Bøger af Charles E Kirkpatrick

Looks at how and why the Victory Plan was written. The Victory Plan was authored by General Albert C. Wedemeyer in the summer of 1941. Discusses a variety of issues: the planner, the requirements, strategic estimates, detailed planning and various assessments. Includes the Army portion of the Victory Plan as an appendix and various illustrations and a bibliography.

In the years following the end of the Cold War, substantial debates about the proper size, organization, composition, and techniques of command of the United States Army spurred the service to reorganize. During this time, such discussions and alterations also affected the Army's forward deployed units in Germany-the United States Army, Europe, and its principal tactical formation, V Corps. In "Ruck It Up!" The Post-Cold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990- 2001, Charles E. Kirkpatrick outlines a decade of change for V Corps, and the physical and intellectual tools it evolved to accomplish its changing missions. The transformation was impressive. It began with reorienting V Corps from its traditional mission of the defense of Western Europe to becoming a force readily deployable within the U.S. European Command area of operations. Organizational, technical, and tactical developments influenced by lessons V Corps learned during missions to Africa and the Balkans spanned the decade between 1990 and 2000. Among the many and occasionally surprising lessons of the V Corps experience between 1998 and 2001 was how flexible, durable, and functional conventional general-purpose forces were in coping with a range of missions from humanitarian relief to combat operations. The author lays the essential groundwork to understand the successes of V Corps when the corps rapidly deployed to Southwest Asia, and then conducted U.S. Central Command's main attack during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. For those who continue to refine the U.S. Army's organization, roles, and missions, a careful review of this microcosm of change within the service offers useful counsel. This volume is recommended not only to those engaged in such demanding and important tasks on behalf of the Army, but also to the general reader who wishes to gain some understanding of the complexity of U.S. Army, Europe, operations after the end of the Cold War.

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in the history of mankind. However, the half century that now separates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowledge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Americans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social, and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united us as a people with a common purpose. Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not only about the profession of arms, but also about military preparedness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will participate in the nation's 50th anniversary commemoration of World War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works produced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called "the mighty endeavor." World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over several diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for further reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army's significant military feats from that war.

"An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941"covers the work of then Maj. Albert C. Wedemeyer, the principal author of the Victory Plan. In just forty-eight months America raised and equipped a modern army seemingly overnight, a feat that owed much to sound military planning. As Wedemeyer makes clear, mobilization transcends purely military matters and must be understood to embrace the capacity of nations. His work underscores the fact that even in 1941 warfare had become so vast in scope, so expensive, and so technologically complex that nations could never again afford to maintain in time of peace the armies needed in time of war. The conclusion seems inescapable: The United States Army must keep mobilization planning at the center of all its military planning. Military planners and all those studying mobilization and logistics will benefit from processes Wedemeyer and his colleagues used in reaching their decisions on the units and material needed. The Victory Plan provides a clear picture of how they approached the challenge of preparing for modern war.

During the Second World War, America possessed the great military leaders needed to guide its armed forces successfully through that terrible ordeal. Those leaders, whose prewar origins have often been obscure, met the challenges of worldwide conflict and went on to provide direction for the United States in the turbulent decades that followed. One of those legendary figures was Omar Nelson Bradley, General of the Army and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Bradley was a product of the American interwar Army, an institution that produced men like George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and George S. Patton. Small in size and lacking modem equipment, the U.S. Army of the 1920s and 1930s focused on education and doctrine and, when it could afford to do so, on training. Officers like Omar Bradley honed their leadership and warfighting skills during this seemingly somnolent period in American military history and then led America's Army through war and peace in the difficult decades of the 1940s and 1950s. To better understand the development of such leaders, this book traces the young Bradley through the prewar period and follows his rapid transition to positions of greater authority during the war years and ultimately his assumption of greater responsibilities in the changing postwar world.

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A striking feature of World War II was America's ability to raise and equip a modern army seemingly overnight. Emerging from its negligible base in 1941 and competing with the needs of the other services and Allies, the Army stood in just forty-eight months at 8 million men with equipment second to none. Such a prodigious feat owes much to sound military planning, as The Victory Plan of 1941 carefully demonstrates. But this study also underscores the fact that even in 1941 warfare had become so vast in scope, so expensive, and so technologically complex that nations could never again afford to maintain in time of peace the armies needed in time of war. As Albert Wedemeyer, the remarkable Army officer who wrote the 1941 plan, makes clear, mobilization transcends purely military matters and must be understood to embrace the total capacity of nations. The conclusion seems inescapable: the United States Army must keep mobilization planning at the center of all its military planning. The experience of the nation's total mobilization for World War II offers good counsel, not so much in its details of numbers and types of units raised or materiel required as in its description of the thought process Wedemeyer and his colleagues used in reaching these decisions. I recommend the following analysis of Wedemeyer's vital work to military planners and to all those studying mobilization and logistics. It will provide a clear picture of how our recent predecessors approached the complex challenge of preparing for modern war, a challenge that remains with us today.Harold W. NelsonColonel, USAChief of Military History