Bøger af Marc LaBonte

The U.S. trade deficit is equal to net foreign capital inflows. Because U.S. investment rates exceed U.S. saving rates, the gap must be financed by foreign borrowing. Net capital inflows have grown over recent years to a record 6.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006. Economists have long argued that the low U.S. saving rate, which is much lower than most foreign countries, is the underlying cause of the trade deficit and that policies aimed at reducing the trade deficit should focus on boosting national saving. The most straightforward policy would be to reduce the budget deficit, which directly increases national saving.

China's policy of intervening in currency markets to limit or halt the appreciation of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the U.S. dollar and other currencies has become an issue of concern for many in Congress. Critics charge that China's currency policy is intended to make its exports significantly less expensive, and its imports more expensive, than would occur if the RMB were a freely-traded currency. They contend that the RMB is significantly undervalued against the dollar and that this has been a major contributor to the large annual U.S. trade deficits with China and the loss of U.S. jobs in recent years. Several bills have been introduced the 112th Congress that seek to address the effects of undervalued currencies (which are largely aimed at China), including H.R. 639, S. 328, S. 1130, S. 1267, and S. 1619 (which passed the Senate on October 11, 2011). On the other hand, some analysts contend that China's industrial policies, its failure to adequately protect U.S. intellectual property rights, and its unbalanced economic growth model, pose more serious challenges to U.S. economic interests than China's currency policy. Some U.S. business groups have also expressed concern that U.S. currency legislation could aggravate U.S.- China commercial ties.

After years of rapid appreciation, house prices barely rose in the second quarter of 2007, and many analysts expect price declines in many markets in the near future. There have already been large drops in house sales and residential investment (house building). Given the central role that the housing boom has played in the current economic expansion, many observers fear that a crash in the housing market will lead to an economy-wide recession. They are concerned that a fall in house prices could spill over into a decline in aggregate spending through four channels. First, builders could respond to lower prices by reducing residential investment, an important component of gross domestic product (GDP). Second, since mortgages are backed by the value of the underlying house, a fall in prices could feed through to financial instability. Both of these effects have already been felt, with the rate of residential investment falling by double digits since mid-2006, and the entire financial sector undergoing a liquidity crunch triggered by problems with subprime mortgage-backed securities in August 2007. Third, a fall in housing prices could lead to a decline in consumer spending through a negative "wealth effect." Some economists have argued that when house ...

The United States has been free of a national debt for only 2 years, 1834 and 1835. We began our existence as a country in 1790 with a debt of $75 million. It rose to $3.8 trillion in 1997. It rose to a high of 108.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of World War II; declined to a post-World War II low of 23.8% of GDP in 1974; and, then, rose to another high of 49.5% of GDP in 1993. The major cause of debt accumulation has been war. The United States has financed the extraordinary expenditures associated with war by borrowing rather than by raising taxes or printing money. This pattern was broken by the large budget deficits of the 1980s and 1990s which caused the national debt to rise substantially as a fraction of GDP during peacetime. While economists have long recognized that a national debt imposes an inescapable burden on a nation, they have debated whether the burden is borne by the generation who contracts the debt or is shifted forward to future generations. There has also been some controversy over the nature of the burden. The current consensus among economists is that the ...

Although "too big to fail" (TBTF) has been a perennial policy issue, it was highlighted by the near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Financial firms are said to be TBTF when policy makers judge that their failure would cause unacceptable disruptions to the overall financial system, and they can be TBTF because of their size or interconnectedness. In addition to fairness issues, economic theory suggests that expectations that a firm will not be allowed to fail create moral hazard-if the creditors and counterparties of a TBTF firm believe that the government will protect them from losses, they have less incentive to monitor the firm's riskiness because they are shielded from the negative consequences of those risks. If so, they could have a funding advantage compared with other banks, which some call an implicit subsidy. S.Con.Res. 8, passed by the Senate on March 22, 2013, and H.Con.Res. 25, as amended and passed by the Senate on October 16, 2013, create a non-binding budget reserve fund that allows for future legislation to address the TBTF funding advantage.

Although "too big to fail" (TBTF) has been a perennial policy issue, it was highlighted by the near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Financial firms are said to be TBTF when policymakers judge that their failure would cause unacceptable disruptions to the overall financial system, and they can be TBTF because of their size or interconnectedness. In addition to fairness issues, economic theory suggests that expectations that a firm will not be allowed to fail creates moral hazard-if the creditors and counterparties of a TBTF firm believe that the government will protect them from losses, they have less incentive to monitor the firm's riskiness because they are shielded from the negative consequences of those risks.

The Federal Reserve (Fed) defines monetary policy as the actions it undertakes to influence the availability and cost of money and credit. Because the expectations of market participants play an important role in determining prices and growth, monetary policy can also be defined to include the directives, policies, statements, and actions of the Fed that influence how the future is perceived. In addition, the Fed acts as a "lender of last resort" to the nation's financial system, meaning that it ensures continued smooth functioning of financial intermediation by providing financial markets with adequate liquidity. This role has become of great importance following the onset of the recent financial crisis. Traditionally, the Fed has three means for achieving its goals: open market operations involving the purchase and sale of U.S. Treasury securities, the discount rate charged to banks who borrow from the Fed, and reserve requirements that governed vault cash or deposits with the Fed as a proportion of deposits. Historically, open market operations have been the primary means for executing monetary policy. Recently, in response to the financial crisis, direct lending became important once again and the Fed has created a number of new ways for injecting reserves, credit, and liquidity into the banking system, as well as making loans to firms that are not banks. As financial conditions normalized, direct lending tapered off. Emergency lending programs have been wound down, with the exception of foreign central bank liquidity swaps.

The U.S. financial system processes millions of transactions each day representing daily transfers of trillions of dollars, securities, and other assets to facilitate purchases and payments. Concerns had been raised, even prior to the recent financial crisis, about the vulnerability of the U.S. financial system to infrastructure failure. These concerns about the "plumbing" of the financial system were heightened following the market disruptions of the recent crisis. The financial market infrastructure consists of the various systems, networks, and technological processes that are necessary for conducting and completing financial transactions. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203, the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010, introduces the term "financial market utility" (FMU or utility) for those multilateral systems that transfer, clear, or settle payments, securities, or other financial transactions among financial institutions (FI) or between an FMU and a financial institution. Utilities and FIs transfer funds and settle accounts with other financial institutions to facilitate normal day-to-day transactions occurring in the U.S. economy. Those transfers include payroll and mortgage payments, foreign currency exchanges, purchases of U.S. treasury bonds and corporate securities, and derivatives trades. Further, financial institutions engage in commercial paper and securities repurchase agreements (repo) markets that contribute to liquidity in the U.S. economy. In the United States, some of the key payment, clearing, and settlement (PCS) systems are operated by the Federal Reserve, and other systems are operated by private sector organizations. With Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was enacted on July 21, 2010, Congress added a new regulatory framework for the FMUs and PCS activities (of FIs) designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council as systemically important. On July 18, 2012, the Council voted unanimously to designate eight FMUs as systemically important. Title VIII expands the Federal Reserve's role, in coordination with those of other prudential regulators, in the supervision, examination, and rule enforcement with respect to those FMUs and PCS activities of financial institutions. Additionally, FMUs may borrow from the discount window of the Federal Reserve in certain unusual and exigent circumstances. Although Title VIII primarily affects the scope of regulatory powers, certain provisions directly affect a utility's business operations. For example, Title VIII allows FMUs to maintain accounts at a Federal Reserve Bank and provides access to the Fed's discount window in unusual and exigent circumstances. Related to PCS, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes requirements that will significantly affect the business of clearinghouses in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (swaps) market. By requiring clearing of certain swap transactions through central counterparties (CCPs or clearinghouses), Title VII is expected to increase the volume of transactions processed by clearing systems subject to Title VIII. Critics contend that Title VIII grants too much discretionary authority to the Fed in an area that they argue was not a source of systemic risk during the recent financial crisis. S. 3497 seeks to repeal Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, stripping FSOC of its authority to designate FMUs as systemically important. This report outlines the changes to the supervision of key market infrastructure that are embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act. It is intended to be used as a reference for those interested in the financial system's "plumbing," and how the associated systems are currently overseen and regulated.

The "Great Recession" and the ensuing weak recovery have led the Federal Reserve (Fed) to reevaluate its monetary policy strategy. Since December 2008, overnight interest rates have been near zero; at this "zero bound," they cannot be lowered further to stimulate the economy. As a result, the Fed has taken unprecedented policy steps to try to fulfill its statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability. Congress has oversight responsibilities for ensuring that the Fed's actions are consistent with its mandate. The Fed has made large-scale asset purchases, popularly referred to as "quantitative easing" ("QE"), that have increased its balance sheet from $0.9 trillion in 2007 to $2.9 trillion at the end of 2012. Currently, the Fed is purchasing $40 billion of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and $45 billion of Treasury securities each month; because these purchases follow on two previous rounds of purchases, they have been referred to as "quantitative easing three" or "QEIII." Unlike the previous rounds, the Fed has not announced when QEIII will end or its ultimate size. The Fed views QE as stimulating the economy primarily through lower long-term interest rates, which stimulate spending on business investment, residential investment, and consumer durables. Since QE began, Treasury yields and mortgage rates have reached their lowest levels in decades; it is less clear how much QE has affected private-borrowing rates and interest-sensitive spending. Critics fear QE's potentially inflationary effects, via growth in the monetary base. Inflation has remained low to date, but QE is unprecedented in the United States and the Fed's mooted "exit strategy" for unwinding QE is untested, so the Fed's ability to successfully maintain stable prices while unwinding QE cannot be guaranteed. The Fed has also changed its communication policies since rates reached the zero bound. From 2011 to 2012, it announced a specific date for how long it anticipated that the federal funds rate would be at "exceptionally low levels," and over time incrementally extended that horizon by two years. In December 2012, it replaced the time horizon with an unemployment threshold-as long as inflation remained low, the Fed anticipated that the federal funds rate would be exceptionally low for at least as long as the unemployment rate was above 6.5%. The Fed argues that its new communication policies make its federal funds target more stimulative. In this view, if financial actors are confident that short-term rates will be low for an extended period of time, then longterm rates will be driven down today, thereby stimulating interest-sensitive spending. Uncertainty about economic projections hampers the Fed's ability to stick to a preannounced policy path, and any future backtracking could undermine its credibility. If unconventional policy were failing because it has undermined the Fed's credibility, the evidence would be high interest rates, high inflation expectations, or both; to date, neither has occurred. The sluggish rate of economic recovery suggests that monetary policy alone is not powerful enough to return the economy to full employment quickly after a severe downturn and financial crisis. It also raises questions about the optimal approach to monetary policy. When is the best time to return to withdraw unconventional policies, and in what order? Should unconventional policies only be used during serious downturns, or also in periods of sluggish growth? Do unconventional policies have unintended consequences, such as causing asset bubbles or market distortions? If so, are legislative changes needed to curb the Fed's use of QE, or would that undermine the Fed's policy discretion and interfere with conventional policymaking? Or should the Fed try other proposed unconventional policy tools to provide further stimulus when inflation is low and unemployment is high?

A book about monetary policy that can be defined broadly as any policy relating to the supply of money. It looks at five economies that have adopted a price stability goal: New Zealand , Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Euro area. It concludes with a brief analysis of the record of inflation targeting in the developing world.