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This report, FEMA-353 - Recommended Specifications and Quality Assurance Guidelines for Steel Moment-Frame Construction for Seismic Applications has been prepared by the SAC Joint Venture, under contract to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to indicate those standards of workmanship for structural steel fabrication and erection deemed necessary to achieve reliably the design performance objectives contained in the set of companion publications prepared under this same contract: FEMA-350 - Recommended Seismic Design Criteria for New Steel Moment-Frame Buildings, which provides recommended criteria, supplemental to FEMA-302, 1997 NEHRP Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures, for the design and construction of steel moment-frame buildings and provides alternative performance-based design criteria; FEMA-351 - Recommended Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade Criteria for Existing Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings, which provides recommended methods to evaluate the probable performance of existing steel moment-frame buildings in future earthquakes and to retrofit these buildings for improved performance; and FEMA-352 - Recommended Postearthquake Evaluation and Repair Criteria for Welded, Steel Moment-Frame Buildings, which provides recommendations for performing postearthquake inspections to detect damage in steel moment-frame buildings following an earthquake, evaluating the damaged buildings to determine their safety in the postearthquake environment, and repairing damaged buildings. The recommended design criteria contained in these three companion reports are based on the material and workmanship standards contained in this document, which also includes discussion of the basis for the quality control and quality assurance criteria contained in the recommended specifications.

One of the activities authorized by the Dam Safety and Security Act of 2002 is research to enhance the Nation's ability to assure that adequate dam safety programs and practices are in place throughout the United States. The Act of 2002 states that the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in cooperation with the National Dam Safety Review Board (Review Board), shall carry out a program of technical and archival research to develop and support: improved techniques, historical experience, and equipment for rapid and effective dam construction, rehabilitation, and inspection; devices for continued monitoring of the safety of dams; development and maintenance of information resources systems needed to support managing the safety of dams; and initiatives to guide the formulation of effective policy and advance improvements in dam safety engineering, security, and management. With the funding authorized by the Congress, the goal of the Review Board and the Dam Safety Research Work Group (Work Group) is to encourage research in those areas expected to make significant contributions to improving the safety and security of dams throughout the United States. The Work Group (formerly the Research Subcommittee of the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety) met initially in February 1998. To identify and prioritize research needs, the Subcommittee sponsored a workshop on Research Needs in Dam Safety in Washington D.C. in April 1999. Representatives of state and federal agencies, academia, and private industry attended the workshop. Seventeen broad area topics related to the research needs of the dam safety community were identified. To more fully develop the research needs identified, the Research Subcommittee subsequently sponsored a series of nine workshops. Each workshop addressed a broad research topic (listed) identified in the initial workshop. Experts attending the workshops included international representatives as well as representatives of state, federal, and private organizations within the United States: Impacts of Plants and Animals on Earthen Dams; Risk Assessment for Dams; Spillway Gates; Seepage through Embankment Dams; Embankment Dam Failure Analysis; Hydrologic Issues for Dams; Dam Spillways; Seismic Issues for Dams; Dam Outlet Works. Based on the research workshops, research topics have been proposed and pursued. Several topics have progressed to products of use to the dam safety community, such as technical manuals and guidelines. For future research, it is the goal of the Work Group to expand dam safety research to other institutions and professionals performing research in this field. The proceedings from the research workshops present a comprehensive and detailed discussion and analysis of the research topics addressed by the experts participating in the workshops. The participants at all of the research workshops are to be commended for their diligent and highly professional efforts on behalf of the National Dam Safety Program. The National Dam Safety Program research needs workshop on Dam Spillways was held on August 26-27, 2003, in Denver, Colorado. The Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, would like to acknowledge the contributions of the U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation in organizing the workshop and developing these workshop proceedings.

This report contains research on behaviors and other factors contributing to the rural fire problem; identifies mitigation programs, technologies, and strategies to address those problems; and proposes actions that USFA can take to better implement programs in rural communities. In the Spring of 2004, the U S Fire Administration (USFA) partnered with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in a cooperative agreement project entitled Mitigating the Rural Fire Problem. The purpose of the project was to examine what can be done to reduce the high death rate from fires in rural U S communities. Rural communities, defined by the U S Census Bureau as communities with less than 2,500 population, have a fire death rate twice the national average. The objectives of the project were to a) conduct research on behaviors and other factors contributing to the rural fire problem, b) identify mitigation programs, technologies, and strategies to address those problems, and c) propose actions that USFA Public Education Division can take to better implement programs in rural communities. Research sources included a review of the published literature, some original statistical analysis, and information from national technical experts who have worked with NFPA.

National Security Presidential Directive-51/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-20 (NSPD-51/HSPD-20), National Continuity Policy, and the supporting National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan (NCPIP) provide direction and implementation guidance for a comprehensive and integrated approach to maintaining a national continuity capability in order to ensure the preservation of our Constitutional form of Government and the continuing performance of National Essential Functions (NEFs) under all conditions. In January 2009, recognizing the critical role played by non-Federal entities in the performance of the NEFs, the Federal Emergency Management Agency issued Continuity Guidance Circular (CGC 1), Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Entities (States, Territories, Tribal, and Local Government Jurisdictions and Private Sector Organizations), to provide guidance in the development of non-Federal essential functions, plans, and programs. Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (CGC 2), Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Entities: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process (States, Territories, Tribes, and Local Government Jurisdictions), provides additional planning guidance to assist non-Federal entities and organizations in identifying their essential functions. Additionally, through the use of a systematic Business Process Analysis, Business Impact Analysis, and the development of risk mitigation strategies, CGC 2 provides guidance to non-Federal entities to ensure the continued performance of these essential functions during and following a significant disruption to normal operations. Guidance in CGC 1 and CGC 2 supports the implementation of Presidential direction in the NCPIP. The provisions of this guidance document are applicable to all levels of State, territorial, tribal, and local government jurisdictions.

On September 5, 1996, Hurricane Fran made landfall near Cape Fear, North Carolina and generated considerable rainfall, moderately high winds, and storm surge and waves along the cost. Although the storm generated high winds along the coast and well inland, severe damage to buildings was concentrated in those areas also impacted by the flood surge and waves. This report focuses on the damage along the North Carolina coast that resulted from flood surge, wave action, erosion, and scour. On September 12, 1996, the Mitigation Directorate of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT) to coastal North Carolina to assess damage caused by Hurricane Fran. The mission of the BPAT was to assess the performance of buildings on the barrier islands most directly affected by Hurricane Fran and to make recommendations for improving building performance in future events. Better performance of building systems can be expected when the causes of observed failures are determined and repair and construction are undertaken in accordance with recognized standards of design and construction. The immediate goal of the BPAT process is to provide guidance to State and local governments for post-hurricane reconstruction. In addition, the BPAT's findings can enhance future coastal design and construction. The BPAT developed recommendations for reducing future hurricane damage. The recommendations address areas of concern such as building materials, design practices, construction techniques, and quality of construction. The recommendations presented in this report are applicable in other communities that experience similar coastal flooding. This report presents the BPAT's observations of the successes and failures of buildings that experienced the flood effects of Hurricane Fran, comments on building failure modes, and provides recommendations intended to enhance the performance of buildings in future hurricanes.

Hurricane Charley made landfall on Friday, August 13, 2004, at Mangrove Point, just southwest of Punta Gorda, Florida. On August 19, 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Mitigation Division deployed a Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) to Florida to assess damages caused by Hurricane Charley. This report presents the MAT's observations, conclusions, and recommendations in response to those field investigations. Several maps included in our first chapter illustrate the path of the storm, the wind field estimates, the impact on people and infrastructure, and the depth of storm surge along the path. The width of the high-wind field was very narrow even though hurricane force winds affected some portion of the Florida peninsula from Punta Gorda to Daytona Beach. There was little storm surge or coastal flooding because of the narrow size of the storm and the translational speed with which it came ashore and crossed the state. The hurricane is believed to have been a design wind event (the wind speeds equaled or exceeded those delineated in the current version of the Florida Building Code [FBC]) for a narrow area from the point of landfall on the west coast inland for 120 miles. The design wind speed for Charlotte County (Punta Gorda) per the FBC is 114 to 130 mph (measured as a 3-second peak gust). The actual measured wind speed near Punta Gorda was 112 mph (3-second peak gust) and measured speeds in other parts of the state suggest that Charley was a design wind event. The storm created a very small area affected by storm surge and most damage was not caused by flooding from storm surge, waves, or erosion. Because Hurricane Charley was a design level wind event, the resultant storm damage provides valuable evidence about the effectiveness of building codes and design practices as they ad¬dress design guidelines for high winds. For buildings built prior to the adoption of the current codes, judgments were made about how the observed damage was reflective of the code to which the building was constructed, and the quality of construction or the inspection process that followed construction. Consideration also was given to the type and use of buildings. Many buildings that were expected to function for critical/essential services were severely damaged by the hurricane and lost function for significant periods of time after the event. The recommendations in this report are based solely on the observations and conclusions of the MAT, and are intended to assist the State of Florida, local communities, businesses, and individ¬uals in the reconstruction process and to help reduce damage and impact from future natural events similar to Hurricane Charley. The general recommendations presented in Section 8.1 relate to policies and education/outreach that are needed to ensure that designers, contractors, and building officials understand the requirements for disaster resistance construction in hurricane-prone regions.

Since 1979, FEMA has worked collaboratively with our federal partners; state, local, tribal, and territorial officials; the private sector; non-profit and faith-based groups; and the general public to meet our mission. Thanks to the efforts of the whole community, we stand united and prepared to effectively meet the needs of our citizens during times of crisis - when they are most in need. This document is intended to highlight FEMA's guiding principles, the ways we are actively engaged with the emergency management community today, and the work we hope to accomplish in the future. Being successful in emergency response means doing the homework and being equipped to respond to the largest scale disasters. It means being present early on the scene. It means operating swiftly, while also being smart. We at FEMA are doing that. And we're doing what it takes to do all of these things even better. In 2011, FEMA responded to more disasters than any year in its history. The variety and magnitude of each event tested our capabilities, as well as the capabilities of communities across the country. While no one hopes to face the same volume of disasters in the coming years, it is imperative that we plan accordingly and continue to evaluate our strategic and operational approaches to serving the American public. Moving forward in 2012, we will continue to focus on our strategic priorities. We will build on the progress made over the past two years and continue to foster a whole community approach to emergency management. With the completion of our all-hazards plans and National Disaster Recovery Framework, development of a National Mass Care Strategy, and implementing the FEMA Qualification System, we're strengthening the nation's capacity to respond to and recover from catastrophic events. Our strength will also come from our continued partnerships with tribal nations, the disability community, rural communities, and others. We have helped thousands of individuals and communities reduce the economic loss and human suffering associated with disasters by providing grants for mitigation activities. As part of Presidential Policy Directive 8, FEMA also led the effort to develop and publish a National Preparedness Goal - a national vision of preparedness and how the country will work together to approach our shared risks. Finally, we are improving the way we serve disaster survivors by enhancing our ability to improve and innovate based on lessons learned. Projecting further, the Fiscal Year 2013 budget request focuses on achieving success in one of DHS' core missions: ensuring domestic resilience to disasters. As such, we place a strong emphasis on funding the key programs that help to ensure that as a nation we will effectively and rapidly respond to and recover from a variety of disasters.

The Nation has made measurable strides toward improving preparedness for the full range of hazards at all levels of government and across all segments of society. National preparedness has improved not only for the countless threats posed by those who wish to bring harm to the American homeland but also for the many natural and technological hazards that face the Nation's communities. Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) describes the Nation's approach to preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States. The Directive requires a National Preparedness Report (NPR), an annual report summarizing the progress made toward building, sustaining, and delivering the 31 core capabilities described in the National Preparedness Goal (the Goal). As the NPR coordinator, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) worked with the full range of whole community partners-including all levels of government, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, communities, and individuals-to develop the NPR. Specifically, FEMA collaborated with federal interagency partners to identify quantitative and qualitative performance and assessment data for each of the 31 core capabilities. In addition, FEMA integrated data from the 2011 State Preparedness Reports (SPRs), statewide self-assessments of core capability levels submitted by all 56 U.S. states and territories through a standardized survey. Finally, FEMA conducted research to identify recent, independent evaluations, surveys, and other supporting data related to core capabilities. FEMA synthesized, reviewed, and analyzed all of these data sources in order to derive key findings that offer insight on critical issues in preparedness, including areas where the Nation has made progress and where areas of improvement remain. During the development of specific core capability key findings, eight broader trends in national preparedness emerged. As shown below, these overarching key findings synthesize information from across multiple core capabilities and mission areas and reflect national-level results on preparedness progress and gaps. With the September 2011 release of the Goal, the Nation is transitioning to a new set of core capabilities. As a result, whole community partners are updating their efforts to collect, analyze, and report preparedness progress according to the Goal's core capabilities and preliminary targets. The 2012 NPR therefore relies on a range of existing assessment approaches and associated quantitative and qualitative data to present the Nation's preparedness progress and to report key findings. Assessment processes, methodologies, and data will evolve in future years to align more directly with the Goal and its capabilities. Efforts are already underway to refine the Goal's capabilities and preliminary targets; future efforts will focus on developing agreed-upon measures and assessment methodologies that will guide the annual development of the NPR.

This report, FEMA-350 - Recommended Seismic Design Criteria for New Steel Moment-Frame Buildings has been developed by the SAC Joint Venture under contract to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide organizations engaged in the development of consensus design standards and building code provisions with recommended criteria for the design and construction of new buildings incorporating moment-resisting steel frame construction to resist the effects of earthquakes. It is one of a series of companion publications addressing the issue of the seismic performance of steel moment-frame buildings. The set of companion publications includes: FEMA-350 - Recommended Seismic Design Criteria for New Steel Moment-Frame Buildings. This publication provides recommended criteria, supplemental to FEMA-302 - 1997 NEHRP Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures, for the design and construction of steel moment-frame buildings and provides alternative performance-based design criteria. FEMA-351 - Recommended Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade Criteria for Existing Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings. This publication provides recommended methods to evaluate the probable performance of existing steel moment-frame buildings in future earthquakes and to retrofit these buildings for improved performance. FEMA-352 - Recommended Postearthquake Evaluation and Repair Criteria for Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings. This publication provides recommendations for performing postearthquake inspections to detect damage in steel moment-frame buildings following an earthquake, evaluating the damaged buildings to determine their safety in the postearthquake environment, and repairing damaged buildings. FEMA-353 - Recommended Specifications and Quality Assurance Guidelines for Steel Moment-Frame Construction for Seismic Applications. This publication provides recommended specifications for the fabrication and erection of steel moment frames for seismic applications. The recommended design criteria contained in the other companion documents are based on the material and workmanship standards contained in this document, which also includes discussion of the basis for the quality control and quality assurance criteria contained in the recommended specifications. The information contained in these recommended design criteria, hereinafter referred to as Recommended Criteria, is presented in the form of specific design and performance evaluation procedures together with supporting commentary explaining part of the basis for these recommendations.

This guide is intended to promote the effectiveness of FEMA incident operations by standardizing the incident action planning process. The guide explains the ICS incident action planning process, describes how FEMA applies it on all FEMA incidents, defines the specific roles and responsibilities of the various players, and establishes standards for incident action planning on FEMA incidents. This guide also communicates to FEMA's partners the details of how the agency conducts the incident action planning process. This guide is also intended to serve as a reference for incident personnel and to provide the basis for FEMA incident action planning staffing and exercising. Finally, this guide informs the required training, position task books, and development of courses for the positions of the FEMA Qualification System. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) primary mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards. When FEMA becomes involved in an incident, it is because the scope and scale of the incident necessitates Federal assistance. When FEMA is engaged, officials from the State and local government are also involved along with nongovernmental organizations (NG0s), elements of the private sector, and-more than likely-other Federal departments and agencies. Ensuring that the efforts of all players are coordinated and synchronized to achieve the best results is the job of incident management. It is also the reason that the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System (ICS) exist. The incident action planning process provides a tool to synchronize operations at the incident level and ensures that incident operations are conducted in support of incident objectives. The iterative incident action planning process provides FEMA and all interagency partners involved in incident management operations the primary tool for managing incidents. A disciplined system of planning phases and collaboration sessions fosters partnerships and clearly focuses incident operations. Because incidents in which FEMA is engaged are complex and intergovernmental and interagency, applying the incident action planning process accurately, consistently, and completely is essential to the success of incident operations. Disciplined application of the incident action planning process produces positive effects on incidents of all size and scope and maintains the otherwise perishable planning skills of FEMA personnel. While the process described in this guide outlines how FEMA as a part of the whole community executes incident action planning, those involved in a FEMA response and recovery must recognize that it will, in all probability, not be the only incident action planning process being executed. For example, local and municipal organizations may develop IAPs to guide the actions of first responders. For a catastrophic incident there may be hundreds of concurrent incident action planning efforts taking place simultaneously. The joint IAP that State and Federal incident management personnel develop must support all local IAPs and synchronize those at the State and Federal level.

Fire departments in the United States responded to nearly 1.6 million fire calls in 2007. The United States fire problem, on a per capita basis, is one of the worst in the industrial world. Thousands of Americans die each year, tens of thousands of people are injured, and property losses reach billions of dollars. There are huge indirect costs of fire as well-temporary lodging, lost business, medical expenses, psychological damage, and others. These indirect costs may be as much as 8- to 10-times higher than the direct costs of fire. To put this in context, the annual losses from floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters combined in the United States average just a fraction of those from fires. The public, the media, and local governments generally are unaware of the magnitude and seriousness of the fire problem to individuals and their families, to communities, and to the Nation. The National Fire Data Center (NFDC) of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) periodically publishes Fire in the United States, a statistical overview of the fires in the United States with the focus on the latest year in which data were available at the time of preparation. This report is designed to equip the fire service and others with information that motivates corrective action, sets priorities, targets specific fire programs, serves as a model for State and local analyses of fire data, and provides a baseline for evaluating programs. This Fifteenth Edition covers the 5-year period of 2003 to 2007 with a primary focus on 2007. Only native National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) 5.0 data are used for NFIRS-based analyses. In 2007, the native NFIRS 5.0 data account for 98 percent of the fire incident data. The report addresses the overall national fire problem.

In 2004, the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) and The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) worked in partnership with the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC) to revise the 1998 text, Retention and Recruitment in the Volunteer Fire Service: Problems and Solutions. The original text was based on a series of workshops bringing together volunteer fire service members from all the States. This edition has been enhanced with new research and current issues as the emergency services enter the 21st century. Many of the original reasons for the recruitment problems remain: lack of time, apathy, and excessive requirements. However, they appear to have become even greater issues with the passing of time. Although the recruitment and retention challenges continue to grow, some volunteer organizations maintain good membership while others continue to function with reduced numbers. Those organizations that seek solutions and adapt to our changing personnel environment are successful. Individuals are still willing to give their time to volunteer emergency services organizations provided the following: The experience is rewarding and worth their time; The training requirements are not excessive; The time demands are adaptable and manageable; They are rewarded with a personal sense of value; There is good leadership minimizing conflict; There is ample support for the organization. The emergency services are the most demanding of volunteer activities today. The physical and time demands associated with training; responding to incidents; maintaining facilities, apparatus, and equipment; fundraising; and administering a nonprofit corporation are grueling if not managed properly. In today's hectic world, strong leadership is required to make the emergency services the organizations that will attract volunteers. This text will cover many of the problems of recruitment and retention and provide some examples of solutions that have worked in volunteer organizations across the Nation.

Lifelines (e.g., systems and facilities that deliver energy fuel and systems and facilities that provide key services such as water and sewage, transportation, and communications are defined as lifelines) are presently being sited in "utility or transportation corridors" to reduce their right-of-way environmental, aesthetic, and cost impacts on the communities that rely upon them. The individual lifelines are usually designed, constructed, and modified throughout their service life. This results in different standards and siting criteria being applied to segments of the same lifeline, and also to different standards or siting criteria being applied to the separate lifelines systems within a single corridor. Presently, the siting review usually does not consider the impact of proximity or collocation of the lifelines on their individual risk or vulnerability to natural or manmade hazards or disasters. This is either because the other lifelines have not yet been installed or because such a consideration has not been identified as being an important factor for such an evaluation. There have been cases when some lifeline collocations have increased the levels of damage experienced during an accident or an earthquake. For example, water line ruptures during earthquakes have led to washouts which have caused foundation damage to nearby facilities. In southern California a railroad accident (transportation lifeline) led to the subsequent failure of a collocated fuel pipeline, and the resulting fire caused considerable property damage and loss of life. Loss of electric power has restricted, and sometimes failed, the ability to provide water and sewer services or emergency fire fighting capabilities. In response to these types of situations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is examining the use of such corridors, and FEMA initiated this study to examine the impact of siting multiple lifeline systems in confined and at-risk areas. The overall FEMA project goals are to develop managerial tools that can be used to increase the understanding of the lifeline systems' vulnerabilities and to help identify potential mitigation approaches that could be used to reduce those vulnerabilities. Another program goal is to identify methods to enhance the transfer of the resulting information to lifeline system providers, designers, builders, managers, operators, users, and regulators. This report presents the analytic methods developed to define the collocation impacts and the resulting analyses of the seismic and geologic environmental loads on the collocated lifelines in the Cajon Pass. The assumed earthquake event is similar to the 8.3 magnitude, San Andreas fault, Ft. Tejon earthquake of 1857. In this, report a new analysis method is developed and applied to identify the increase in the vulnerability of the individual lifeline systems due to their proximity to other lifelines in the Cajon Pass. A third reports presents an executive summary of the study. The Cajon Pass Lifeline Inventory report and this present report taken together provide a specific example of how the new analysis method can be applied to a real lifeline corridor situation.

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) agencies regardless of service delivery model have sought guidance on how to better integrate their emergency preparedness and response activities into similar processes occurring at the local, regional, State, tribal and Federal levels. The primary purpose of this project is to begin the process of providing that guidance as it relates to mass care incident deployment. The World Bank reported in 2005 that on aggregate, the reported number of natural disasters worldwide has been rapidly increasing, from fewer than 100 in 1975 to more than 400 in 2005. Terrorism, pandemic surge, and natural disasters have had a major impact on the science of planning for and responding to mass care incidents and remain a significant threat to the homeland. From the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the subsequent use of anthrax as a biological weapon, to the more recent surge concerns following the outbreak of H1N1 influenza, EMS have a real and immediate need for integration with the emergency management process, and to coordinate efforts with partners across the spectrum of the response community. The barriers identified from the literature review and interviews with national EMS leadership include: lack of access to emergency preparedness grant funding; underrepresentation on local, regional, and State level planning committees; and lack of systematic mandatory inclusion of all EMS provider types in State, regional, and local emergency plans. In December 2004, New York University's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response held a national roundtable that included experts from major organizations representing the EMS system as a whole. The report from that meeting concluded that: "EMS providers, such as fire departments and hospital-based, commercial, and air ambulance services, ensure that patients receive the medical care they need during a terrorist attack. While EMS personnel, including Emergency Medical Technicians and paramedics, represent roughly one-third of traditional first responders (which also include law enforcement and fire service personnel), the EMS system receives only four percent of first responder funding. If EMS personnel are not prepared for a terrorist attack, their ability to provide medical care and transport to victims of an attack will be compromised. There will be an inadequate medical first response." In 2007, the Institute of Medicine in its landmark report Emergency Medical Services at the Crossroads issued a recommendation that stated: "The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department of Homeland Security and the States should elevate emergency and trauma care to a position of parity with other public safety entities in disaster planning and operations." Since the time of these reports Federal progress to address these issues has included the creation of the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the creation of the Emergency Care Coordination Center (ECCC) within HHS, and the creation of the Federal Interagency Committee on EMS (FICEMS) Preparedness Committee. In an effort to increase the level of preparedness among EMS agencies, the National Emergency Medical Services Management Association (NEMSMA) approached the DHS and OHA to engage them in a partnership that would provide a greater understanding of the shortfalls in EMS emergency preparedness and provide resources to fill those gaps. The primary objective of this project is to understand model policies and practices across a spectrum of disciplines and provider types that will lead to a better prepared EMS deployment to mass care incidents. This project should serve as a foundation for further development of EMS specific policies and templates that improve EMS readiness to manage the full spectrum of hazards that face their communities.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, works to reduce the ever-increasing cost that disasters inflict on the nation. Preventing losses before they occur by designing and constructing buildings and their components to withstand anticipated forces from various hazards is one of the key components of mitigation and is one of the most effective ways of reducing the cost of future disasters. The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) is the federal program established to address the nation's earthquake threat. NEHRP seeks to resolve two basic issues: how will earthquakes affect us and how do we best apply our resources to reduce their impact on our nation. The program was established by Congress under the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-124) and was the result of years of examination of the earthquake hazard and possible mitigation measures. Under the NEHRP, FEMA is responsible for supporting program implementation activities, including the development, publication, and dissemination of technical design and construction guidance documents. Generally, there has not been much technical guidance addressing residential buildings unless they are located in areas of high seismicity or exceed a certain size or height. This is because most residential buildings were thought to perform fairly well in earthquakes due to their low mass and simple construction. While buildings may not normally experience catastrophic collapse, they can still suffer significant amounts of damage, rendering them uninhabitable. This is especially true when construction techniques are less than adequate. What is particularly important from FEMA's point of view is that, given the sheer number of this type of building, even minor damage represents a significant loss potential and temporary housing demand that will need to be addressed after an earthquake by all levels of government. This guide provides information on current best practices for earthquake-resistant house design and construction for use by builders, designers, code enforcement personnel, and potential homeowners. It incorporates lessons learned from the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes as well as knowledge gained from the FEMA-funded CUREE-Caltech Woodframe Project. It also introduces and explains the effects of earthquake loads on one- and two-family detached houses and identifies the requirements of the 2003 International Residential Code (IRC) intended to resist these loads. The stated purpose of the IRC is to provide: "... minimum requirements to safeguard the public safety, health, and general welfare, through affordability, structural strength, means of egress facilities, stability, sanitation, light and ventilation, energy conservation and safety to life and property from fire and other hazards attributed to the built environment." Because the building code requirements are minimums, a house and its contents still may be damaged in an earthquake even if it was designed and built to comply with the code. Research has shown, however, that earthquake damage to a house can be reduced for a relatively small increase in construction cost. This guide identifies above-code techniques for improving earthquake performance and presents an estimate of their cost. Note that the information presented in this guide is not intended to replace the IRC or any applicable state or local building code, and the reader is urged to consult with the local building department before applying any of the guidance presented in this document. The information presented in this guide applies only to one- and two-family detached houses constructed using the nonengineered prescriptive construction provisions of the IRC. Applicable IRC limits on building configuration and construction are described.

As Federal employees, we all have a range of responsibilities: to our families, loved ones, communities, and the American public. By preparing for emergencies, we can enhance the safety of our families and strengthen our ability to carry out our work. This guide was produced by the FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination to encourage Federal employees and the whole community in the Washington, D.C. area to take practical steps to better prepare ourselves and our families for emergencies that could threaten our homes, workplaces, and communities. Each day, you and other Federal employees provide an array of essential services. Your own personal readiness for natural, accidental, or intentional hazards is a key part of the Federal Government's ability to continue serving its citizens. Emergencies can happen at any time, without warning. Federal, State, local and non-governmental organizations are committed to helping people in need, but that assistance may be delayed during a large incident. You and your family should be ready for the unexpected and prepared to provide for yourselves. The best way to ensure your own safety and wellbeing is to take responsibility for your own emergency preparedness. Even if you do not have designed emergency duties, you may be expected to carry out your job functions in an emergency. Other conditions as your workplace or in your community also could make it difficult for you to get home right away. Your family should have plans and resources to take care of themselves in your absence. Fortunately, there are practical steps you can take now that can make a big difference in a wide range of emergencies - Be Informed! Make a Plan! Build a Kit!

Past storms such as Hurricanes Andrew, Hugo, Charley, Katrina, and Rita, and recent events such as Hurricane Ike continue to show the vulnerability of our "built environment". While good design and construction cannot totally eliminate risk, every storm has shown that sound design and construction can significantly reduce the risk to life and damage to property. With that in mind, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed this manual to help the community of homebuilders, contractors, and local engineering professionals in rebuilding homes destroyed by hurricanes, and designing and building safer and less vulnerable new homes. The intent of the manual is to provide homebuilders, contractors, and engineering professionals with a series of recommended foundation designs that will help create safer and stronger buildings in coastal areas. The designs are intended to help support rebuilding efforts after coastal areas have been damaged by floods, high winds, or other natural hazards. The foundations may differ somewhat from traditional construction techniques; however, they represent what are considered to be some of the better approaches to constructing strong and safe foundations in hazardous coastal areas. The objectives used to guide the development of this manual are: To provide residential foundation designs that will require minimal engineering oversight; To provide foundation designs that are flexible enough to accommodate many of the homes identified in A Pattern Book for Gulf Coast Neighborhoods prepared for the Mississippi Governor's Rebuilding Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal; To utilize "model" layouts so that many homes can be constructed without significant additional engineering efforts. The focus of this document is on the foundations of residential buildings. The assumption is that those who are designing and building new homes will be responsible for ensuring that the building itself is designed according to the latest building code (International Building Code(R), International Residential Code(R), and FEMA guidance) and any local requirements. The user of this manual is directed to other publications that also address disaster-resistant construction. Although the foundation designs are geared to the coastal environment subject to storm surge, waves, floating debris, and high winds, several are suitable for supporting homes on sites protected by levees and floodwalls or in riverine areas subjected to high-velocity flows. Design professionals can be contacted to ensure the foundation designs provided in this manual are suitable for specific sites. This edition of FEMA 550 introduces the Case H foundation, which is an open/deep foundation developed for use in coastal high hazard areas (V zones). It is also appropriate to use the Case H foundation in Coastal A and non-coastal A zones. Case H foundations incorporate elevated reinforced concrete beams that provide three important benefits. One, the elevated beams work in conjunction with the reinforced concrete columns and grade beams to produce a structural frame that is more efficient at resisting lateral loads than the grade beams and cantilevered columns used in other FEMA 550 open foundations. The increased efficiency allows foundations to be constructed with smaller columns that are less exposed to flood forces. The second benefit is that the elevated reinforced concrete beams provide a continuous foundation that can support many homes constructed to prescriptive designs from codes and standards such as the IRC, the American Forest and Paper Association's Wood Frame Construction Manual for One- and Two-Family Dwellings (WFCM), and the International Code Council's Standard for Residential Construction in High Wind Regions (ICC-600). The third benefit that Case H foundations provide is the ability to support relatively narrow homes. It is anticipated that Case H foundations can be used for several styles of modular homes.

Hurricane Opal made landfall on Santa Rosa Island, in Santa Rosa County, Florida, near Navarre Beach on October 4, 1995. Fifteen counties in the Florida Panhandle were declared Federal disaster areas. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT) whose mission was to evaluate structural damage and recommend mitigation measures that will enhance the performance of buildings in future storms. The BPAT's observations focused on the performance of buildings during the hurricane, including both successes and failures. These observations and the BPAT's recommendations are documented in this report. The BPAT's observations regarding flood and wind damage caused by the storm are described in detail, and recommendations are presented regarding design and construction of new structures and substantial improvements to existing structures; permitting, plan review, and inspection; construction materials; and repair and retrofit of damaged structures.

Earthquakes represent an enormous threat to the Nation. Although damaging earthquakes occur infrequently, their consequences can be staggering. As recent earthquakes around the world have demonstrated, high population densities and development pressures, particularly in urban areas, are increasingly vulnerable. Unacceptably high loss of life and enormous economic consequences are associated with recent global earthquakes, and it is only a matter of time before the United States faces a similar experience. Earthquakes cannot be prevented, but their impacts can be managed to a large degree so that loss to life and property can be reduced. To this end, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) seeks to mitigate earthquake losses in the U.S. through both basic and directed research and implementation activities in the fields of earthquake science and engineering. This program is authorized and funded by Congress and is managed as a collaborative effort among the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the United States Geological Survey (USGS). These four Federal organizations work in close coordination to improve the Nation's understanding of earthquake hazards and to mitigate their effects. The missions of the four agencies are complementary: FEMA, a component of the Department of Homeland Security, works with states, local governments, and the public to develop tools and improve policies and practices that reduce earthquake losses; NIST enables technology innovation in earthquake engineering by working with industry to remove technical barriers, evaluate advanced technologies, and develop the measurement and prediction tools underpinning performance standards for buildings and lifelines; NSF strives to advance fundamental knowledge in earthquake engineering, earth science processes, and societal preparedness and response to earthquakes; and USGS monitors earthquakes, assesses seismic hazard for the Nation, and researches the basic earth science processes controlling earthquake occurrence and effects. Mindful of the increasing threat posed by earthquakes, NEHRP initiated a review of the scientific goals and strategies of the Program and a discussion of the opportunities and priorities for the five-year interval 2001-2005. This review and discussion culminated in the new strategic plan presented here. Shaping the plan are four goals that represent the continuum of activities in the Program, ranging from research and development to application and implementation. These four goals are as follows: A. Develop effective practices and policies for earthquake loss-reduction and accelerate their implementation. B. Improve techniques to reduce seismic vulnerability of facilities and systems. C. Improve seismic hazard identification and risk assessment methods and their use. D. Improve the understanding of earthquakes and their effects.

The original Earthquakes -A Teacher's Package for K-6 (FEMA 159) was developed as a joint effort of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) under contract with FEMA. NSTA's project team produced an excellent product. Since its publication in 1988, over 50,000 teachers have requested copies. This revised version brought members of the original project team together with a group of teachers who had used the materials extensively in their classroom and served as teacher-educators at FEMA's Tremor Troop workshops. About 75% of the original material remains unchanged: a few activities were removed and a few added. A major change was the addition of assessments throughout the units. The examples we provide relate to life outside the classroom and/or activities similar to those of scientists. We also added matrices linking activities to the National Science Education Standards. The Teacher's Package has five units. Each of the first four units is divided into three levels: Level 1, for grades K-2; Level 2, for grades 3-4; and Level 3, for grades 5-6. Since classes and individuals vary widely you may often find the procedures in the other levels helpful for your students. The last unit has four parts with activities for students in all grades, K-6. Unit L, Defining an Earthquake, builds on what students already know about earthquakes to establish a working definition of the phenomenon. Legends from near and far encourage children to create their own fanciful explanations, paving the way for the scientific explanations they will begin to learn in this unit. Unit I, Why and Where Earthquakes Occur, presents the modern scientific understanding of the Earth's structure and composition, and relates this to the cause of earthquakes. Unit II, Physical Results of Earthquakes, provides greater understanding of the processes that shape our active Earth. Earthquakes are put in the context of the large- and small-scale changes that are constantly at work on the continents as well as the ocean floor. Unit IV, Measuring Earthquakes, explains earthquakes in terms of wave movement and introduces students to the far-ranging effects of earthquakes. Unit V, Earthquake Safety and Survival, focuses on what to expect during an earthquake; how to cope safely; how to identify earthquake hazards; and how to reduce, eliminate, or avoid them.

The Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994, caused widespread building damage throughout some of the most heavily populated communities of Southern California including the San Fernando Valley, Santa Monica and West Los Angeles, resulting in estimated economic losses exceeding $30 billion. Much of the damage sustained was quite predictable, occurring in types of buildings that engineers had previously identified as having low seismic resistance and significant risk of damage in earthquakes. This included older masonry and concrete buildings, but not steel framed buildings. Surprisingly, however, a number of modern, welded, steel, moment-frame buildings also sustained significant damage. This damage consisted of a brittle fracturing of the steel frames at the welded joints between the beams (horizontal framing members) and columns (vertical framing members). A few of the most severely damaged buildings could readily be observed to be out-of plumb (leaning to one side). However, many of the damaged buildings exhibited no outward signs of these fractures, making damage detection both difficult and costly. Then, exactly one year later, on January 17, 1995, the city of Kobe, Japan also experienced a large earthquake, causing similar unanticipated damage to steel moment-frame buildings. Prior to the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe earthquakes, engineers believed that steel moment-frames would behave in a ductile manner, bending under earthquake loading, but not breaking. As a result, this became one of the most common types of construction used for major buildings in areas subject to severe earthquakes. The discovery of the potential for fracturing in these frames called to question the adequacy of the building code provisions dealing with this type of construction and created a crisis of confidence around the world. Engineers did not have clear guidance on how to detect damage, repair the damage they found, assess the safety of existing buildings, upgrade buildings found to be deficient or design new steel moment-frame structures to perform adequately in earthquakes. The observed damage also raised questions as to whether buildings in cities affected by other past earthquakes had sustained similar undetected damage and were now weakened and potentially hazardous. In response to the many concerns raised by these damage discoveries, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sponsored a program of directed investigation and development to identify the cause of the damage, quantify the risk inherent in steel structures and develop practical and effective engineering criteria for mitigation of this risk. As the project progressed, interim guidance documents were published to provide practicing engineers and the construction industry with important information on the lessons learned, as well as recommendations for investigation, repair, upgrade, and design of steel moment frame buildings. Many of these recommendations have already been incorporated into recent building codes. This project culminated with the publication of four engineering practice guideline documents. These four volumes include state-of-the-art recommendations that should be included in future building codes, as well as guidelines that may be applied voluntarily to assess and reduce the earthquake risk in our communities. This policy guide has been prepared to provide a nontechnical summary of the valuable information contained in the FEMA/SAC publications, an understanding of the risk associated with steel moment-frame buildings, and the practical measures that can be taken to reduce this risk. It is anticipated that this guide will be of interest to building owners and tenants, members of the financial and insurance industries, and to government planners and the building regulation community.

On the evening of September 21, 1998, Hurricane Georges made landfall on Puerto Rico's east coast as a strong Category 2 hurricane. It traveled directly over the interior of the island, mainly in an east-west direction, and passed off Puerto Rico's west coast on September 22. Puerto Rico had not experienced a hurricane of this magnitude since Hurricane Hugo, a devastating Category 3 hurricane that passed over the northeast corner of Puerto Rico in a southeast to northwest direction in September 1989. On September 30, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Mitigation Directorate deployed a Building Performance Assessment Team (BPAT) to Puerto Rico to assess damages caused by Hurricane Georges. The team included architects, engineers, planners, insurance specialists, and floodplain management specialists. The BPAT's mission was to assess the performance of buildings and other structures throughout Puerto Rico and make recommendations for improving building performance in future events. After an aerial assessment of the island, the BPAT conducted field investigations in selected areas affected by the storm. The field investigations of significantly damaged areas centered on the performance of single-family residential home construction. Isolated examples of success and failure in commercial buildings (primarily building envelope issues in high-rise buildings) and several essential facilities observed during field investigations were also documented. Commercial buildings were not investigated for compliance with current structural seismic guidelines. One- and two-family residential buildings, however, were investigated for their ability to sustain a seismic event. Seismic resistance of nonstructural elements was also observed. It is important to note that wind speeds experienced on the island were not of the strength to test the design of Puerto Rico's buildings. A more significant wind event striking Puerto Rico would likely have resulted in even more failures than were observed. A large number of residential buildings in Puerto Rico experienced structural damage from the high winds of Hurricane Georges. The BPAT concluded that while not all of the damage caused by Hurricane Georges could have been prevented, a significant amount could have been avoided if more buildings had been constructed to Puerto Rico's existing Planning Regulation 7 (building code). Additional damage could have been avoided if more buildings had been designed and constructed to current codes and regulations that address flood, wind, and seismic loads. Although the BPAT observed several examples of successful mitigation implementation, many buildings unfortunately received too little attention to mitigation. If effective mitigation efforts had been implemented more extensively in the design and construction of buildings, the widespread devastation of the hurricane would have been substantially reduced.

This FEMA 154 Report, Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards: A Handbook, is the first of a two-volume publication on a recommended methodology for rapid visual screening of buildings for potential seismic hazards. The technical basis for the methodology, including the scoring system and its development, are contained in the companion FEMA 155 report, Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards: Supporting Documentation. The rapid visual screening procedure (RVS) has been developed for a broad audience, including building officials and inspectors, and government agency and private-sector building owners, to identify, inventory, and rank buildings that are potentially seismically hazardous. Although RVS is applicable to all buildings, its principal purpose is to identify (1) older buildings designed and constructed before the adoption of adequate seismic design and detailing requirements, (2) buildings on soft or poor soils, or (3) buildings having performance characteristics that negatively influence their seismic response. Once identified as potentially hazardous, such buildings should be further evaluated by a design professional experienced in seismic design to determine if, in fact, they are seismically hazardous. The RVS uses a methodology based on a "sidewalk survey" of a building and a Data Collection Form, which the person conducting the survey (hereafter referred to as the screener) completes, based on visual observation of the building from the exterior, and if possible, the interior. The Data Collection Form includes space for documenting building identification information, including its use and size, a photograph of the building, sketches, and documentation of pertinent data related to seismic performance, including the development of a numeric seismic hazard score. Once the decision to conduct rapid visual screening for a community or group of buildings has been made by the RVS authority, the screening effort can be expedited by pre-planning, including the training of screeners, and careful overall management of the process. Completion of the Data Collection Form in the field begins with identifying the primary structural lateral-load-resisting system and structural materials of the building. Basic Structural Hazard Scores for various building types are provided on the form, and the screener circles the appropriate one. For many buildings, viewed only from the exterior, this important decision requires the screener to be trained and experienced in building construction. The procedure presented in this Handbook is meant to be the preliminary screening phase of a multi-phase procedure for identifying potentially hazardous buildings. Buildings identified by this procedure must be analyzed in more detail by an experienced seismic design professional. Because rapid visual screening is designed to be performed from the street, with interior inspection not always possible, hazardous details will not always be visible, and seismically hazardous buildings may not be identified as such. Conversely, buildings initially identified as potentially hazardous by RVS may prove to be adequate.

Recent decades have seen a dramatic earthquake related losses. In the past ten years estimated losses were twenty times larger than in the previous 30 years combined. FEMAs expenditures related to earthquake losses have become an increasing percentage of its disaster assistance budget. Predictions are that future single earthquakes, which will inevitably occur, may result in losses of $50-100 billion each. Losses are rising due to several factors. These include: a denser population of buildings being located in seismically active regions. an aging building stock and the increasing cost of business interruption. Nonstructural and contents damage are also large contributors to loss, especially in regions with high-technology manufacturing and health-care industries. It is this increase in losses from all hazards that has led FEMA to support actions to reduce future losses. One of these is Project Impact, an initiative to encourage loss reduction activities through partnerships at the local community level. One of the key components of Project Impact is the community's adoption and enforcement of an adequate building code. Performance Based Seismic Design (PBSD) is a methodology that provides a means to more reliably predict seismic risk in all buildings in terms more useful to building users. PBSD will benefit nearly all building users. The PBSD methodology will be used by code writers to develop building codes that more accurately and consistently reflect the minimum standards desired by the community. A performance based design option in the code will facilitate design of buildings to higher standards and will allow rapid implementation of innovative technology. When performance levels are tied to probable losses in a reliability framework, the building design process can be tied into owner's long-term capital planning strategies, as well as numerical life cycle cost models. PBSD is not limited to the design of new buildings. With it, existing facilities can be evaluated and/or retrofitted to reliable performance objectives. Sharing the common framework of PBSD, existing buildings and new buildings can be compared equitably. It is expected that a rating system will develop to replace the currently used Probable Maximum Loss (PML) system. Such a system is highly desirable to owners, tenants, insurers, lenders, and others involved with building financial transactions. Despite its inconsistency and lack of transparency, the PML system is widely used and a poor rating often creates the financial incentive needed for retrofit decisions. This Action Plan presents a rational and cost effective approach by which building stakeholders: owners, financial institutions, engineers, architects, contractors, researchers, the public and governing agencies, will be able to move to a performance based design and evaluation system. The Plan recognizes that there is a strong demand from stakeholder groups for more reliable, quantifiable and practical means to control building damage. It also recognizes that there is not a focused understanding among these groups as to how these goals can be obtained. This Plan describes how performance based seismic design guidelines can be developed and used to achieve these goals. It will be a vehicle to bring together the diverse sets of demands from within the stakeholder groups and distill them into cohesive and practical guidelines. It engages each of the groups in the development these guidelines, by which future building design will become more efficient and reliable.

On September 22, 1992, at the request of the Mayor of Kauai County, the Federal Coordinating Officer for the Iniki disaster tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) to assemble a team of experts to assess the performance of buildings. The team was tasked with surveying the performance of primarily residential structures under wind and water forces generated during Hurricane Iniki. The goal of this effort is to provide guidance and offer recommendations for reducing damage from future hurricanes. This goal is best met through learning from both failures and successes of building performance. During the field assessment, the team investigated primarily structural systems (i.e., systems in a building that resist lateral and vertical forces. For all buildings, the performance of exterior architectural systems, such as roofing, windows, and doors was analyzed. The analysis also included the effects of windborne and waterborne debris and the quality of construction and materials. The majority of building types observed were one- and two-story, wood-frame, single-family and multi-family residential structures. However, pre-engineered steel commercial and industrial buildings, as well as resort hotels and condominiums constructed of reinforced concrete and masonry, were also examined. This report includes detailed engineering discussions of building failure modes and successful building performance. It also provides detailed recommendations for enhancing building performance under hurricane and flood conditions.

This Juvenile Firesetter Intervention Handbook is designed to teach communities how to develop an effective juvenile firesetter intervention program. The chapters of this Handbook can be viewed as the six building blocks essential to construct a successful program. The cornerstone of the blueprint is understanding the personality profiles of juvenile firesetters and their families. The next step is identifying at-risk youth and assessing the likelihood that they will become involved in future firesetting incidents. The identification of the three levels of firesetting risk-little, definite, and extreme-leads to specific types of intervention, including evaluation, education, referral, and follow up. These are the critical components of a juvenile firesetter program To provide a complete complement of services to juvenile firesetters and their families, the juvenile firesetter program must be part of a community network. This network consists of a continuum of care designed to provide a range of intervention services, including prevention, immediate treatment, and graduated sanctions to juvenile firesetters and their families. Finally, there is a specific set of programmatic tasks that will ensure the delivery of swift and effective intervention to at-risk youth and their families. A planned an coordinated effort on the part of the fire service and human service organizations is the best way to reduce juvenile involvement in firesetting and arson and to protect and preserve lives and property in our communities.

During the past few decades, the number of large public warehouse stores (often referred to as big-box stores) across the nation has grown significantly, changing both consumer buying habits and the public's risk of injury during earthquakes. During an earthquake, occupant safety in a big-box store depends on both the structural performance of the building and on the performance of the storage racks and their contents. Earthquake ground motions can cause storage racks to collapse or overturn if they are not properly designed, installed, maintained, and loaded. In addition, goods stored on the racks may spill or topple off. Both occurrences pose a life-safety risk to the exposed shopping public. The immediate stimulus for the project that resulted in this report was a 2003 request from the State of Washington to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for guidance concerning the life-safety risk posed by the storage racks in publicly accessible areas of retail stores, especially the risk of rack collapse of loss of stored goods during an earthquake. FEMA asked the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC) to develop the requested guidance. To do so, the BSSC established a Rack Project Task Group composed of practicing engineers, storage rack designers, researchers, representatives of the Rack Manufacturers Institute (RMI) and the Retail Industry Leaders Association, and members of applicable technical subcommittees responsible for updating the NEHRP Recommended Provisions. In developing this guidance document, the Task Group focused primarily on steel single selective pallet storage racks. It reviewed available information on storage rack performance during earthquakes and the background on the development of standards and code requirements for storage racks; assessed seismic requirements for storage racks and current practices with respect to rack design, maintenance and operations, quality assurance, and post-earthquake inspections; and examined available research and testing data. Based on its study, the Task Group developed short-term recommendations to improve current practice and formulated long-term recommendations to serve as the basis for improved standards documents such as the NEHRP Recommended Provisions, ASCE 7, and the RMI-developed storage rack specification. Over the near term, the Task Group recommends that the 2003 NEHRP Recommended Provisions requirements for steel single selective pallet storage rack design be followed and that connections be checked in accordance with a procedure to be developed by RMI. The Task Group also recommends that additional guidance presented in this report be voluntarily adopted by store owners and operators. Further, given the fact that maintenance and use of storage racks is a key element to their acceptable performance during earthquakes, store owners and operators should adopt an appropriate quality assurance plan; as a minimum, the best self-imposed practices of store owners and operators should be maintained. The Task Group's primary long-term recommendation is that the RMI specification be brought into conformance with the 2003 NEHRP Recommended Provisions, which is the basis for seismic requirements found in current seismic design standards and model building codes. The Task Group also recommends that optional performance-based and limit state procedures and component cyclic testing procedures be incorporated into the RMI-developed specification. Compliance with these procedures will demonstrate that the storage racks have the capacity to resist maximum considered earthquake ground motions without collapse. It also is recommended that regulatory bodies periodically review the quality assurance programs of stores and implement any regulations needed to satisfy life-safety concerns that relate to the securing of rack contents and rack maintenance and use.

This report, FEMA-351 - Recommended Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade Criteria for Existing Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings has been developed by the SAC Joint Venture under contract to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide structural engineers with recommended criteria for evaluation of the probable performance of existing steel moment-frame buildings in future earthquakes and to provide a basis for updating and revision of evaluation and rehabilitation guidelines and standards. It is one of a series of companion publications addressing the issue of the seismic performance of steel moment-frame buildings. The set of companion publications includes: FEMA-350 - Recommended Seismic Design Criteria for New Steel Moment-Frame Buildings. This publication provides recommended criteria, supplemental to FEMA-302 - 1997 NEHRP Recommended Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings and Other Structures, for the design and construction of steel moment-frame buildings and provides alternative performance-based design criteria. FEMA-351 - Recommended Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade Criteria for Existing Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings. This publication provides recommended methods to evaluate the probable performance of existing steel moment-frame buildings in future earthquakes and to retrofit these buildings for improved performance. FEMA-352 - Recommended Postearthquake Evaluation and Repair Criteria for Welded Steel Moment-Frame Buildings. This publication provides recommendations for performing postearthquake inspections to detect damage in steel moment-frame buildings following an earthquake, evaluating the damaged buildings to determine their safety in the postearthquake environment, and repairing damaged buildings. FEMA-353 - Recommended Specifications and Quality Assurance Guidelines for Steel Moment-Frame Construction for Seismic Applications. This publication provides recommended specifications for the fabrication and erection of steel moment frames for seismic applications. The recommended design criteria contained in the other companion documents are based on the material and workmanship standards contained in this document, which also includes discussion of the basis for the quality control and quality assurance criteria contained in the recommended specifications. The information contained in these recommended evaluation and upgrade criteria, hereinafter referred to as Recommended Criteria, is presented in the form of specific recommendations for design and performance evaluation procedures together with supporting commentary explaining part of the basis for these recommendations.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) program, developed in the early 1990s, is used to determine the cost effectiveness of proposed mitigation projects for several FEMA mitigation grant programs. In 2008, FEMA collaborated with many Applicants and subapplicants on enhancements to update values in the software and to make it more efficient. The purpose of the BCA Reference Guide is to provide BCA software users with an overview of the grant programs, application development, benefits and costs, and the location of BCA guidance documents and helpful information. This guide also outlines sources of additional information needed to use the software to obtain a Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) for a single project or multiple projects. Hazard mitigation is any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from natural hazards and their effects. This definition distinguishes actions that have a long-term impact from those that are more closely associated with immediate preparedness, response, and recovery activities. Hazard mitigation is the only phase of emergency management specifically dedicated to breaking the cycle of damage, reconstruction, and repeated damage. As such, States, Territories, Indian Tribal governments, and communities are encouraged to take advantage of the funding provided by Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) programs in both the pre- and post-disaster periods. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA HMA programs provide a critical opportunity to reduce the risk to individuals and property from natural hazards, while simultaneously reducing reliance on Federal disaster funds. HMA guidance provides continuity between five FEMA mitigation grant programs: the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM), Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA), Repetitive Flood Claims (RFC), and Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) programs. Each HMA program was authorized by a separate legislative action, and as such, each program differs slightly in scope and intent, but all of them provide significant opportunities to reduce or eliminate potential losses to State, Tribal, and local assets. HMGP may provide funds to States, Territories, Indian Tribal governments, local governments, and eligible private non-profits following a Presidential major disaster declaration. The PDM, FMA, RFC, and SRL programs may provide funds annually to States, Territories, Indian Tribal governments, and local governments. While the statutory origins of the programs differ, all share the common goal of reducing the risk of loss of life and property due to natural hazards. This publication was prepared with contributions by the URS Group, Inc., Gaithersburg, MD.

On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck southern Dade County, Florida, generating high winds and rain over a vast area of the county. Although the storm produced high winds and high storm surge, the effects of the storm surge and wave action were limited to a relatively small area of the coastal floodplain. It was evident from the extensive damage caused by wind, however, that wind speeds are significant. In September 1992, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Federal Insurance Administration (FIA), at the request of the FEMA Disaster Field Office Staff, assembled a Building Performance Assessment Team. The task of the team was to survey the performance of residential buildings in the storm's path and to provide findings and recommendations to both the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team and the Dade County Building Code Task Force. The basis for performing the survey is that better performance of building systems can be expected when causes of observed failures are corrected using recognized standards of design and construction. The assessment team developed recommendations for reducing future hurricane damage such as that resulting from Hurricane Andrew. Recommendations included areas of concern such as building materials, construction techniques, code compliance, quality of construction, plan review, inspection, and reconstruction/retrofit efforts. The recommendations presented in this report may also have application in other communities in Florida. This report presents the team's observations of the successes and failures of buildings in withstanding the effects of Hurricane Andrew, comments on building failure modes, and provides recommendations for improvements intended to enhance the performance of buildings in future hurricanes.