Bøger i Hart Studies in Constitutional serien

This is the first part of a 2-volume set that presents an in-depth investigation into the canon of constitutionally conforming interpretation. These volumes address the fundamental issues the canon raises in the national, supranational and international contexts. In volume 1, experts from 19 jurisdictions, including Brazil, Canada, India, the UK, and the USA, present reports which give concise overviews of the approaches and debates on constitutionally conforming interpretation. These reports cover the structural background, the conditions of application, as well as issues of competence. Further aspects discussed are its perceived normativity and popularity in everyday legal practice.Together with volume 2, which explores the canon's use and theoretical impact beyond the national context in a comparative and critical manner, this book fills an important gap in legal scholarship and sets the stage for cross-national discourse.

This book considers the relationship between proportionality and facts in constitutional adjudication. Analysing where facts arise within each of the three stages of the structured proportionality test - suitability, necessity, and balancing - it considers the nature of these 'facts' vis-à-vis the facts that arise in the course of ordinary litigation. The book's central focus is on how proportionality has been applied by courts in practice, and it draws on the comparative experience of four jurisdictions across a range of legal systems. The central case study of the book is Australia, where the embryonic and contested nature of proportionality means it provides an illuminating study of how facts can inform the framing of constitutional tests. The rich proportionality jurisprudence from Germany, Canada, and South Africa is used to contextualise the approach of the High Court of Australia and to identify future directions for proportionality in Australia, at a time when the doctrine is in its formative stages.The book has three broad aims:First, it considers the role of facts within proportionality reasoning. Second, it offers procedural insights into fact-finding in constitutional litigation. Third, the book's analysis of the dynamic Australian case-law on proportionality means it also serves to clarify the nature and status of proportionality in Australia at a critical moment. Since the 2015 decision of McCloy v New South Wales, where four justices supported the introduction of a structured three-part test of proportionality, the Court has continued to disagree about the utility of such a test. These developments mean that this book, with its doctrinal and comparative approach, is particularly timely.

This book provides a theoretical framework which clarifies how different types of international norm conflicts can be solved efficiently. By drawing on Robert Alexy's distinction between rules and principles, it develops a novel approach which helps better identify and conceptualise norm conflicts and their resolution. The book develops a unique method by which to identify norms of international law as rules and principles respectively. Using examples taken from different international legal regimes, such as international environmental law and international human rights law, it argues that it is indeed possible to distinguish between the two types of norms within the body of international law. It goes on to use this distinction to consider which tools are available at the international level to resolve conflicts involving either type of norm, highlighting their gaps and inefficiencies. Finally, it provides a new framework to be used for looking at international conflicts and provides several case studies which show that drawing the distinction between rules and principles can be a means by which scholars, judicial bodies and states may analyse ambiguous judicial decisions or international legal provisions, and thus foster greater clarity in the field of international law.

What sort of methods are best suited to understanding constitutional doctrines and practices? Should we look to lawyers and legal methods alone, or should we draw upon other disciplines such as history, sociology, political theory, and moral philosophy? Should we study constitutions in isolation or in a comparative context? To what extent must constitutional methods be sensitive to empirical data about the functioning of legal practice? Can ideal theory aid our understanding of real constitutions? This volume brings together constitutional experts from around the world to address these types of questions through topical events and challenges such as Brexit, administrative law reforms, and the increasing polarisations in law, politics, and constitutional scholarship. Importantly, it investigates the ways in which we can ensure that constitutional scholars do not talk past each other despite their persistent - and often fierce - disagreements. In so doing, it aims systematically to re-examine the methodology of constitutional theory.

The New Labour government first elected in 1997 had a defining influence on the development of the modern UK constitution. This book combines legal and political perspectives to provide a unique assessment of the way in which this major programme of constitutional reform has changed the nature of the UK constitution. The chapters, written by leading experts in UK public law and politics, analyse the impact and legacy of the New Labour reform programme some 20 years on from the 1997 general election, and reveal the ways in which the UK constitution is now, to a significant extent, the 'New Labour constitution'.The book takes a broad approach to exploring the legacy of the New Labour years for the UK constitution. The contributors evaluate a range of specific substantive reforms (including on human rights, devolution, freedom of information, and the judicial system), changes to the process and method of constitutional reform under New Labour, the impact on key institutions (such as the judiciary and Parliament), and a number of wider constitutional themes (including national security, administrative justice, and the relationship between the Labour Party and constitutionalism). The book also reflects on the future challenges for the constitution constructed by New Labour, and the prospects for further constitutional reform.In bringing together this range of perspectives to reflect on the implications of the New Labour era of reform, this book offers a critical examination of a foundational period in the development of the contemporary UK constitution.

This book presents a new constitutional argument for the legitimacy of evolutive interpretation of the ECHR. It constructs a model, in which evolutive and static constitutional principles are balanced with each other. The author argues that there are three possible interpretive approaches in time-sensitive interpretations of the ECHR, but that only one of them is justifiable by reference to the constitutional principles of the ECHR in every single case. The ECHR's constitutional principles either require an evolutive or static interpretation or they do not establish a preference relation at all, which leads to a margin of appreciation of the member states in the interpretation of the Convention. The balancing model requires the determination of the weights of the competing evolutive and static constitutional principles. For this purpose, the author defines weighting factors for determining the importance of evolutive or static interpretation in a concrete case.

This book presents a defence of the value of equality within law which is neither purely formal nor an entirely speculative theory of justice. It does this by combining a theoretical with a doctrinal project.At the theoretical level, it argues that there is a distinct and meaningful conception of equality before the law which can be separated from concerns of distributive justice. It therefore rejects the claim that legal equality is merely formal. Rather, it is grounded in the equal moral status of all legal subjects. The demand that individuals be treated in accordance with the principle of equality before the law, then, requires that they not be treated in ways that would deny their equal moral standing. This principle of moral equality is the fundamental normative basis of the rule of law.This general claim is applied, in the second half of the book, to antidiscrimination law. It is argued here that the wrong of wrongful discrimination consists in implicit or explicit denial of the equal moral status of legal subjects. This is also a core wrong that the common law seeks to remedy via judicial review and is thus intimately tied to legality itself.In the final chapter, these two strands are brought together to defend the idea that law is a public asset which must be directed towards advancing the best interests of those it governs. This kind of equality principle, one which sets the outermost limits of the use of public power, must look beyond individual rights claims. It manifests a fundamental commitment to substantive equality - manifest in a commitment to collective flourishing - without tying it to group-based distributive concerns which arise from distinct social and historical contexts and require the exercise of political authority to choose among a range of plausible options for their resolution.