Bøger af Miranda Priebe

RAND researchers generated four plausible near-term great power war scenarios and assessed how they could shape the postwar strategic environment.

Whenever and however Russia's invasion of Ukraine ultimately ends, the U.S.-Russia relationship is likely to remain hostile in its aftermath. Over the long term, however, the United States will have incentives to reduce the risks and costs of its relationship with Russia in order to focus on other challenges, such as China. Future U.S. policymakers might therefore wish to again consider a limited less-hardline approach toward Russia. Supporters of such approaches contend that limited less-hardline approaches can reduce an adversary's insecurity, moderate its behavior, and reduce the costs and risks associated with competition between the two countries. Critics are reluctant to make concessions to U.S. rivals and worry that softening the U.S. stance could embolden a rival to become more demanding and aggressive. The authors used four historical case studies of limited less-hardline approaches with strategic similarities to the U.S.-Russia relationship before the war in Ukraine to evaluate these competing claims. These cases were (1) negotiations between Britain and Russia over Central Asia from 1899 to 1914 (2) U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the post-World War II order from 1945 to 1946, (3) the U.S.-Soviet dâetente from 1969 to 1975, and (4) the U.S.-Russia reset from 2009-2013. The authors found that such approaches have led to durable but narrow gains without emboldening the rival to be more demanding or aggressive. These limited policies also have limited effects. They only reduce a rival's threat perceptions modestly and do not prevent future deterioration of the relationship over outstanding conflicts of interest.

In this report, RAND researchers assess the evidence for claims that U.S. security relationships cause the United States to adopt its partners' interests, incentivize partners to behave recklessly, and risk dragging the United States into conflict.

This report assesses whether and how the U.S. military might utilize unpredictability in force employment, posture, and operations to deter adversaries and identifies the possible risks and costs of such approaches.

Under a realist grand strategy of restraint, the United States would cooperate more with other powers, reduce its forward military presence, and end some security commitments. The authors identify unanswered questions about such a strategy.

The authors examine potential command-and-control impediments to multidomain operations and propose alternative models for joint all-domain command and control.

This report provides an analytical framework for understanding allies' willingness to contribute to a military response to Russian attacks on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member. We identify 13 factors that could influence allies' decisionmaking, consider how decisionmaking may vary in the event of an unconventional attack, and propose steps to mitigate Russian influence attempts and increase NATO unity in the event of an attack.

Due to increasing air and missile threats to air bases, the Air Force is developing concepts to operate from several small operating locations in a conflict with a near-peer competitor. The authors identify capabilities the Air Force needs to carry out distributed operations in a contested environment. They then assess whether the current force presentation model can provide these capabilities and compare it with alternative models.