Bøger af Central Intelligence Agency

THE COMPREHENSIVE, RELIABLE, INDISPENSABLE GLOBAL REFERENCE WORK - FULLY UPDATED FOR 2020VOLUME 1 OF 3 - CONTAINS:Introduction: History of the Factbook, Guide to Country Profiles, Definitions and Notes, 39 Pages of Regional and World Reference Maps.Countries: World, Afghanistan to Gabon.For Volume 2, search for "1949117146".For Volume 3, search for "1949117154".Unique three-volume, large-format edition.Giant 8"x10" size - easy to read and navigate.New for 2020: expanded maps section - two-page world maps now each occupy three pages for greater detail.Complete & unabridged - 1,800+ pages total, 600+ pages per volume."Batteries last hours, books last decades. Get the print edition!"Looks AMAZING on any professional or home bookshelf!The World Factbook provides up-to-date information on the history, people, government, economy, geography, communications, transportation, military, and transnational issues for 267 world entities. This almanac-style reference work is created with input and data from numerous government departments, and is the single most accurate source of intelligence on the nations and peoples of our world.CREATED BY THE CIA, TRUSTED BY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, DIPLOMATS, ACADEMICS, JOURNALISTS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS AROUND THE GLOBE.Sources include: Antarctic Information Program (National Science Foundation) - Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (Department of Defense) - Bureau of the Census (Department of Commerce) - Bureau of Labor Statistics (Department of Labor) - Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs - Defense Intelligence Agency (Department of Defense) - Department of Energy - Department of State - Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior) - Maritime Administration (Department of Transportation) - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (Department of Defense) - Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Department of Defense) - Office of Insular Affairs (Department of the Interior) - Office of Naval Intelligence (Department of Defense) - Oil & Gas Journal - United States Board on Geographic Names (Department of the Interior) - United States Transportation Command (Department of Defense) - and more...Proudly Published in the U.S.A. by CARLILE MEDIA.

This collection of material by and about Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Ambassador to Iran comprises the largest single release of Helms-related information to date. The documents, historical works, essays, interviews, photographs, and video offer an unprecedented wide-ranging look at the man and his career as the United States' top intelligence official and one of its most important diplomats during a crucial decade of the Cold War. From mid-1966, when he became DCI, to late 1976, when he left Iran, Helms dealt directly or indirectly with numerous events whose impact remains evident today and which are covered in the release. They include the Vietnam War, two military conflicts between Israel and the Arab states, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an unsuccessful covert action in Chile, arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, Watergate, disclosures of controversial CIA activities, the formation of OPEC, and the first oil embargo. From his respective vantage points at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Va., and the US Embassy in Tehran, Helms participated in all of these developments-depending on the situation-as intelligence manager, presidential adviser, or representative of US national security interests.

Provides complete and up-to-date information on the world's nations, including brand-new geopolitical maps, details on prominent figures and parties, contact information for diploatic missions, population statistics, geographic information, including climate and natural hazards, and facts on transportation, trade, and communication infrastructure.

After Communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed twenty years ago and the Soviet Union disintegrated two years later, immense opportunities for archival research opened. Even though serious obstacles to archival work have persisted in Russia (which houses the central repositories of the Soviet regime), the archives of nearly all of the former Warsaw Pact countries are now fully or at least largely open. As a result, scholars have been able to explore many aspects of the Warsaw Pact that could only be guessed at in the past, including questions of military planning, force preparations and operations, nuclear command arrangement, and civil-military issues.

Since the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the anticipated reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces in the event of a crisis was a topic of intense interest for the United States and its NATO allies as well as for the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union engaged in successive efforts from the late 1960s onwards to codify is command and control arrangements over the armed forces of its East European allies - first through a peacetime and later a wartime statute - the U.S. Intelligence Community's collection and analytic efforts on the subject were ongoing. This publication explores evolving U.S. views on the relationship between the Soviet Union and its Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies.

The Czechoslovak crisis, as it came to be known, started in January 1968, when Alexander Dubcek was elevated to the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz), replacing moribund Antonin Novotny, who had served as First Secretary since 1957. Under Dubcek, the communist leadership embarked on a program of dramatic liberalization of the Czechoslovak political, economic, and social order, including the overhaul of the CPCz leadership, increased freedom of speech, surrender of authority to the Czech National Assembly by the Communist Part, real elections as local and national levels, and even the suggestion of legalizing non-communist political parties. In all, the crisis lasted more than a year, with the first none months consisting of Czech reforms triggering Soviet statements of concern and eventually threats, buttressed by Warsaw Pact military buildups disguised as exercises. When the invasion occurred in the early morning hours of 21 August, the Czechoslovak leadership as not immediately removed, but remained largely intact through April 1969, when Dubcek was finally replaced as First Secretary by a more pro-Soviet Gustav Husak. All this alarmed Moscow and the leadership of the Warsaw Pact, but throughout the Prague Spring, Dubcek went out of his way to demonstrate his personal loyalty to Moscow and Prague's intention to remain firmly within the Warsaw Pact military alliance. How sincere he was in these remonstrations is difficult to say, but Dubcek and his allies clearly feared a repetition of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, brutally crushed by Soviet troops. These fears were mirrored in Washington and, to a certain extent, even in Moscow.

The Central Intelligence Agency is unlike any other Agency in the U.S. Government. Here you can find exhibits, museum galleries, statues, and a memorial wall and garden dedicated to our remarkable colleagues-men and women from every directorate-who have given their lives while advancing our Agency's mission. While CIA Headquarters is accessible only to our Agency's family, this publication will provide you with a small window into our hallways in both the Original and New Headquarters Buildings and the surrounding campus.

The Central Intelligence Agency is unlike any other Agency in the U.S. Government. This publication shares a History of the CIA, a discussion of the Components and Centers of the CIA, and includes information about Their Work, The Intelligence Community, Sites to See at the CIA, and Items of Interest at the CIA.

This is the story of how the men and women of CIA responded to the attacks of September 11th. To the extent it can be told in an unclassified account, it offers a sense of the teamwork, creativity, and commitment displayed by Agency officers in the days and weeks after the tragedy. Love of country and dedication to mission sustained them in their vital work.

In the wake of 11 September 2001, the issue of homeland security spawned a vibrant public discussion about the need to coordinate a wide range of federal governmental activities to achieve greater security for the United States. Congress enacted laws that established a new executive department, the Department of Homeland Security, and a new federal intelligence chief, the director of national intelligence. In both cases, the objective was to integrate activities of disparate organizations better in order to improve critical government functions. In fact, for more than half a century, there have been numerous efforts to enhance cooperation among the many parts of the nation's intelligence establishment under the leadership of a principal intelligence official, called the director of central intelligence. The story of this study is what the nation's leaders expected of directors of central intelligence in accomplishing this task, and how those who held the responsibility attempted to carry it out. The hope is that lessons drawn from that experience can inform today's ongoing debate about how best the new director of national intelligence can accomplish America's national intelligence mission. The study presents an unusual perspective. Examinations of past intelligence performance often focus on how intelligence has played a role in specific circumstances. Studies of directors of central intelligence have usually stressed how they led the Central Intelligence Agency, conducted their relationships with the president, or affected US policy. No study until this one has focused on how each director sought to fulfill his "community" role. This book was prepared under the auspices of the Center for the Study of Intelligence by Dr. Douglas F. Garthoff, a former CIA analyst and senior manager. It reflects the author's deep experience in Intelligence Community affairs as well as his extensive research and interviews. Dr. Garthoff's study represents a valuable contribution to our professional literature and a rich source of insights at a moment when the responsibilities and authorities of the Intelligence Community's senior leadership are again in the public spotlight.