Bøger af Colin S. Gray

Cyber is now recognized as an operational domain, but the theory that should explain it strategically is, for the most part, missing. It is one thing to know how to digitize; it is quite another to understand what digitization means strategically.The author maintains that, although the technical and tactical literature on cyber is abundant, strategic theoretical treatment is poor. He offers four conclusions: (1) cyber power will prove useful as an enabler of joint military operationsl; (2) cyber offense is likely to achieve some success, and the harm we suffer is most unlikely to be close to lethally damaging; (3) cyber power is only information and only one way in which we collect, store, and transmit information; and (4) it is clear enough today that the sky is not falling because of cyber peril. As a constructed environment, cyberspace is very much what we choose to make it.

The U.S. has long suffered from a serious strategy deficit. In short, there is a general crisis of strategic comprehension, a lack of agreement on the most effective organizing ideas. Airpower is by no means lonely in suffering from strategic theoretical uncertainty. The study argues that the United States needs a theory of war and warfare. It claims that future warfare will be diverse and that the tactical, operational, and strategic value of airpower must always be situational. A coherent theory of employment for all of airpower?s capabilities, not only the kinetic, is needed. Airpower?s potential utility lies within a spectrum of possibilities and is dependent on context. The study advises frank recognition of airpower?s situational limitations. (Dr. Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in England. Originally published by the Airpower Research Institute)

Strategist Colin Gray offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, "Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies?" He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."

Commentators distinguish between two kinds of power, ?hard? and ?soft.? The promise in this logic is obvious. Unfortunately, to date, the idea of soft power has not been subjected to a critical forensic examination. The ill consequences of America?s difficulty in thinking and behaving strategically are augmented perilously when unwarranted faith is placed upon soft power that inherently resists to strategic direction. Although it is appropriate to be skeptical of the utility of soft power, this must not be interpreted as advice to threaten or resort to military force with scant reference to moral standards. Not only is it right in an absolute sense, it is also expedient to seek, seize, and hold the moral high ground. The more challenging contexts for national security will still require the mailed fist, even if it is cushioned, but not concealed, by a glove of political and ethical restraint. (Originally published by the Strategic Studies Institute)

While one can never guarantee strategic success, which depends on policy, military prowess, and the quality of the dialogue between the two, a strategic education led by the judgments in these maxims increases the chances that one's errors will be small rather than catastrophic. The maxims are grouped according to five clusters.

All would-be strategists would benefit by some formal education. However, for education in strategy to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, as well as the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance. The author emphasizes the necessity for strategic education to help develop the strategic approach, the way of thinking that can solve or illuminate strategic problems. He advises that such education should not strive for a spurious relevance by presenting a military variant of current affairs. The author believes that the strategist will perform better in today's world if he has mastered and can employ strategy's general theory.

Strategic studies as a field of civilian scholarship has developed along distinctive lines in the United States since World War II.

Synopsis coming soon.......

This text presents a comprehensive study of the strategic value of the navy based on an in-depth analysis of the historical relationships among land, sea, air and space power.

Gray explores the roots of the American style in foreign policy and strategy, and how that style relates to defense options.

Situated on the banks of the Ohio River, Louisville, Kentucky, represents a cultural and geographical intersection of North and South.

A contemporary primer on the leading arguments about U.S. national security, National Security Dilemmas addresses the major challenges and opportunities that are live-issue areas for American policymakers and strategists today. Colin S. Gray provides an in-depth analysis of a policy and strategy for deterrence; the long-term U.S.

Colin Gray presents an inventive treatise on the nature of strategy, war, and peace, organized around forty maxims. This collection of mini essays will forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public against many-probably most- fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about war, peace, and security.

How the wars of the near future will be fought and who will win them

(Strategy here covers all military activity.) The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence, and information warfare.