Bøger af Martin Blumenson

This publication tells the story of the United States Ari Force's involvement in the region form the end of the second World War until the major infusion of American troops into Vietnam in1965. During these years, and most noticeably after 1961, the Air Force's principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air Force in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of the Saigon government. This story includes some issues of universal applicability to the Air Force: the role of air power in an insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign ally, and how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issue unique to the Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized, technological modern air force with a feudal, decentralized, indigenous one without overwhelming it, and how best to adapt fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle environment.

(Includes maps) The campaign in the summer of 1944 related in this volume included some of the most spectacular ground action of the U.S. Army during World War II. It began with the slow and costly hedgerow fighting against determined German efforts to contain the Normandy beachhead; it entered its decisive stage when the breach of German defenses permitted full exploitation of the power and mobility of U.S. Army ground troops; and it reached the peak of brilliance with successive envelopments of principal German forces and the pursuit of their remnants north and east to free, most of France, part of Belgium, and portions of the Netherlands. By late August the war in the west appeared to be almost over, but the tyranny of logistics gave the enemy time to rally at the fortified West Wall and delay surrender for another eight months. In the European Theater subseries the backdrop for this volume is "Cross-Channel Attack", which carries the story to 1 July. "Breakout and Pursuit" follows the U.S. First Army through 10 September (where "The Siegfried Line Campaign" picks up the narrative), and the U.S. Third Army through 31 August (where "The Lorraine Campaign" begins). The logistical factors that played so large a part in governing the pace and extent of combat operations are described in much greater detail in Volume I of "Logistical Support of the Armies." The tremendous scope of this campaign, and its partially improvised character, have left a heritage of controversies to which no final answers can be given. The author has had free access to the records and to many of the leading players in the drama, and his account should have wide appeal to the general reader as well as to the serious military student of grand tactics.

(Includes maps) The focus of the American and British war effort in 1943 was on the ancient lands bordering the Mediterranean Sea where in May victory came at last in Tunisia and where in July Allied armies began a five-week campaign to conquer Sicily. The invasion of Italy in September sharpened that focus as Allied troops for the first time since 1940 confronted the German Army in a sustained campaign on the mainland of Europe. The fighting that followed over the next eight months was replete with controversial actions and decisions. These included apparent American peril during the early hours in the Salerno beachhead; a British advance from the toe of the peninsula that failed to ease the pressure at Salerno; the fight to cross a flooded Rapido River; the bombing of the Benedictine abbey on Monte Cassino; and the stalemated landings at Anzio. The author addresses these subjects objectively and candidly as he sets in perspective the campaign in Italy a'1d its accomplishments. It was a grueling struggle for Allied and German soldier alike, a war of small units and individuals dictated in large measure by inhospitable terrain and wet and cold that soon immersed the battlefield. The methods commanders and men employed to defeat the terrain and a resourceful enemy are instructive now and will continue to be in the future, for the harsh conditions that were prevalent in Italy know no boundary in time. Nor do the problems and accomplishments of Allied command and co-ordination anywhere stand out in greater relief than in the campaign in Italy. The role of United States forces in earlier operations in the Mediterranean has been told in previously published volumes of this series: Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West and Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. A volume in preparation, Cassino to the Alps, will carry the operational story through the last year of the fighting. The strategic setting is described in detail in Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944.

This Discussion Paper seeks to furnish systematic data on litigation under Section 1983 of the U.S. Code, which the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted to permit prisoners to sue correctional officials in Federal court when the conditions of confinement fail to meet constitutional standards. Section 1983 litigation represents 1 in 10 of the civil cases filed in U.S. district courts. This profile of such lawsuits examining more than 2,700 cases disposed of in 1992 in 9 States (Alabama, California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) shows that 95% of cases result in dismissals, 4% result in stipulated dismissals or settlements, and 2% result in trial verdicts (of these, less than 1/2 of 1% result in a favorable verdict for the prisoner). Half the cases last 6 months or less because they fail to meet Section 1983 requirements. In cases lasting 6 to 12 months, the percent of issues the court dismissed decreases, with a corresponding increase in stipulated dismissals and successful defendants' motions to dismiss, a relative decrease in cases challenging convictions and sentences, and an increase in the relative number of cases concerning inadequate medical treatment, lack of due process, and denial of access to the courts. In cases surviving up to 2 years, issues of physical security become more frequent; the cases are more likely to have appointed counsel and evidentiary hearings; and successful prisoner litigation becomes more likely, with both settlements and verdicts resulting in financial awards to prisoners. The authors, Hanson and Daley of the National Center for State Courts, state that (1) cases that lack an adequate basis in law or fact should be resolved through State administrative grievance procedures instead of through litigation in the U.S. courts, and (2) under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, intended to resolve prisoners' grievances through State administrative procedures, the U.S. Attor

This magnificent biography by the world's foremost expert on the life of George S. Patton portrays the many faces of the general with uncompromising insight: the gruff, demanding public front known (and feared) by millions; the sensitive, intellectual visage shown to intimates; and the self-conscious, emotional, religious man only a handful of people ever met. Martin Blumenson deftly explores the life of this American hero, a paradoxical man who inspired others to greatness but who sometimes questioned the greatness within himself.Illustrated with 64 photographs, many from the Patton family archives, Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945 is a dramatic and memorable portrait of a complex American hero, a man called "the greatest combat general of modern times."

One of World War II's most brilliant and controversial generals, George S. Patton (1885-1945) fought in North Africa and Sicily, as commander of the Third Army, spearheaded the Allies' spectacular 1944-1945 sweep through France, Belgium, and Germany. Martin Blumenson is the only historian to enjoy unlimited access to the vast Patton papers. his many books include Masters of the Art of Command (available from Da Capo Press) and Patton: The Man Behind the Legend.

In southern Italy in January 1944, American forces at the base of the Monte Cassino height tried to cross the Rapido River and registered one of the most bitter failures of World War II. Conceived by General Mark Clark to help the Allied landings at Anzio, the attack at the river was part of a coordinated effort to capture Rome. Bloody River, first published in 1970, presents a detailed and impartial examination of this still controversial disaster. Unlike other accounts, Blumenson's focuses on the event itself, its circumstances and the people directly involved. Questioning why the attack failed, Blumenson finds the answers in the relationship among Clark, Walker and Major General Geoffrey Keyes, the corps commander in the middle.

"For the Allies, D day was only the beginning. Having succeeded in that epic venture, they faced the prospect of moving beyond the beaches of France.For the Germans who had failed to halt the Allies at"