "send down" books of traditions. Blasphemy, adultery and apostasy do not merit capital punishment in the Book of Allah. These rulings represent a corruption of Islamic law. This requires attention. Islamic law requires rehabilitation to ensure that all legislation related to religion is firmly rooted in revelation and only in revelation. Prescribing capital punishment in cases of blasphemy, adultery and apostasy disregards the Book of Allah and encroaches upon tawhid, the principle that the authority to enact laws in religion belongs to Allah alone. Is treating tradition as a "second" root of legislation in keeping with tauhid? Thus, the sharia requires rehabilitation. It is necessary to emphasize justice. It is necessary to restore the Book of Allah as the only root of legislation in all matters related to religion. Following tradition in preference to revelation brought disasters upon the umma. The Mongols devastated the Abbasid empire after the murder of a caravan of Mongol traders and ambassadors sent by Genghis Khan to request justice for the killers of the traders and ambassadors. The Abbasids perpetrated these transgressions because they followed the tradition which says that "the blood of the kafir is halal for the believer" in preference to the Book of Allah that teaches that "Allah does not love wrongdoers." The Abbasids paid dearly for confusing tradition with revelation and following tradition in preference to revelation. Even to this day, acts of terrorism elicit a disproportionate response against Muslims.

Islam is an Abrahamic religion. It reiterates the previous revelations. It rectifies a range of misunderstandings that proliferated regarding them. Islam is a monotheistic religion. However, the treatment of tradition as "revelation," as a "partner" and even "judge" of revelation, tainted the knowledge of Islam with shirk. Allah is the Lawgiver in religious matters. Persons are free to legislate in non-religious matters, for example regarding traffic laws. It is necessary to return to the Book of Allah from the bellicose teachings encountered in traditions and the writings of hawkish ulama. It is necessary to retrieve the defensive teaching of jihad, important to abandon the jihad al talab. It is also necessary to abandon the teaching of the alleged abrogation of the peace verses by the verse of the sword. The purification of religion requires freeing the sharia of extremists tendencies. It requires being brought in line with the teaching of the Quran. Attachment to militant misinterpretations of Islam places the umma at risk of retaliation for acts of aggression by a few extremists. The Muslim past is strewn with clashes. Political struggles between Muawiya and Ali, as well as between Yazid and Hussein, emerged with the passing of the prophet. The Battle of the Camel pitted Aisha against Ali while the Battle of Siffin pitted Muawiya against Ali. These were fratricidal wars. Up to fifteen thousand companions died in these two battles. There was also a war between Ali and the Kharijites. A range of alternative perceptions emerged during this turbulence. The Murjiates wished to remain neutral. Disagreements emerged not just regarding succession but also about the way to approach revelation. A few wanted to understand revelation with the assistance of reasoning. A different sect wanted to adhere to tradition, assuming that tradition encompassed revelation. The two sects were the rationalists and the traditionists. Traditionists accorded greater credence to following their predecessors, recorded in the prophetic traditions. The two groups comprised the Mutazilites and the ahl al-kalam on the one hand, and the traditionists or the ahl al-hadith on the other. The rationalists followed Abu Hanifa, while the ahl al-haith followed Malik, al-Shafi'i and ibn Hanbal. The rationalists asserted that understanding revelation required recourse to reason. Traditionists preferred to understand revelation through the lens of tradition. Traditionists became enchanted with the ways of their predecessors, while the rationalists were less prone to follow tradition. The encounters between the two groups reached a political expression in the mihna, launched by al-Mahdi in 780. Five thousand philosophers were killed by Musa al-Hadi, the son of al-Mahdi, in 786. After a brief reign of the rationalists from 809 to 849, al-Mutawakkil resumed the persecution of the rationalists. But the trauma of the umma is due to having strayed from the right path. This transpired because the umma misunderstood revelation as well as the tradition of the prophet. The misunderstanding is due to the reluctance to use reason and an infatuation with tradition. Traditions attributed to the prophet were treated as revelation. Following Bukhari was understood as following the traditions of the prophet. But the tradition of the prophet was to follow the Book of Allah, not books of traditions. By turning from the Book of Allah to the books of traditions, the umma drifted from the Book of Allah under the misapprehension that it was getting nearer to Allah by following books of traditions. This was a tragedy. It explains the state of the umma and highlights the need to return to the path of Allah.

Have traditional ulama conflated if not replaced ethics with rituals? Why are there no books in Bukhari on justice, reason, freedom, or ethics? Even Shatibi refrained from treating justice as a purpose of Islamic law. The de-emphasis on ethics, in tandem with the enforcement of religiosity is reducing the attractiveness of Islam. Muslims turn to Islamism because they are unable to find justice in tradition, which is becoming less relevant as a result of disregarding key teachings of the Book of Allah. The failure to treat non-Muslims with justice is palpable in the teaching of jihad al-talab, a radical rendition of religion without grounding in revelation. The pushback for unjust efforts to propagate Islam by the sword, based in addition on traditions according to which "the blood of the kafir is halal for the believer," resulted in defeats for the umma, bringing an end to every empire without exception. For building an empire upon a corrupt knowledge of revelation is to build on quicksand. The repression of reason exacerbated the misunderstanding of revelation and the treatment of tradition as "revelation." The repression of reason stifled freedom of expression, thereby inhibiting progress. Traditional exegesis and jurisprudence rest on problematic premises. These encompass the perceptions that revelation is flawed because it is "unclear," "incomplete," and "incoherent." These presupposition emerged because of the reticence to use reason. They corrupted exegesis. Accordingly, traditional exegesis and jurisprudence require reconstruction, on the basis of presuppositions that are in accord with, rather than in defiance of the teaching of revelation. Further tenets in defiance of revelation encompass the perception that tradition is revelation, that reason is subordinate to tradition, the assumption that isnad matters more than matn, the teaching of predestination, the teaching of abrogation, the teaching of jihad al-talab, and the perception that the globe is a battlefield between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb. The premises that tradition is revelation, that it judges, abrogates and even replaces revelation are particularly troubling. For they are expressions of scriptural and juristic shirk. The tainting of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence render them ill-equipped to generate reliable scriptural and juristic analysis. Traditional exegesis and jurisprudence rest on premises. A premise is an assertion that provides a pillar of the analysis. Premises take the form of presuppositions. Presuppositions could be in accord with, indifferent to, or in defiance of a discourse a particular exegesis endeavours to articulate. As a matter of principle, all presuppositions in the exegesis of revelation should be derived from revelation. If for any reason a particular presupposition veers from or defies revelation, the analysis based upon that presupposition becomes flawed and requires being rehabilitated or rejected. This transpired with a few presuppositions in traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. They encompass the perceptions that revelation is flawed because it is "unclear," "incomplete," and "incoherent." These perceptions require being replaced with assumptions that are in accord with the teaching of revelation. There is a possibility of neglecting substance by excessive preoccupation with formalities. There is much emphasis on the recitation of revelation. Regrettably, much recitation takes place without comprehension. It has been said that actions speak louder than words. We must walk the talk. The focus on formalities is reflected in the emphasis on the performance of rituals at the expense of ethics. But the Book of Allah emphasizes ethics. This is evident in verses nineteen to thirty-five in chapter seventy of the Book of Allah. These verses describe in detail the actions of persons that perform the salat. Allah warns us about persons who pray, but refuse even neighbourly deeds.

The rejection of reason accelerated the turn from revelation to tradition. The result is confusion and alienation from revelation. The turn from revelation to tradition was triggered by the rejection of reason. For the turn from the Book of Allah to follow books of manmade traditions rested upon flawed reasoning. It rests on a poor rendering of three verses in the Book of Allah. These verses encompass the verse saying that we have "a good example in the prophet," that "whatever the messenger gives you, take it," and that Allah exhorts us to "obey Allah and the messenger." But the Book of Allah also refers to Abraham as a good example. Besides, does it follow from the prophet being referred to as a "good example" that we should follow books of traditions? This is a non-sequitur. The verse that is rendered to suggest that we should take "whatever the messenger gives us" refers to the distribution of war booty, not his traditions. This is a further non-sequitur. The verse that renders heeding the messenger as meaning "following traditions" conflates "obeying the messenger" with "following traditions." This is another non-sequitur. All three reveal flawed knowledge of revelation based upon fallacies. This should not be a surprise as these "arguments" were proffered by persons that rejected reason. It is not surprising that their "arguments" are less than reasonable. Further errors followed. These errors enabled the transmutation of Islam into its traditional and Islamist forms. The errors encompass the teaching of predestination in traditional Islam and the teaching of jihad al-talab in militant Islam, as a sixth pillar of Islam. The first rendered Muslims passive at home, while the second encouraged a militant posture abroad. As a result, traditionists "equate" the revelations of Allah with texts reported in paraphrase by persons that were not prophets. This is tantamount to treating the books of traditions as "partners" of the Book of Allah. It is tantamount to "scriptural shirk." Is it possible to ascribe "partners" to the Book of Allah without ascribing a "partner" to Allah? Are these reports the words of God? Are they even the verbatim words of the prophet? The reason the umma is experiencing difficulties it turned from Allah to the prophet, from the Book of Allah to the books of traditions, to rituals. In brief, the umma became traditional. But Islam is not traditional, except in so far as it re-iterates the messages of the previous revelations, the Tawrat and the Injeel. The Book of Allah is revolutionary. It warns us not to follow traditions of the forefathers tainted by shirk. Not everyone listened. Accordingly, the umma is paying a price for its heedlessness. As a result of the turn from revelation to tradition, the umma is drifting. The transformation or re-invention of Islam as political Islam or Islamism was enabled by the conflation of terms that require being kept separate. There are no synonyms on Quranic Arabic. Words that were fused and confused encompass revelation and tradition, jihad in self-defense and aggressive jihad, sunna and hadith, wahy (inspiration) and tanzil (revelation), udwan (hostility) and qital (fighting) as well as nahy (discouragement) and tahrim (prohibition). The corruption of the knowledge of key words, enabled by the repression of reason, corrupted the knowledge of Islam. The intention was to make traditional" practices palatable and acceptable. The words whose meanings changed encompass: wahy, hikma, ibadat, salat, hawa, jihad, qalb, and mutashabihat.

Islam teaches that there is no compulsion in religion. But militant ulema assert us that persons that depart from Islam are to be killed. The ulema even empower individuals to carry out the punishment. They permit random individuals to act as judge, jury and executioner. This amounts to permitting, if not counselling, the believers to commit murder. Is this in accordance with the teaching of Islam? It is not. For Allah prohibited taking a person's life without just cause. Does apostasy amount to a just cause? If it does not, then killing an apostate is murder and the perpetrator must be punished accordingly. Where do the ulema find to audacity to legislate differently from what Allah prescribed? Are they suggesting they legislate better than Allah? For the Book of Allah does not prescribe the death penalty for leaving Islam. Apostasy is a sin, not a crime. What is taking place? Is there a politicisation of religion? Are we witnessing the emergence of fascism and despotism? Upon what grounds do the ulema endorse a tradition reported by transmitters who were not prophets and even embrace the tradition as replacing a ruling of Allah? Is this rational? Is it Islamic? The turn to faith (salat) has to be initiated from within rather than forced from without; if it is forced, it is spiritual rape. Forcing a person to enter or remain connected to faith results in hypocrisy. The Book of Allah teaches that "there is no compulsion in religion." However, extremists justified resorting to force by misinterpreting key passages of the Book of Allah. "Encouraging righteousness and discouraging wrong" is among them. (Quran, 3:110, 3:104 and 22:41) The "best community" encourages righteousness and discourages wrong. In different words, the best community is ethical and encourages people to be ethical. By comparison, we find no book on ethics in Bukhari. Why is that? Following the Book of Allah encourages us to practice justice. Where do we find a book on justice in Bukhari? Following Bukhari teaches us to practice ritual, formal compliance with faith. But ritual without sincerity is empty. The Book of Allah was sent as enlightenment for humanity. It is a book of guidance, that differentiates right from wrong, justice from injustice, and good from evil. However, people drifted from the Book of Allah to different books, the books of traditions. This produced profound effects. The problems of the umma stem from turning from the Book of Allah to the books of traditions. The turn from revelation to tradition was facilitated by the perception that the forefathers understood the Book of Allah better than subsequent generations. The turn from revelation to tradition, or the eclipse of revelation by tradition, was enabled by the belittling of reason and the veneration of the forefathers. The traditions of the forefathers replaced the Book of Allah as guidance. This trauma was enabled by the shutting of the mind, what Fazlur Rahman referred to it as "intellectual suicide." The shutdown of the mind resulted from the clashes between the rationalists and the traditionists about the right way to understand the Book of Allah. The traditionists wanted to follow the book of Allah by following their forefathers. The rationalists, by contrast, want to follow the Book of Allah without intermediaries. The backlash against reasoning is a result of problematic exegesis that warped the teaching of the Book of Allah by mixing it with manmade reports of traditions. Problematic scholarship repressed reason with the result that Muslim experience difficulties in understanding revelation. The state of the umma requires a re-assessment. It is necessary to make a fresh start. The denigration of science and reason left the Muslims behind different nations in the sciences and technology and made them vulnerable to conquest and subjugation. Recovery and renewal require the return to revelation, through the rehabilitation and re-engagement of reason.

In Muslim history there was a group of extremists known as the "assassins." They were addicts and would smoked hashish before embarking on a mission to assassinate a person. The chief of the assassins would determine who would be slated for an assassination mission. The assassins were zealots. They based their approach on fabricated reports about the prophet Muhammad, according to which he sent a death squad to kill a pregnant female poet in her sleep, because she wrote unflattering poetry about him. Death squads of this kind "work" to this day. Harbie was a member of the Warriors of the Mahdi. He was already among the most-wanted extremists. Mohamad Rejab was a YouTuber. He espoused traditional Islam. He wanted to restore the "unity of the umma." He had problems with reformers. He thought they wanted to "destroy Islam from within." He was particularly irate with people that questioned the sunna. He referred to them as "hadith rejectors." Rejab was unhappy with his followers. A few "expressed doubts" about religion. He shouted at them and referred to them as "weak." He was not an intellectual, although he tried to present himself as such. He denounced a fellow YouTuber in a video. A gang of thugs broke into the house of the person and terrorized his family. By breaking into the house, these persons violated the teaching of Islam. For chapter 49, the Inner Apartments, guides us to greet the dwellers of a house and ask for permission before entering anyone's dwelling. The thugs did not bother with that. In attacking the family, they committed several felonies. They perpetrated a public disturbance, damaged private property, broke into a house, illegally entered a private residence, and kidnapped the persons in the house. Thank God, no one was hurt. There was a case earlier that a person was treated as an enemy of Islam. A few thugs broke into his house and terrorized his family. Scotland Yard must catch the culprits and make them take responsibility for their actions. Rejab made a YouTube video and denouncing me as an apostate, too. According to traditional ulema, but not according to Allah, abandoning Islam is punishable by death. Rashad Khalifa was murdered after being declared an apostate by a group of 38 ulema. Harbie grew up in Pakistan. He went to a madrassa that taught the prophetic tradition but not revelation. He was taught that Muslim are to rule the world. Harbie was rabid. According to him, Islamic jihad is an all-out war; it begins with force and violence. It includes attacking the religious places of the kuffar. It also includes efforts to divide the kuffar, including ridiculing the kuffar traditions. It demands conversion, and ends with [the] killing of those kuffar that refuse to accept Muslim rule and pay jizya (exemption tax). After hearing Rejab expressing dissatisfaction about my activities on YouTube, Harbie resolved to earn his place in paradise with "taking care" of me. The "Warriors of the Mahdi" were present on Clubhouse. They had rooms bashing the Quran-centric groups. They made threats against all who disagreed with them, and attempted to have the Quran-centric clubs banned from Clubhouse. Recently we went on a vacation on Samui. I made my plans plain on Facebook. It appears Harbie followed me there. Harbie arrived the Relax Bungalows. "They plotted and planned, and Allah also plotted and planned. And Allah is the best of the planners." We were enjoying our stay in Samui, and I was getting work done. One night, however, I heard a rumbling noise. A stranger was attempting to enter the bungalow through the window. He had a firearm. I ran out of the bungalow. He chased me. I heard shots. A few bullets whizzed past me. Then there were more shots. But these sounded differently. I turned around and saw the assassin fall to the ground. Another person emerged behind him. "Oh no, there's another one." My heart sank...

Judgement in religion is the prerogative of Allah. To derive prohibitions from traditions is tantamount to treating the transmitters of traditions as "judges." Furthermore, treating tradition as a "judge" of revelation subordinates revelation to tradition. Those who judge by what Allah did not reveal are treated in the Book of Allah as kafirun (disbelievers), zalimun (wrongdoers) and fasiqun (rebels). The purpose of the sharia is to ensure equity. Just laws protect persons and the wellbeing of society. Unjust laws harm people and undermine the well-being of the community. The turn from revelation to tradition reoriented the umma from Allah to the prophet, from the Book of Allah to the books of traditions, and from ethics to aesthetics. The beauty of recitation is prioritized at the expense of the understanding of the meaning of revelation. The turn from revelation to tradition detached jurisprudence from its moorings in tauhid. The treatment of tradition as revelation produced troubling effects. It fused tradition with revelation. In a few cases, man-made rulings replaced revealed rulings. Tradition replaced revelation as preeminent root of the sharia. In a few instances, rulings from traditions replaced revealed rulings. Rulings in defiance of revelation from traditions were embedded in penal law. This transpired in cases of the punishments for apostasy, blasphemy, and adultery. Mandating capital punishment for these acts transgressed the limits (hudud) of Allah. The treatment of tradition as revelation "equal" to the Book of Allah spawned legislation based on tradition, parallel to legislation based on revelation. Thus, rulings of traditional jurisprudence based on the premise that tradition provides a foundation for legislation require being reviewed. In different words, traditional exegesis and jurisprudence require reconstruction, to bring them in line with revelation. This requires treating revelation as the exclusive foundation of legislation in the sharia. Refraining from the utilization of reason restricts the power of a person to act rationally. This takes him or her from the ranks of the mukallafuna, responsible persons in possession of their faculties. The failure to use reason renders traditional exegesis and jurisprudence unreliable. This requires attention. The treatment of the hadiths as revelation "equal" to the Book of Allah suggests two roots of the law. But Allah prohibited "adding" to revelation. The prophet also prohibited the recording of traditions. A few persons recorded the prophetic traditions regardless. These reports would be treated as a root of the law. Prohibiting the use of reason to understand the Book of Allah made access to revelation harder. The characterisation of the use of reason in the understanding of revelation as kufr discouraged the ulema from using reason. As a result, the religious sciences, particularly exegesis and jurisprudence, atrophied. This underlines the need to reconstruct religious thought.

To the extent that terrorist acts perpetrated by Muslims triggered the "war on terror," it could be reduced by a "war on error," in particular by a "war" on errors in traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. For these two pursuits were affected by militant renditions of the teaching of revelation. Traditional jurisprudence teaches that the believers are required wage war on non-Muslims every year, even when the non-Muslims in question are not waging war on Muslims, nor helping anyone else to do so. While a few ulema emphasized jihad as a struggle against the self, "other scholars, basing their conclusions on a different set of hadiths, proclaim that an offensive jihad (jihad al-talab) launched to extend the abode of Islam is valid on religious grounds and, moreover, that it is a collective responsibility (fard kifayah) devolving upon all Muslims. If it remains unfulfilled, all of them would be guilty of violating a divine injunction. Undertaking this religious obligation is mandated at least once every year and cannot be neglected, as its importance is equal to observing the obligatory prayers, the Ramadan fast, pilgrimage, and giving alms. This suggests that it is incumbent upon every adult male." (H. Mavani, "Tension between the Quran and the Hadith: The Case of Offensive Jihad," Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies, Autumn 2011 - Vol. IV - No. 4, p. 398). Jihad al-talab is endorsed in the Book of Jihad in Sahih Muslim: "Fight in the name of Allah and in the way of Allah...When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withhold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to (accept) Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them...If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the Jizya. If they agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek Allah's help and fight them." (sunnah.com/muslim/32). Spreading Islam by the sword was justified by recourse to the specious teaching of abrogation, according to which all verses that teach peace and reconciliation were abrogated by the verses of the sword, Quran, 9:5 and 9:29. Revelation permits and even requires war in self-defense. It does not, however, endorse jihad al-talab in any form. Notwithstanding the fact that jihad means chiefly the struggle for self-improvement: "the fuqaha not only successfully associated jihad with killing (qatl), they also invented an arsenal of arguments that justified armed expeditions, conquests, raids, incursions, and other military activities as essential forms of jihad. The main tool and principal method of achieving such a mischievous rendering of the term was naskh, abrogation. By using the concept of naskh, according to which Allah's earlier revelations were considered as superseded by later ones, they were able to argue...that later (human) traditions of the Prophet's companions overruled the authoritative verses of the Book and of the authentic sunna." (Muhammad Shahrur, "Interview with Muhammad Shahrur by Andreas Christmann (2007)," pp. 525 - 535, in The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason, Brill, 2009, p. 396). A better world requires better education. Better education requires a better methodology of Islam. This requires dispensing with unwarranted accretions and problematic assumptions that corrupted the exegesis, jurisprudence and the knowledge of Islam. We must restructure thought, as M, Iqbal argued in the "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam." Muhammad 'Abduh similarly referred to traditionalism as a "disease." (M. Abduh, Theology of Unity, 1966, p. 66). Renewal of Islam requires doing away with the teaching of abrogation, problematic assumptions, and the notion that the best way to understand revelation is without the use of reason, through tradit

Muslims rose to prominence by following revelation. They receded into obscurity by following tradition. For tradition is a reflection of revelation. Yet tradition has practically become a fetish. How did the reorientation from revelation to tradition take place? It appears that Muslims became captivated by tradition. At first, there was just the authority of revelation. With the establishment of religion, tradition began to compete with revelation for attention. First, tradition cast doubt on the ability of reason to "explain" revelation. To discredit reason further, tradition portrayed the use of reason in explaining revelation as a form of kufr. This was the beginning of the descent into anti-rationalism. To enhance its prestige further, tradition presented itself as "equal" to revelation. This took place in defiance of statements in revelation that Allah has no "equals." As a result of the incorporation of tradition in revelation, the meaning of "revelation" became broader. Revelation was no longer restricted to mean the word of God; it would also encompass reports by persons known as "transmitters." The elevation of tradition to revelation had profound effects on the Muslim civilization. For revelation found a "partner" in tradition. In the longer term, tradition did not merely "supplement" or "clarify" revelation. It went on to "judge," and even "abrogate" parts of revelation. Traditions - reports of persons - replaced the words of God. Hence, renewal requires rescuing the knowledge of revelation from corruption by unwarranted accretions and assumptions, as the perception that tradition is revelation. Knowledge of revelation also requires being rescued from unwarranted practices, as the teaching of abrogation. These tasks require the engagement and therefore the rehabilitation of reason. For as a result of the disparagement of reason, people were prodded to follow traditions even against reason. The rehabilitation of the knowledge of revelation requires the affirmation of the pre-eminence of revelation in relation to tradition. Tradition, for its part, requires being relegated to its role as the actualization of revelation in practice rather than its "equal," "judge" or "abrogator." As a result of the shutting of the gates to ijtihad, the reasoning ability of exegetes atrophied. They began to experience difficulties in comprehending revelation. In response, and in defiance of the teaching of revelation, they pronounced parts of revelation to be "unclear." For revelation presents itself as "clear." They thereby denied a part of what revelation teaches, that it is "a perspicuous book" (kitab al mubin). The rejection of reason necessitated recourse to an alternative way of "explaining" revelation. This alternative way was the engagement of tradition to "explain" revelation. This was rather strange, as tradition appears to require explanation, more than revelation. For there are multiple variants of traditions. The decision to turn to tradition rather than reason to explain revelation reflected the belief that tradition explains better than reason. That even understanding tradition requires the use of reason was disregarded. Exegetes were expected to refrain from using their reason. The recourse to tradition to "explain" revelation, however, required the elevation of tradition to revelation. For in verses 44, 45 and 47 of chapter 5 of the Quran, Allah has forbidden "judging" by anything that He did not reveal. The elevation of tradition to revelation had far reaching and not entirely welcome effects. It expanded the scope of revelation and in the process affected its teaching. Revelation encompassed six extra books, the traditions. Revelation would be "supplemented" and "explained" by tradition. It was declared that "tradition judges revelation" and that "revelation needs tradition more than tradition needs revelation." This reversed the relationship between revelation and tradition.

Islam is a monotheistic religion, part of the Abrahamic faiths. However, its teaching was altered by militant exegesis. With the replacement of the peace verses by the verse of the sword by militant exegetes, the religion of reconciliation, as Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, the chief of the defunct ISIS put it, became a "religion of war." How could this happen? Traditional Islam is defined by "tradition." Tradition is defined by the ulema, at times acting under political pressure. Believers are expected by traditionists to perceive revelation through tradition. We are expected to follow the ways of the forefathers. But did the forefathers always follow the Book of Allah faithfully? Or did they depart from it from time to time? Does tradition always faithfully reflect and follow revelation? Moreover, the Book of Allah advises against following the forefathers. They might not have gotten everything right. They may have gotten a few things wrong. If we follow their errors, we could also fall into error. Who guides better than Allah? Traditional Islam encompasses revelation, the prophetic traditions and the work of the ulema. A few acknowledge a role for reason. It is wise to differentiate between the four, traditionally the four chief "roots" of the sharia, as failing to differentiate them could result in "conflating" them. Establishing and retaining key differences is an integral part of reliable analysis. However, there are irregularities in the traditional paradigm of analysis. For the traditional exegesis produced a flawed rendition of Islam. The treatment of tradition as revelation, for example, is problematic. Chief aberrations encompass the disparagement of reason, the treatment of tradition as revelation, the subordination of revelation to tradition and the teaching of abrogation. The disparagement of reason encouraged refraining from using reason. This transpired the Book of Allah endorsing the use of reason, notwithstanding. Refraining from the use of reason reduced the knowledge of revelation. The misunderstanding of revelation rendered revelation harder to follow. In desperation, Muslims turned from revelation - which they could not understand due to the prohibition of the use of reason - to tradition, in the expectation of finding better guidance therein. The treatment of tradition as revelation triggered a re-orientation from revelation and its partial replacement by tradition. Recourse to abrogation enabled re-inventing Islam - the religion of reconciliation par excellence - as a religion of war. Achieving renewal entails recovering and practicing the true teaching of Islam. To recover the true teaching of Islam requires the rehabilitation and re-engagement of reason, affirming the preeminence of revelation in relation to tradition, a desacralisation of tradition, and a rejection of the teaching of abrogation. Muslims face a plethora of problems. Prominent is a deficit in the knowledge of religion. The ability to interact with the community, whether at the regional or global level is also among them. At the core of these problems is the corruption of knowledge. For knowledge was tainted by flawed exegesis, traditional as well as Islamist. Muslims are experiencing difficulties in relating to non-Muslims as well as to each other because the knowledge of their religion is eluding them. It is eluding them because, as taught by tradition, they refrain from recourse to reason to understand religion. Rather than use reason to understand and follow revelation, they were persuaded by traditional ulema to follow traditions, uttered and transmitted by persons, rather than the Book of Allah. Traditionists justify the turn from revelation to tradition by presenting what is essentially hearsay as "revelation." These traditions are presented to us as "supplementary and explanatory revelation," as if Allah did not explain with sufficient clarity.

Muslims are experiencing problems due to a misunderstanding of Islam. The misunderstanding of revelation resulted from the repression of reason by Muslim tradition. Reason is gift from Allah. To reject the blessing of reason betrays ungratefulness, which is among the meanings of kufr. Reason is disparaged by persons that feel threatened by it. The fear of reason precipitated the extermination of 5,000 rationalists by Musa al-Hadi during the mihna or Inquisition of 786. The killing of the philosophers confirms that "orthodoxy" was established by force rather than arguments. The persons that perpetrated this atrocity were not well versed in argumentation. Thus, they resorted to violence to force their perceptions on the umma through coercion, prohibited by revelation. The misunderstanding of revelation encouraged extremists to follow their passions. The misunderstanding was the result of traditional exegesis, which requires understanding revelation through the prism of tradition. Traditional exegesis treats traditions as a furqan of revelation. This is reflected in the perceptions that tradition "judges" revelation, and that revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation. By treating tradition rather than revelation as the furqan, traditional exegesis defied tauhid. Treating tradition as a "judge" of revelation is tantamount to scriptural shirk. The traditional approach entails the repression of reason. But the refusal to use reasoning to understand revelation made it harder to understand revelation. It rendered traditional exegesis unreasonable and unreliable. The assumptions that render the traditional exegesis unreliable comprise the perception that reason is the enemy of revelation, that reason is subordinate to tradition, and that tradition may "judge," "abrogate," and "replace" parts of revelation. The repression of reason enabled the emergence of perceptions that defy revelation, the perceptions that revelation is "unclear," "incomplete," and "incoherent." Problematic assumptions encompass the perception that tradition is "equal" to revelation and that tradition is a root of the sharia. These perceptions generated unwelcome effects. The allegation that tradition is equal to revelation embedded scriptural shirk in exegesis. The perception that tradition may "abrogate" and replace the rulings of revelation by rulings from tradition embedded juristic shirk in traditional jurisprudence.The embedding of scriptural and juristic shirk into the fabric of the religious knowledge corrupted knowledge and a warped the penal code. The death penalties for blasphemy, apostasy and adultery, were incorporated into Islamic law without endorsement in revelation. These punishments embedded extremism into the law. The punishments were drawn from tradition rather than revelation. They result in injustice and impart to Islam a reputation for cruelty. The shirk at the foundation of the exegesis of revelation renders the knowledge brought by traditional exegesis and jurisprudence unreliable. Thus, requires reconstruction and rehabilitation. The reconstruction of religious knowledge requires a return to reason and the affirmation of the preeminence of revelation in relation to all tradition. Reconstruction also requires the affirmation of revelation as the foundation of all legislation in religion. It requires a return to a rational methodology of understanding revelation.

Muslims are taught by tradition to refrain from using reason in religion. The use of reason is associated with the expression of "capricious opinion." The bias against reason is also based on the perception that the use of reason in Islam is kufr. This is known as al-fiqr kufr. Refraining from reasoning, however, makes it harder to understand and therefore follow revelation. Belittling reasoning defies the teaching of revelation, too. Moreover, the failure to think of the effects of our actions may result in extremism. Extremists are unreasonable. Refraining from the use of reason makes it difficult to understand revelation, or anything else for that matter. From a sharia perspective, refraining from the use of reason takes us from the ranks of the mukallafun, or accountable persons. Is the work of the ulema that refrain from reasoning reliable? Muslims reminisce about the achievements of the past. Much research emphasizes past successes, "what Muslims had first." Few ask what went wrong, preferring to entrust the responsibility for this research to non-Muslims. But non-Muslims are not necessarily unbiased. Due to the insufficient use of reason on the relationship between reason and revelation, Muslims embraced the perception that there is an adversarial rather than a symbiotic relationship between reason and revelation. The rejection of reason enabled the emergence of traditional Islam, the acceptance of the teaching of abrogation, and the belief in predestination. The belief in predestination rests on the rejection of causation. The aversion to reasoning resulted in aberrations in exegesis and jurisprudence. Thus, traditional exegesis and jurisprudence require re-construction, this time on firm foundations. This requires the rehabilitation and re-engagement of reason, the restoration of revelation to its preeminence in relation to tradition, rejection of problematic presuppositions regarding revelation, and dispensing with the teachings of abrogation, fatalism and aggressive jihad. Taqlid resulted from the shutting of the gates to reasoning or ijtihad. Anti-rationalism produced two strands of Islam: traditional and political Islam. Both stem from the rejection of reason, the unquestioning following of tradition and the engagement of the teaching of abrogation. Traditional Islam was evolved to keep the peace by sedating the believers with the teaching of predestination. Political Islam was engineered to provide religious justification for waging wars of aggression in the garb of spreading Islam by the sword. The rejection of reason resulted in a corruption of the method of interpreting revelation. The religious sciences, including exegesis and jurisprudence, became irrational. For that reason they could not generate reliable results. The emergence of traditional Islam was enabled by the eclipse of revelation by tradition. The emergence of political Islam was enabled by the abrogation of the peace verses by the verse of the sword. The transformation of Islam into its traditional and political variants was enabled by recourse to the teaching of abrogation. It was also buttressed by the perception, alien to revelation, that the world is separated into two areas, the realm of peace (dar al-Islam) and the realm of war (dar al-harb). It is necessary to rehabilitate and reconstruct knowledge, which was tarnished by the rejection of reason, and ensure that all religious sciences rest on reliable foundations.

The umma is experiencing trauma because it turned from revelation to tradition. This showed a deficit of trust in revelation and and too much trust in tradition. But Allah says He loves those who put their trust in Him. To turn from revelation to tradition is to trade revealed knowledge for reports of mere persons. Allah said He does not change the condition of people until they first change what is in themselves (13: 11). The turn from revelation to tradition was triggered by an enchantment with tradition. The turn was assisted by the repression of reason. The turn was justified by the assertion that tradition, too, is revelation. However, the sharia is drawn from traditions, too. Accordingly, jurists do not treat tradition merely as wahy. They also treat tradition as tanzil, what Allah "sent down." But those who do not judge by what Allah "sent down" are identified as unbelievers, rebels, and wrongdoers (5: 44-45, 47). The prophet prohibited recording his sayings. But hawkish rulers, in defiance of the prophet's prohibition, asked different ulama to record the traditions. The effects were troubling. The Mongols erased the Abbasids when the Abbasid rulers acted according to the tradition which asserts that "the blood of the kafir is halal for the believers." Based on this tradition, the Abbasids murdered a group of Mongol traders, as well as the ambassadors sent by Genghis Khan to ask for justice. Abandoning the Book of Allah resulted in the deaths of a million persons in the reprisals that followed. Anti-rationalism resulted in the deaths of five thousand philosophers murdered by Musa al-Hadi in 786, during the mihna or inquisition. This was a "reign of terror," a persecution of philosophers by the followers of traditions. Anti-rationalism plunged Muslims into stupefaction and stagnation. Due to the resulting backwardness, anti-rationalism also rendered the umma vulnerable to external assaults. Reason was subordinated to tradition. Even revelation was subordinated to tradition. The relationship between revelation and tradition in Islam requires attention. For tradition eclipsed revelation. This was an aberration. Traditional jurisprudence teaches that revelation is the first root of legislation, followed by tradition. Yet in exegesis, the relationship between revelation and tradition is reversed. Tradition is placed above revelation. This reversal is expressed in the perceptions that "tradition judges revelation" and that "revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation." These are troubling pronouncements. For they treat the rulings of persons as more authoritative than the rulings of God. They reflect scriptural shirk. The reversal of the relationship between revelation and tradition encroaches on the pre-eminence of revelation. It represents a breakdown of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. Tradition went from being mere reports from the past to being treated as "revelation," a "judge" of the Book of Allah, "abrogating" and even "replacing" parts of the Book. The gradual elevation of tradition to being more authoritative than revelation is an expression of "creeping shirk." The result is a sharia where reports of persons in a few cases replace revealed rulings. This transpired with the punishments for adultery, apostasy and blasphemy. These punishments do not merely defy the Book of Allah; they result in miscarriages of justice, and attribute an unjustified aura of harshness to the sharia and Muslims generally. Hence, the relationship between revelation and tradition requires being reset. Tradition must be subordinated to revelation. The teaching of abrogation was used to transform the religion of reconciliation into an agenda of territorial expansion and global conquest. Shirk tainted exegesis as well as jurisprudence. The politicisation of research reduced it to the rank of political propaganda. These aberrations require attention

The allegation of an irreconcilable tension between reason and revelation sets up a mutually exclusive relationship between reason and revelation, utterly alien to revelation. According to this perception, a person cannot be a thinker and a person of faith. We have to choose between the two. This "choice" requires a person to sacrifice his or her intellect if he or she were to be a person of faith. This "choice" forces us to choose between thinking and being faithful. This false dichotomy was propagated by luminaries such as al-Ghazali. He rejected reason as a faculty for the attainment of the knowledge of revelation. He experienced a breakdown of reason. The Muslims umma that followed in his footsteps also rejected reason and experienced an atrophy of reason. This cerebral dysfunctionality was depicted as a "crisis in the Muslims mind" by AbdulHamid AbuSulayman. It was referred to as "intellectual suicide" by Fazlur Rahman. The breakdown of reason triggered a range of troubling effects. These encompass a paralysis of the Muslims mind, prohibition of reasoning, misunderstanding of revelation, rise of militant misinterpretations of revelation, a reorientation from revelation to tradition, a corruption of exegesis, jurisprudence and law, transformation of Islam as a way of reconciliation into a religion of war, rejection of causation, retardation of the arts and sciences, teaching of predestination, recourse to abrogation, turn to aggressive jihad, and wars of aggression that ensured the defeat of the Muslims. Rather than relying on reason, traditionists embraced the traditions of the predecessors, who teach that reason is unsuitable for attaining knowledge of religion. The rejection of reason paved the way anti-rationalism if not fanaticism. It also resulted in a misunderstanding of revelation and misguidance. For no reliable exegesis is possible without the engagement of reason. The rejection of reason is a result of corrupt reasoning, and the failure to realize that reason and revelation are in agreement, as long as reason is used responsibly. Reason was repressed in different ways. It was alleged that the use of reason to understand revelation was kufr or unbelief. It was also alleged that reasoning is subordinate to tradition. This was problematic, in so far as reason was used to construct the method of the authentication and evaluation of traditions in the first place. The association of reasoning in matters of religion as kufr was tantamount to asking Muslims to refrain from reasoning in religion. This amounts to asking us to abandon our reason, in effect to become persons bereft of rationality, fit for confinement in an asylum for the insane. In fact, in so far as the larger part of the corpus of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence rests on the assumption that it is better not to use reason in matters of religion, we could conclude that this body of knowledge was produced by persons without recourse to reason. A cynical person could be tempted to remark that the results speak for themselves. For traditional exegesis and jurisprudence are riddled with incoherence and contradictions that reveal a breakdown of reason and the ability to generate rational inferences. An example or two would suffice at present. It was highlighted by traditional ulema themselves that traditional ulema fell intro inconsistency when they maintained that tradition is both subordinate and equal to revelation. For in exegesis tradition is treated as a "judge" of revelation while in jurisprudence it is treated as second to revelation as a root of the law. A further example of problems in traditional jurisprudence are encountered in prescribing capital punishments for acts for which revelation refrains from prescribing the death penalty. These include the punishments for apostasy, blasphemy and adultery. This is a result of a careless reading of revelation by persons reluctant to use reason.

"Risk is the possibility of an adverse or disastrous outcome of a given action. Risk arises out of the fact that our knowledge, in particular our knowledge of the future, is limited. While the past may be relatively well known, future is unknown. It is tempting to predict the future on the basis of the past, according to the dictum, "history repeats itself." However, no single model takes into account all variables that may influence the outcome of a given act. The existence of risk implies a limit on our ability the control our fate. Some contingencies may be unforeseen. While science attempts to control the environment, inclusive of future events, history has shown repeatedly that human control is always incomplete. Complete control rests only with God. Risks arise in all walks of life. A person driving through a red light takes a risk of getting involved in an accident. A smoker takes the risk of developing cancer. A gambler takes the risk of losing money. There is a risk of fire, or the risk of becoming a victim of crime. There is a risk of being kidnapped, being mistaken for someone else, or the risk of becoming an innocent victim. There is also the risk of physical or psychological injury, illness or an outbreak of epidemic, on a local or a global scale. Natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes or tsunamis also present risks. There is also a risk of war, civil war, or even a world war. There is a risk of political instability (rioting or a coup d'état). There is a risk of property loss or damage, or a risk of disgrace (damage to one's reputation). Everything from wearing protective clothing, starting a retirement fund, to spending on defence is a different way of shielding oneself or one's community from risk and the fundamental insecurity that characterises all human existence. Risks can be divided into avoidable and unavoidable. Avoidable risks, such as the risk of loss arising from gambling (qimar), are self-imposed. In order to avoid such risks one merely needs to abstain from the activities that give rise to them. Other risks, such as the risk of losses in business, may be unavoidable. In principle, unavoidable risks are permitted, but avoidable are not. Hence, risk taking is permitted in business but not in gambling. The fact that risk in business is unavoidable makes it fundamentally different from risks such as arise in gambling. In gambling, one party can win only if another loses. Gambling is thus a "win-lose" or "zero sum game." By contrast, partners in business gain or suffer a loss together. In finance, risks arise in both investment as well as in lending. The main risk in investment is the risk of losses. The main risk in lending is the risk that borrowers may fail to repay their loans to creditors. This risk is known as credit risk, also known as the risk of default or more simply as counterparty risk. A common method of protecting against credit risk is simply to withhold lending from all borrowers unable to post acceptable collateral. At the company level another method is for lenders to purchase credit derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS), effectively a form of insurance on debt. Another risk that arises in lending is interest risk. This is the risk that interest rates may change in an unfavourable direction. A common method of protection against interest risk is to enter into interest rate swap (IRS) contracts. Liquidity risk arises in both lending and investment. This risk arises from the fact that it may become difficult if not impossible to liquidate securities, whether stocks or bonds, at a time of crisis. Liquidity crises commonly take place when investors wish to liquidate their assets at the same time. Selling pressure drives prices down and makes it impossible to liquidate securities at any but rock bottom prices. This is essentially what transpired during the recent 2008 global financial crisis.

Reason acquired a bad reputation in Islam. This was the result of a tradition which treats refraining from the use of reason in religion as a manifestation of piety. According to this "reasoning," Muslims are expected to refrain from using their reason in matters of religion. Exegetes were expected to suppress their reason on the basis of a hadith according to which the prophet forbade the use of 'reason-based tafsir' as disbelief (kufr). The disparagement of reason has a troubling past in Islam. It was propagated by the Sufis, who perceived people of reason as their enemies and the enemies of Islam. They alleged that there is a "tension" between reason and revelation. The perception that equated reasoning with disbelief goes a long way towards explaining not just the proliferation of violence but the fall of the Islam itself. For a civilization that does not value reason is doomed. It by using reason that we attain knowledge of revelation and receive guidance from it. To this day we hear religious teachers advising their protégés against the perils of reasoning.The rejection of the relationship between causes and effects did a great disservice to Islam. For rejecting the relationship between cause and effect entails a rejection of a significant part of the teaching of revelation. Islam teaches that there is a relationship between the way we act and what we gain from it. If we believe and perform praiseworthy acts, we go to paradise. If we disbelieve and do evil, we go to the fire. Evidence of flawed reasoning is also found in the teaching of the purposes of the sharia. This teaching, attributed to al-Shatibi, fails to highlight justice as a purpose of the sharia. How to explain this glaring omission? For in the Quran, justice is next to piety. In their backlash against the rationalists, who advocated both reason and justice, the traditionists disregarded justice. More evidence of poor reasoning may be found in the elevation of tradition to revelation, the assertion that tradition judges revelation, and the belief in the theory of abrogation. The rejection of reasoning had catastrophic consequences for the Muslim civilization. It facilitated the incorporation of a range of unwarranted assumptions within exegesis and jurisprudence, including the perceptions that revelation is "ambiguous," "deficient," that tradition is revelation, and that revelation is better explained by tradition than reason. Little attention was paid to the fact that the explanation of revelation by tradition also requires the use of reason. Another troubling practice was the subordination of reason to tradition, which was reflected in the belief that tradition had to be followed even against reason. The subordination of revelation to tradition was expressed in the perception that "tradition judges revelation" and that "revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation." Are these statements in agreement with the teaching of tauhid? The subjugation of reason and revelation to tradition tainted the knowledge of Islam. Folklore was engaged to "explain" revelation. What is more, it was expected to do so without the use of reason. This produced a paralysis in the Muslim mind. Contradictory beliefs became embedded in exegesis as well as in jurisprudence. An example is the perception that traditions are "equal" to and subordinate to revelation, simultaneously. Another example is the replacement of parts of revelation by traditions, which resulted from the utilization of the teaching of the abrogation of revelation by tradition. The theory of abrogation enabled extensive tampering with the knowledge of revelation, to the point that it distorted and corrupted its teaching. The alleged abrogation of the peace verses by the ayah as-sayf, taken out of context, transformed the teaching of peace into a political agenda known as Islamism. It transformed Islam as the religion of peace into Islamism as an ideology of war and conquest.

The renewal of Islamic civilisation requires the rehabilitation of knowledge. For the Muslim way of life is based on the knowledge of the Muslim way of life. If that knowledge is corrupted, the way of life based on that knowledge will also be tainted. Faced with the necessity to acquire present-day knowledge, Muslims recommend the Islamization of knowledge. However, what is required is the rehabilitation rather than the Islamization of knowledge. Islam was revealed to be adopted by people. An abstract formula cannot become a Muslim. Recourse to the teaching of abrogation resulted in a corruption of the knowledge of revelation. Hence, the theory of abrogation requires rethinking. The theory of abrogation is controversial, and with reason. For the application of this theory has enabled tampering with the teaching of revelation. There is a tendency to assert that the former revelations were corrupted, and that Islam escaped the bane of corruption. What is missed is that even if the text of revelation remains unchanged, its knowledge may still be corrupted. This is what appears to have transpired, when a few verses of the Quran were pronounced "abrogated." To declare a verse of revelation to be abrogated is to ask believers to reject a part of revelation, to ask believers to disbelieve in parts of revelation. Is a request of this kind in keeping with the teaching of revelation? Many jurists rejected abrogation. These encompass Fazlur Rahman, Muhammad Asad, Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Muhammad Ghazali. Abu Muslim al Isfahani also rejected the theory of abrogation. The theory of abrogation was adopted to enable an articulation of Islam to justify expeditions to enlarge the "realm of peace" at the expense of the "realm of war," an early variant of the "clash of civilizations" thesis. The concept of abrogation was adopted to re-interpret Islam in a manner that would justify building an empire. The teaching of abrogation achieved a political purpose: it facilitated the emergence of "political Islam." Unfortunately, the application of abrogation tainted the knowledge of revelation. This had adverse effects on the Muslim empire. That exegetes agreed to the utilisation of the theory of abrogation in the first place, to put themselves at the service of a political agenda, is regrettable. It reveals the plateau which exegesis reached by allowing itself to be used for political ends. It betrays its endorsement of the political authorities of the day. The theory of abrogation became entrenched after rule of the Mu'tazilites (813 to 849). With the emergence of the prophetic traditions, Islam became "traditional," based on tradition and revelation. The abrogation of the peace verses by the ayah as-sayf transformed the knowledge of revelation. It transformed the religion of peace into a rationale for empire-building in the "clash" between the "the realm of peace" at the expense of the "realm of war," a process fuelled by political aspiration. The effects of the alteration of the knowledge of revelation are apparent in penal law, where penalties from traditions replaced those prescribed by revelation. The penalties in the traditions flouted the penalties prescribed by revelation. The words of persons "abrogated" the rulings of God. The application of abrogation by tradition flouted of a fundamental rule of jurisprudence, which is that revelation is the chief authority that may not be abrogated by an alternative authority. The renewal of Islam requires the rehabilitation of knowledge, in particular, the knowledge of revelation. Hence, what is required is a rehabilitation rather than the Islamization of knowledge. This requires the engagement of reason. For revelation was "eclipsed" by tradition, facilitated by the teaching of abrogation. Exegesis requires freeing from unwarranted accretions and problematic procedures. The rehabilitation of exegesis, however, requires the utilisation and therefore the rehabilitation of reason.

Islamic finance replicates usury by structuring sukuk to replicate interest-bearing bonds. To regain authenticity, Islamic finance must discard "profit" and capital guarantees. For these guarantees in effect transform profit into usury. It gets worse. For replication of interest-based financing also replicates problems traceable to usury: rising disparities in wealth, escalating prices, falling employment and stagnating growth. Governments need to resist pressure from the financial sector to affect public policies. The law should enable businesses to make sales on an instalment basis without forcing people to engage expensive lenders that increase costs without adding value. Developers should be allowed end encouraged to sell property on an instalment basis at zero interest, the way IKEA and Apple corporation already do. The reduction in prices resulting from the abolition of interest will spur demand, increase sales, and clear the backlog of unsold properties in the real estate sector. Higher sales will also enhance government tax revenues. There is no justification for the perpetuation of exploitative financing entailed by interest-based lending. When Islamic finance was reinvented in the 1990s, expectations were high. It was hoped that Islamic finance would provide a better alternative to the conventional system, based on usury and characterised by roller-coaster cycles of boom and bust. Islamic finance would avoid the pitfalls of conventional finance, among them the rise of large and growing levels of debt - public and private. Yet what actually transpired differed from what was expected. A few enterprises - such as Dubai World - ended up with unexpected levels of debt, as well as a glut of infrastructure (residential and commercial property) for which there appeared to be insufficient demand. The surplus of property was proving difficult to sell and rent as the financial crisis of 2008 went into full swing. A few sukuk defaulted. A few - as those issued by Dubai World - nearly defaulted. Since the defaults and the near defaults, it has become evident that sukuk defaulted not just because of reduced profits due to the financial crisis. The sukuk also defaulted or almost defaulted because were designed to replicate bonds, which exposed them to the risk of default.

"The umma is experiencing difficulties because it marginalised the Book of Allah. The umma drifted from revelation because it refrained from using reason, the God-given faculty that enables the acquisition of knowledge, including knowledge of revelation. This transpired under the influence of ulema that had little regard for reason. The umma retreated from reason under pressure from tradition. There was a power struggle between the traditionists and the rationalists regarding the right way to follow revelation. Traditionists argued that the right way to follow revelation was to follow the ways of the forefathers. Rationalists, by contrast, argued that the right way to comprehend revelation was to use reason. Traditionists did not agree. As they could not defeat the rationalists intellectually, for they were not well versed in reasoning, they resorted to violence. They exterminated five-thousand rationalists in 786, during the reign of Musa al-Hadi, in a pogrom reminiscent of the Reign of Terror, that transpired in 1792, a millennium afterwards in revolutionary France. It appears that "orthodoxy" was established by force not just in revolutionary France. Sixteen thousand adherents of tradition were put to death at the time of the rule of Maximilien Robespierre and the Jacobins. However, in Islam, it was the rationalists that were persecuted by the traditionists. In a seismic paradigm shift, the umma turned from revelation to tradition, to follow the forefathers, as recorded in the books of traditions. "In the eyes of our honourable scholars there is no question that God appointed them not only as the guardians of His religion but also as the intermediaries between Him and the people, as the translators of His orders and prohibitions, and as the commentators of His verses and rules." (Shahrur, 2009:390). There was a re-orientation from the Book of Allah to the books of tradition, from revelation to the ways of the forefathers. Traditional Islam - based upon traditions - altered the meaning of key words. For example, the word hikma in the Book of Allah, which means wisdom, was rendered as the way of the prophet. This rendering of the term hikma amounted to tampering with the meaning of the term. It reflects an anti-intellectual bias, designed to reinforce taqlid, or the unquestioning following of tradition. The bias against reason was reinforced by al-Ghazali, who recommended that thinkers be put to death. By reorienting the Muslims from the Book of Allah to the books of traditions, the misrendering of the term hikma enticed Muslims away from the path of righteousness to the ways of the predecessors. Traditional ulema assert that there is no morality without revelation. This would mean that all persons that did not receive revelation are not in a position to be ethical. Persons that assert that there is no morality without revelation are unaware that it is reason that enables us to anticipate the effects of different acts. Thus, to reject causality is not just to reject ethics not grounded in revelation; it is also to reject ethics derived from revelation. It is not surprising that Bukhari features no books on justice, freedom and reason. The disregard of causality was instrumental in paving the way for a range of catastrophes, for example the Abbasids' killing of Mongol traders. "The immediate cause of the Mongol invasion can be attributed to a grievous mistake of 'Alauddin Muhammad, the Shah of Khwarism. A body of traders who had arrived from Mongolia was put to death, and when Chengiz Khan deputed an embassy to enquire into the reasons for it, Muhammad replied by killing the envoy too. On receiving the news of this outrage upon international courtesy, the Mongol Khakan Chengiz Khan let loose the whirlwind of savagery upon the world of Islam." (Nadwi, 2006:49, 61-73). Muslims rulers could not foresee the effects of their crimes because they followed neither revelation nor used their reason..

Islam practiced today differs from the way of the prophet, for he followed what was revealed to him, the Book of Allah. The prophet did not follow what God did not reveal, the books of traditions. Allah says in verses 44, 45 and 47 of chapter five of the Mushaf that whoever "judges by what Allah did not reveal" are kafirun (unbelievers), zalimun (wrongdoers) and fasiqun (rebels). The prophet did not follow books of traditions. Persons that follow traditions follow what the prophet did not follow, did not authorise and did not know of. The sunna of the prophet was to follow revelation. Persons that follow traditions follow worldly reports transmitted by persons that were not prophets. Are traditions better guidance than the Book of Allah? The umma fell because it abandoned the Book of Allah to follow traditions transmitted by persons that were not prophets. Following books of traditions amounts to a defiance of the prohibition by Allah and His messenger of "adding" to revelation. Treating tradition as revelation amounts to a "fabrication" of revelation. Persons that recorded traditions defied Allah and the messenger. Disobeying Allah and the messenger is prohibited in the Quran. The Book of Allah commands us to "obey Allah and the messenger." For the umma to rise up it must return to the Book of Allah and refrain from treating traditions as revelation. To do so is a travesty. Books of traditions could be used to study the past, as wisdom, but never as revelation or a root of the law. Following tradition at best could be treated as recommended, but not binding. Legislation is the prerogative of Allah alone. Four errors accelerated the drift from the Book of Allah. The first error was the repression of reason, by association of its use in the comprehension of revelation with kufr or unbelief. This had the effect of discouraging Muslims from using their minds. Because they were advised against using their reason to understand revelation, Muslims became confused and could no longer understand revelation, which presents itself as "easy to understand and remember." Traditionists, however, made the Mushaf difficult to understand, not just by alleging that we should not use our minds to understand the Quran. They also asserted, in defiance of the teaching of revelation, that the Mushaf is "unclear," "incomplete" and "incoherent" or "contradictory." Hence, Muslims became intellectually paralysed. Muslims could no longer follow the Book of Allah because they were prohibited from using their minds. In desperation, they turned to their forefathers, despite the warning in revelation against following the ways of the forefathers. Turning to traditions of the forefathers, recorded in the books of traditions, was the second error. The error was amplified by treating traditions as "revelation." Treating traditions as revelation amounted to ascribing "partners" to the Book of Allah. Is it possible to ascribe "partners" to the Book of Allah without also ascribing partners to Allah? The third error was the subordination of revelation to tradition. This took place in three ways. It was asserted that tradition would "judge," "abrogate," and "replace" parts of revelation. The death penalties for adultery, apostasy and blasphemy are examples of revealed rulings being replaced by rulings derived from worldly traditions. This was tantamount to placing the authority of persons above the authority of Allah. Is it possible to place a human being above Allah without falling into shirk? The final error was to replace the religion of peace, taught by the Book of Allah, with a religion of war, taught by hawkish ulema. The wars of aggression embarked upon on the basis of the teaching of the abrogation of the peace verses by the verse of the sword provoked retaliation and the fall of all Muslim empires. Renewal requires rejecting Islamism and returning to the teaching in the Book of Allah.

Fazlur Rahman referred to what he perceived was the "intellectual suicide" of traditional ulema. Jurists refer to a responsible, sane person as a mukallaf. A person not in his or her right mind is not equipped to pronounce authoritatively on issues relating to religion. Pronouncing on matters relating to Islam requires a person to be a mukallaf, to be in his or her right mind. Being in one's right mind requires the ability and willingness to use of reason. The jurist that refrains from the use of God-given reason is not just ungrateful; he or she fails the test of a responsible or rational person, a mukallaf. The person that refrains from using reason is irrational. An irrational person is technically insane. A mukallaf, however, must be a "sane" person. By refraining from using reason, traditional exegetes and jurists withdrew from the ranks of the mukallafuna. Thereby they barred themselves from commenting with authority on matters of religion. By refraining from the use of reason, they forfeited their right to be treated as mukallafuna (plural of mukallaf). As a result, their right to pronounce with authority on Islam, in particular on exegesis and jurisprudence, is rendered problematic. The fact that traditional exegesis and jurisprudence are based on the rejection of reason renders the pronouncements of traditionists unreliable. The Muslim umma waned because it turned from revelation to tradition. This transpired under the sway of persons with an aversion to reason. The reluctance to use reason prevented Muslims from understanding and therefore following revelation. For following the guidance of Allah requires attaining knowledge of the Book of Allah. And accessing knowledge of revelation requires the use of reason. By prohibiting the use of reason in religion, traditionists do not just prevent themselves from understanding religion; they also prevent the pious from understanding and therefore following the Book of Allah. They hinder the pious from fi sabilillah: "The Qur'an was neglected almost entirely." [1] "From the time the Muslim community abandoned the Qur'an and was overcome by confusion and error, its unity was lost." [2] "The Muslim Ummah experienced these disasters because it had become alienated from the eternal truths of Islam." [3] As a different writer put it: "the one and only reason for the social and cultural decay of the Muslims consisted in the fact that they had gradually ceased to follow the teachings of Islam." [4] [1] Taha Jabir Alwani, Islamic Thought: an Approach to Reform, IIIT, 2006, p. 36, accessed on 12 May 2021: https: //www.academia.edu/43889716/Islamic_Thought_An_Approach_to_Reform_?email_work_card=title[2] Taha Jabir Alalwani, Apostasy in Islam: A Historical and Scriptural Analysis, Original Edition Translated from Arabic by Nancy Roberts Abridged by Alison Lake, The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2011, p. 18.https: //www.academia.edu/43889653/Apostasy_in_Islam_A_Historical_and_Scriptural_Analysis.[3] Taha Jabir al-Alwani, "Taqlid and Ijtihad (Part One)," in Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought, pp. 82-96, Compiled from the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, IIIT, 2005, p. 82, accessed on 17 Sep. 2020: https: //iiit.org/wp-content/uploads/IssuesinContemporarIslamicThought_Combined.pdf [4] Muhammad Asad, Islam at the Crossroads, Kazi Publications Inc, 1995 p. xvii.

"Methodology" in research is the experience of uncovering knowledge. Knowledge is the awareness of truth. Ignorance is the reverse of knowledge. Reliable methodology enables us to proceed from darkness to enlightenment. Methodology enables understanding. It requires relating the factors of knowledge in Islam: revelation, tradition, the ulema and reason. It also requires defining the purposes of exegesis and jurisprudence, two of the religious sciences in Islam. Exegesis endeavours to understand text; jurisprudence deduces the rulings (laws) from the knowledge of revelation. Thus, jurisprudence presupposes exegesis. If the exegesis is flawed, jurisprudence will also be flawed. This does not guarantee, however, that if any exegesis is reliable, the results of jurisprudence will also be reliable. For errors may take place even in jurisprudence deduced from flawless exegesis. Both exegesis and jurisprudence require the engagement of reason. Without reason, no exegesis or jurisprudence is possible. Among of the errors of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence is that these disciplines were evolved with a reduced use of reason. This was based on: "the hadith that reportedly goes to the prophet, according to which he forbade the use of 'reason-based tafsir' as a form of disbelief (kufr)." The rejection of reason proved disastrous. For it rendered exegetes and jurists that refrained from the use of reason handicapped. Reliable methods of exegesis and jurisprudence are derived from revelation, knowledge from the Most High. The assumptions of a reliable methodology must agree with the teaching of revelation. Problems in methodology resulted in a corruption of the knowledge of revelation. The corruption resulted from the repression of reason. The repression of reason resulted in a reinterpretation of the knowledge of revelation. The corruption of knowledge ensured the fall of the umma. The religion of peace was reinvented as a blueprint for waging wars of aggression and territorial expansion, through recourse to the teaching of abrogation. The teaching of abrogation enabled unscrupulous ulema to tamper with the teaching of revelation. By designating jihad al-talab as a religious requirement, the sixth pillar of Islam, hawkish ulema did not just render lawful what Allah prohibited; by advocating wars of aggression to propagate religion by the sword, hawkish ulema ensured the fall of the Muslim umma. For the wars of aggression, which required Muslim to become aggressors, resulted in retaliation by non-Muslims assaulted with jihad al-talab. The retaliation by the Mongols, for example, triggered by the abhorrent mass murder of Mongol traders and ambassadors, vanquished the Abbasid caliphate. The peaceful co-existence of the umma within the "global village" requires a reassessment of the traditional perceptions of revelation, to bring them into line with the teaching of the Book of Allah. For traditional renditions veered from the teaching of revelation, for example on the meaning of jihad. It is necessary to reject exclusive renditions of Islam in favour of the tolerant Islam practiced by the prophet and taught by revelation. Thomas Kuhn argued in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions that science evolves through a series of revolutions, where a scientific paradigm is challenged and replaced by a more advanced paradigm, that explains reality more fully and comprehensively. This takes place when a scientist uncovers an aberration in the existing paradigm. Islamic religious disciplines were penetrated by a range of anomalies, arising from the repression of reason, which restricted reflection. The ensuing aberrations encompassed the treatment of tradition as revelation, the subordination of revelation to tradition, and the re-interpretation of the religion of reconciliation as a religion of war, by means of recourse to the alleged abrogation of the peace verses by the verse of the swor