Bøger af Felix Munoz-Garcia

An introduction to game theory, complete with step-by-step tools and detailed examples. This book offers condensed breakdowns of game-theory concepts. Specifically, this textbook provides ¿tools¿ or ¿recipes¿ to solve different classes of games.Game Theory presents the information as plainly and clearly as possible. Every chapter begins with the main definitions and concepts before diving into the applications to different settings across economics, business, and other social sciences. Chapters walk readers through algebraic steps and simplifications. This makes the text accessible for undergraduate and Masters-level students in economics and finance. Paired with the exercises published on the accompanying website, students will improve both their theoretical and practical understandings of game theory.Readers will walk away from this book understanding complete and incomplete information modelsas well as signaling games.

This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders¿ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller¿s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students.The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D.Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.

Subsequent chapters dedicate special attention to incomplete information games, such as signaling games, cheap talk games, and equilibrium refinements, emphasizing common steps and including graphical illustrations to focus students' attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis.

Subsequent chapters dedicate special attention to incomplete information games, such as signaling games, cheap talk games, and equilibrium refinements, emphasizing common steps and including graphical illustrations to focus students' attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis.