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Recent advances in establishing the nature and scope of estimators in econometrics have shed more light on the importance of instrumental variables. In this book, the authors argue that such methods may be regarded as a strong organizing principle for a wide variety of estimation and hypothesis testing problems in econometrics and statistics.
This is the second of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at invited symposium sessions of the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline.
This book examines the consequences of misspecifications from the fundamental to the nonexistent for the interpretation of likelihood-based methods of statistical estimation and interference.
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making provides a unified and comprehensive study of welfarism, cooperative games, public decision making, and voting and social choice theory - technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms.
This book presents an exploration of the idea of the common or social good, extended so that alternatives with different populations can be ranked. The approach is, in the main, welfarist, basing rankings on the well-being, broadly conceived, of those who are alive (or ever lived).
This is the first of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and commentaries presented in invited symposium sessions of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society. The papers summarize and interpret recent key developments and discuss future directions in a wide range of topics in economics and econometrics.
These essays by Clive W. J. Granger span more than four decades and cover major topics in spectral analysis, seasonality, nonlinearity, methodology, and forecasting. The introduction by Eric Gysels, Norman R. Swanson and Mark W. Watson places the essays in context and demonstrates their enduring value.
Ragnar Frisch (1895-1973) received the first Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science together with Jan Tinbergen in 1969 for having played an important role in ensuring that mathematical techniques figure prominently in modern economic analysis. This collection explores his contributions to econometrics and other key fields in the discipline as well as the results of new research.
This book discusses economic behavior at the individual and group level and the implications to the performance of economic systems. The lectures are delivered in a non-technical level to benefit the newcomers, yet the overview of the distinguished lecturers is beneficial to seasoned researchers.
Advances in Econometrics: Fifth World Congress, Volume II, edited by Professor Truman F. Bewley of Yale University, includes a wide variety of topics, comprising empirical and policy oriented subjects as well as theoretical and methodological ones.
This study, first published in 2006, asks whether democracy, modeled as competition between political parties that represent different interests in the polity, will result in educational funding policies that will, at least eventually, produce citizens who have equal capacities (human capital), thus breaking the link between family background and child prospects.
In this book Andreu Mas-Colell brings together work on economic theory written over the last twenty years, based upon his pioneering work in the use of differential topology in the analysis of general equilibrium. The analysis is presented in a way which makes it accessible to the broader range of economic theorists and advanced students.
This is the second of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and commentaries presented in invited symposium sessions of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society. The papers summarize and interpret key developments and discuss future directions in a wide range of topics in economics and econometrics.
This first volume contains papers focusing on econometrics that were delivered at the Fifth World Congress, held in 1985. Designed to make material accessible to a general audience of economists, these papers should be helpful to anyone with training in economics who wishes to follow new ideas and tendencies in the subject.
These twenty papers were selected by the author. The book includes a major introduction by Werner Hildenbrand, who assesses Professor Debreu's contribution to economic theory and explains the part played by these papers in the development of the subject.
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