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Exploring the history and role of reduction in the philosophy of science and of mind, this volume offers a new framework in which various notions of reduction can be defined, and offers a a powerful explication of an 'ontological', notion of reduction.

When I was Dickinson Miller's assistant from 1940 to 1942, I soon realized that I had encountered an unusually powerful, acute, and original mind and a writer whose clear but vivid style matched the high quality of his intelligence.

Artistic Judgement sketches a framework for an account of art suitable to its philosophical investigation. The text stresses the differences between artworks and other things, and locates the understanding of artworks both in a narrative of the history of art and in the institutional practices of the artworld.

Against the background of this general interpretation I examine in detail his work on some of the central problems of metaphysics and, because Moore's being able to sustain a consistent anti-skepticism is essential to the survival of the base from which he works on those problems, of epistemology too.

This book, in Chapters I-V, is mainly concerned with the kind of justification and rationality characteristic of a truth-seeker, specifically a seeker of truth about the world impinging upon the senses: the so-called empirical world.

This is a unique book on terrorism that openly, rationally and passionately delves into what underlies terrorism, what in some cases justifies it on ethical grounds, and how terrorism might be dealt with successfully.

And, some of the causal efficacy due to persons is imparted by, not merely to, them. Further, some of the causal efficacy due to persons and imparted by them is imparted by and not merely to their physical, active bodies. In both there appears to be more than mere causal efficacy imparted to the environment by a person.

In this book, I discuss the question whether God exists, not as a Tillichian religious symbol, but as an actual person, albeit a person who is very different from you and me.

Conscious experience and thought content are customarily treated as distinct problems. Part One develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes to experience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, but deploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in which contents may be rooted in experience.

This book is nominally about linguistic representation. In the end, then, this book is about everything, which, since it is a philosophy book, is as it should be. I recognize that it is nowadays unfashionable to write books about every thing.

Peirce's conception of causation, and a novel approach to causation, based upon the semeiotic of Peirce. The author successively discusses Peirce's theories of final causation, natural classes, semeiotic, and semeiotic causation.

My interest in the issues considered here arose out of my great frustration in trying to attack the all-pervasive relativism of my students in introductory ethics courses at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

KEITH LEHRER MARSHALL SWAIN IX INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM Many philosophers try to refute skepticism, but few try to give a precise characterization of the thesis they attack.

Some of the material contained herein appeared first in the form of journal articles, and I wish to thank the journals in question for allowing the material to be reprinted here. Quarterly 12 (1975), and Chapter Three contains much revised material from 'Subjunctive Generaliza tions', Synthese 28 (1974), 199 (Reidel).

This book grew out of the lectures that I prepared for my students in epis temology at SUNY College at Brockport beginning in 1974. Brown for a useful correspondence concerning key arguments in Chapters Five and Seven, to Keith Lehrer for a criticism of one of my arguments that led me to make some important revisions, and to Roderick M.

Others wishing to remain more faithful to what religion traditionally meant throughout the ages, agree that Theism does make factual claims but that these are so radically different from the kind of claims made by science that it is only right that they should be established by a separate method on its own.

"He [Francis Bacon] writes of science like a Lord Chan cellor" - William Harvey "Don't say: 'There must be something common . Thus, the skeptic argues, a certain conclusion - say, the existence of another's pain - is not justified on the basis of (behavioral) evidence either deductively or inductively, and hence it is not justified at all.

One of the earliest and most influential treatises on the subject of this volume is Aristotle's Categories. (Categories I/ii) Equally surprising are such details as Aristotle's use of the terms 'homonymy' and 'synonymy' in connection with things talked about rather than words used to talk about them.

When this happens, as I hope it does in the present case, it is because the essays pursue related themes in such a way that, together, they at least form a start toward the development of a systematic theory on the common foundations supporting the particular claims in the particular articles.

Never theless, to the author's eye they have unities of theme and development which, if they fail to give them the true identity of the book, may (to adapt a metaphor from Hume) generate those smooth and easy transi tions of the imagination which arouse dispositions appropriate to sur veying such identical objects.

If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B).

TItis book is the joint project of a philosopher, Lehrer, and a mathematician, Wagner. Wagner read the manuscript of Lehrer [1978] and subsequently solved some mathematical problems of the elementary model.

Philosophy, Aristotle is well known to have said, begins in wonder. So, at best, wonder is only a necessary condition for philosophy. In particular, we wonder about astron omy and biology and psychology (and about philosophy) - about whether and how such disciplines are possible and, crucially, about whether and how such disciplines fit together.

In this book I address a dichotomy that is as central as any in ontology - that between ordinary objects or substances and the various attributes (Le.

Singular reference is a crucial philosophical topic. This book explains in detail why in the past some philosophers favored a descriptivist approach to this matter and why in more recent times others support a referentialist standpoint.

The goal of the book is to present the latest research on the new challenges of data technologies. It will offer an overview of the social, ethical and legal problems posed by group profiling, big data and predictive analysis and of the different approaches and methods that can be used to address them.

They explore Plato's dialogue, looking at questions of how philosophy and sophistry relate, both on a methodological and on a thematic level.While many of the contributing authors argue for a sharp distinction between sophistry and philosophy, this is contested by others.

The contributions of philosophers and psychologists establish a fruitful dialogue, so that readers realize that disciplinary divisions are overcome through dialogue and the common object of inquiry: the way human beings reflect and act in their everyday experiences.