Bøger i Studies in Security and Intern serien

Investigates how states decide to employ cyber in military and intelligence operations against other states and how rational those decisions are. Aaron Franklin Brantly contextualizes cyber decision-making processes into a systematic expected utility-rational choice approach to provide a mathematical understanding of the use of cyber weapons.

Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences.

Examines the patterns of migration flows during the post-World War II period, with particular attention to crises or shocks to the international system, as in the case of migration following the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria. The authors' analysis makes several important contributions to this debate.

This book makes a case for a reorientation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, posing an alternative conceptualization of nuclear order centered on the regional level. It draws on an array of theoretical tools from the literatures on regionalism, security governance, and international institutions, developing a framework that analyzes the conditions that would allow for more robust regional nuclear cooperation. These include the presence of (1) institutional architecture, (2) political, economic, and military relations among states, and (3) fundamental regional awareness and identity.Wan then deploys this theoretical approach to several case studies, including Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, focusing on two interrelated questions. First, what is the viability of a stronger regional nuclear order in the region? Second, what form would such an order most likely take? In the process, the book identifies the magnitude and character of the proliferation challenge specific to each region. It also considers the existing character of nuclear cooperation at the regional level.Wan presents the historical development of regional nuclear order in Latin America as a model for the rest of the world. In this area, regional institutions - ranging from organizations to dialogues to ad hoc arrangements - gradually became more involved across economic, environmental, and human security domains, providing the foundation for multilateral cooperation in the nuclear arena. As his analysis shows, in light of the contemporary proliferation landscape, the establishment and strengthening of such regional nuclear orders is essential.