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The security challenges facing the United States today are as complex as at any time in our nation's history. The confluence of Revolutionary political, economic, and technological changes has made defense calculations less predictable and the maintenance of peace no less difficult than in the past.

The initial years of the 21st century have witnessed numerous large-scale crises, from the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Kashmir earthquake to longer-term, multi-faceted emergencies, such as those in Sudan. The United States has been involved as part of multinational coalitions in S&R missions in the Balkan states, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It has also provided humanitarian assistance in response to devastating natural disasters around the world. Increasingly, the scale and scope of such events involve both civilian and military components, as resources are stretched thin to support multiple ongoing crises. Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are key elements of the global response to crises, whether natural or man-made disasters or post-conflict S&R scenarios. ICTs are vital enablers of the coordination mechanisms that civilian and military organizations need to assist local populations and host governments. ICT capabilities and requirements need to be better understood, so that relief and reconstruction efforts can be better constructed and coordinated by all parties working in the interest of the affected population. This primer presents current knowledge and best practices in creating a collaborative, civil-military, information environment to support data collection, communications, collaboration, and information sharing needs in disaster situations and complex emergencies. It consists of two parts. Part one defines and discusses the role of lCTs, the growing recognition of a need for improved collaboration, coordination, and information sharing, and the institutional and cultural characteristics of the various civilian and military participants in relief and reconstruction efforts. Part two draws real-world conclusions, provides best-practice recommendations, and offers practical checklists for maximizing use of communications and information management systems and processes.

The Pre-Conflict Management Tools (PCMT) Program was developed to transform how intelligence analysts, policy analysts, operational planners, and decision makers interact when confronting highly complex strategic problems. The PCMT Program capitalizes on technologies and methods that help users collect, process, perform analyses with large quantities of data, and employ computational modeling and simulation methods to determine the probability and likelihood of state failure. The Program's computational decision aids and planning methodology help policymakers and military planners devise activities that can mitigate the consequences of civil war, or prevent state failure altogether. State failure has become an increasingly important national and international security issue since the end of the Cold War. Weak and failed states establish a nexus of interests between global terrorism, embattled leaders or insurgents, and large populations easily mobilized by a combination of violent ideology and economic opportunity. Civil war, the most common form of armed conflict around the world, undermines regional and international stability and catalyzes larger national security problems, such as weapons proliferation, organized crime, and terrorism. The PCMT Program builds on social science research on state failure and conflict, by turning government users into consumers of social science models employed by academic researchers and validated through peer review processes and implementation by practitioners. By constructing an analytic suite out of existing models, the Program avoids the controversies of 1960's social science research programs, such as Project Camelot, by rejecting the notion of a single, government-sponsored theory of conflict or placing policymakers in the position of determining what is or is not valid social science. PCMT architecture and methodology capitalize on changes in the landscape of information made possible by the ever-increasing quantity and diversity of information available electronically, by modeling, simulation, and analysis for identifying social vulnerabilities, and by a collaborative analytic and planning process at interagency and international levels. Each component of the PCMT architecture incorporates or extends established tools and practices that have improved performance in a variety of endeavors in other domains. The PCMT data collection capability helps the user organize and exploit all information available in electronic form, whether collected from open sources or the user's private databases. This enables analysts to filter data, rather than sample from small populations of sources whose ability to represent the character of the available universe of data is in doubt. Moreover, automated document coding enables analysts to work from datasets that would be too costly to construct, maintain, and manipulate manually. As a result, PCMT data collection and management technologies enable users to perform new kinds of analysis. The PCMT modeling and simulation suite contains multiple models of social vulnerabilities that assess the probability of state failure. Each model instantiates a different social science theory as to why states fail and civil war occurs. The suite gives policymakers diverse perspectives on each country or region. The application of multiple, competing models in analytic processes also assists users in confronting uncertainty by preventing decision makers from developing plans based on the outputs of a single model or theory. Instead, the PCMT suite assists users in crafting robust, adaptive policies that satisfice across landscapes of potential futures or scenarios generated through simulation Finally, PCMT is constructed to facilitate communication and analysis at interagency and international levels. By giving users warning of state failure months in advance, coalitions, partnerships, and plans can be formed to head off a crisis.

Recent proliferation surprises in the Middle East-the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, Libya's decision to eliminate its WMD, and evidence of significant progress by Iran toward a nuclear weapons capability-underscore the need for the nonproliferation community to reassess some of its key assumptions about WMD proliferation and the nature of the evolving international landscape. Such a reassessment must be highly speculative. Much about Iraq's WMD programs is likely to remain a mystery due to the destruction of records and the looting of facilities following the fall of Baghdad, as well as the continuing silence of many Iraqi weapons scientists and former government officials.1 Likewise, the calculations driving key proliferation-related decisions by Libya and Iran remain murky. This lack of knowledge, however, should not inhibit attempts to grasp the implications of these developments for U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy. Although this paper focuses primarily on Iraq, it also seeks to draw lessons from recent experiences in Libya and Iran to understand better how proliferators think about WMD; the challenges in assessing the status and sophistication of developing world WMD programs; the contours of the emerging international proliferation landscape; and the efficacy of various policy instruments available to the United States for dealing with these so-called ultimate weapons.

Without oil, no engine can run. Movement is the oil that enables America's military forces to sustain an operation, and nothing happens until something moves! As America's military priorities are reordered, the ability to move quickly, sustain forces anywhere in the world, and pre-position equipment and material near likely areas of crisis is more important than ever. Because of the apparent ease of movement during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, however, decision makers may, in the afterglow of the Desert Store victory, be prone to misinterpret the lessons of the Gulf War and fail t address movement capabilities properly for the Future. A good example is a recent Congressional decision to divert funds from salted improvement to the Army's afloat pre-positioning capability to the building of an amphibious assault ship. The capacity to foster global stability and defend our national interests depends upon correct long-range planning for transport. Logistics - especially mobility - has long been a bill payer for combat equipment, so perhaps a reappraisal is in order. Lessons of the Gulf War can help reshape America's defense transportation system for the post-Cold War era. Commitment to a balanced and unified mobility strategy should provide the most cost effective, rapidly deployable, and sustainable combat capability. Regional focus - particularly in a multiple-conflict scenario - and reduced forward presence will significantly increase America's reliance on movement in the future. Careful restructuring of military movement capabilities will lessen the risks of distance and time in an unstable world and contribute to the economic well-being of the nation. To do less might invite confrontation with adversaries willing to test the substance and purpose of our reach.

France is the only European ally-except for the United Kingdom (UK)-that regards its military capabilities, operational performance, and defense industry as vital levers to exert global influence. While the French believe strongly in their need to preserve "strategic independence," they see new challenges in the evolving international security environment that will oblige them to accept greater cooperation with others, even in areas once considered too sensitive to discuss. Although some French strategists remain uncomfortable with the notion of closer defense ties with the United States, others ask whether there might be a greater danger ahead: specifically, if Europe's strength dissipates as America "rebalances" toward the Asia-Pacific region, where does France turn to find capable and willing partners to protect its security interests? The Libyan conflict in 2011 brought to light many of the cross-currents that are shaping French defense policy. French leaders are proud of their military's performance in Libya, which many view as having validated President Nicolas Sarkozy's decision in early 2009 on France's return to full participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military structures. But the conflict also exposed Europe's continuing dependence on U.S. military capabilities, reinforced France's lack of confidence in Germany and the European Union as serious military partners, and increased its determination to improve defense cooperation with the United Kingdom. Despite some downsizing, France has resisted the dramatic cuts in defense spending and capabilities under way elsewhere in Europe. If Sarkozy wins the presidential election on May 6, 2012, he can be expected to continue many elements of the transformation strategy launched by his government's June 2008 White Book on Defense and National Security. If the Socialist Party challenger, François Hollande, wins, he will reassure leaders at the NATO Summit in Chicago (May 20-21, 2012) that France will maintain its nuclear deterrent and participation in NATO military structures. But reductions in the defense budget are likely whether Sarkozy or Hollande wins. There will be opportunities for expanded U.S.-French and perhaps U.S.-UK-French defense cooperation under a Sarkozy or Hollande administration. But Paris and Washington will need to manage tensions related to their respective defense industries. For the United States, more is at stake than the health of the French defense establishment. France's policies, capabilities, and operational commitments can play an important role in shaping those of many other Europeans. By working even more closely with its oldest ally, the United States can help ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

Since January 2004, a Malay-Muslim-based insurgency has engulfed the three southernmost provinces in Thailand. More than 4,500 people have been killed and over 9,000 wounded, making it the most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia. Now in its 8th year, the insurgency has settled into a low-level stalemate. Violence is down significantly from its mid-2007 peak, but it has been steadily climbing since 2008. On average, 32 people are being killed and 58 wounded every month. Most casualties are from drive-by shootings, but there are also about 12 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks a month. The insurgency is now characterized by less indiscriminate violence and more retaliatory attacks. Insurgents continue to target security forces, government officials, and Muslim moderates who seek accommodation with the Thai state as part of efforts to make the region ungovernable by limiting provision of social services and driving Buddhists from the south. The overall level of violence may be influenced more by insurgent calculations about the optimum amount of violence needed to advance their political goals than by improved capabilities of the security forces. Despite better coordination, Thai counterinsurgency operations are still hampered by bureaucratic infighting and a lack of professionalism. Human rights abuses by security services with blanket immunity under the Emergency Decree continue to instill mistrust among the local population. Moreover, as long as violence is contained in the deep south, the insurgency will remain a low priority for the new Thai government, which is focused on national political disputes and is reluctant to take on the military by pursuing more conciliatory policies toward the south. Indeed, even under the 30-month tenure of the Democrat Party with an electoral base in the south, the insurgency was a very low priority and its few policy initiatives were insufficient to quell the violence. The new Pheu Thai government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the younger sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a September 2006 coup, will have its hands tied in the south. Its election victory and focus on national reconciliation have already engendered mistrust of the Thai military. The new government will be reluctant to criticize the military's handling of the insurgency, take on the culture of impunity, or push for any form of political autonomy. This will make any devolution of political authority unlikely, limiting chances for a negotiated solution. As a result, low level violence is likely to continue indefinitely. The most important immediate U.S. objective in Thailand is political stability at the national level and deepening bilateral economic ties. Absent a cohesive Thai government with the political will to overcome military resistance to policies that might address underlying causes of the insurgency, U.S. pressure to do more is likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive. Accordingly, the United States should maintain quiet diplomatic pressure on the government to broaden its counterinsurgency efforts and offer any requested intelligence and law enforcement assistance, while being cognizant of Thai sensitivity over its sovereignty.

Despite protests across Russia sparked by last December's fraud-filled Duma (parliament) elections, Vladimir Putin is preparing to return to the presidency this May. Will Putin replay his 2004-2008 approach to Iran, during which Russia negotiated the S-300 air defense system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue Russia's breakthrough in finding common ground with the United States on Iran seen under President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the S-300 contract? While coordinating more closely with Washington on Iran during the Medvedev administration, Moscow did not and has not closed the door to engagement with Tehran. In 2010, Russia voted for new, enhanced sanctions against Iran at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Nevertheless, Moscow and Tehran have remained engaged diplomatically, and their relations have stabilized and begun to recover from their winter 2010-2011 low point. At the same time, Russia continues to insist that Iran comply with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and cooperate fully with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. However, Russia is wary of pushing so hard on compliance lest Iran entirely abandon its treaty obligations and walk out of the NPT. In February 2011, Moscow began to oppose another round of UNSC sanctions, and in July 2011 put forward a "step-by-step" initiative coordinated with other Permanent Members of the Security Council and Germany (the so-called P5+1). The Moscow approach offered Tehran a gradual reduction in sanctions in return for improved cooperation with the IAEA in monitoring Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Putin's resentment of U.S. power and suspicion of American motives will make for frostier atmospherics between Moscow and Washington. Nonetheless, mistrust of Iran will continue to outweigh Putin's misgivings about the United States. Everything else being equal, the United States will always be more important to Russia than Iran. Most Russian experts now believe that Iran is advancing toward a military nuclear weapons program-though it has not made a final decision to go all the way-and a ballistic missile program to accompany it. Russia sees these programs as a threat to its interests. Moscow's decision to toughen its approach to Iran on the nuclear issue is likely to remain the basis of Russian policy in the period ahead, so long as the U.S.-Russia "reset" does not totally collapse, especially if Iran does not move toward greater cooperation with the IAEA. Russia's looming domestic and external challenges will strengthen the inclination to continue some variant of reset, even if through Putin's clenched teeth. Russian experts warn that a serious fraying in U.S.-Russia relations might cause Moscow to tilt back toward Tehran. The record on the S-300 contract, however, suggests that any rollback in Russian support for sanctions will depend mostly on whether Iran decides to cooperate more fully with the IAEA in clarifying Iran's nuclear enrichment program and moving toward verifiable restraints on its enrichment activities. On regional issues, however, Russia and Iran will continue at least to appear to pursue neighborly engagement with each other. The Arab Spring has pushed forward overlapping but not identical challenges and opportunities to the positions of both countries in the Middle East, including how to deal with Syria. The impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan has raised the prospect that Russia and Iran may once again have to partner closely in resisting Taliban threats to their regional equities, as they did before 9/11. Engagement has historically been Moscow's default setting for dealing with Tehran. Russia's current step-by-step initiative appears designed to continue engagement, while underscoring Russia's potential role as a mediator between Iran and the international community. the future of Russian-Iranian relations.

In 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense published Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. In this strategy document, the Defense Department outlines the new focus of U.S. efforts on threats emanating primarily from South Asia and the Middle East, spelling out the U.S. commitment to address them by working with allies and partners, acknowledging Europe as the "home to some of America's most stalwart allies and partners." It clearly states that the United States "has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], which is critical to the security of Europe and beyond." In addition, the United States will be hosting the next NATO summit in Chicago on May 20-21, 2012. This will be an opportunity to send a strong message of Alliance solidarity in the face of budgetary restraints and will provide a concrete commitment to "smart defense" through pooling and sharing limited resources. The NATO summit might also provide an opportunity to consider what this means for NATO-Russia cooperation in an age of austerity. Immediately following Russian elections, there may be a case for reviewing the state of play between NATO and Russia, should the new Russian president seize the opportunity to refine his approach toward security cooperation with the West. This paper, completed in February 2012, provides concrete ideas for the United States, Russia, and Europe to take account of the 2012 agenda, and refine their relationships toward the goal of partnership and the ultimate emergence of an inclusive European security community. The paper first provides an honest assessment of the NATO-Russia cooperation of the past 20 years and concludes that this relationship has yet to deliver a truly "strategic partnership" in line with the current rhetoric, many documents, and political declarations. It attempts to shed light on the Russian outlook and reviews the limits of the current partnership. It points to a significant level of "unfinished business" from the post-Cold War, which will have to be addressed if there is any hope of building a whole Europe that is free, undivided, and at peace. The second part reviews the current challenges facing NATO Allies and Russia in three main areas: the reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, stalemate regarding conventional forces in Europe, and limits of cooperation in missile defense. In reviewing the debate in these three areas, the paper offers options to move forward in each case but, in all three areas, concludes with the need for a broad political-military dialogue, reaching beyond the confines of the NATO-Russia relationship to broadly address Russian concerns. In each area, the paper points to fundamental disagreements that reach well beyond the issue at hand to a basic difference of views on the European security construct and on threat perceptions that ultimately reflect a fundamental lack of trust, paralyzing the strategic community. The third and last part of the paper spells out a confidence-building program to reassure Russia regarding Western intentions and to develop trust through operational cooperation, transparency in contingency planning and exercising, dialogue about deterrence and transparency on safety measures regarding tactical nuclear weapons, smart defense approaches and projects, and possible joint installations and co-ownership as cooperation develops. In conclusion, the paper argues for renewed bilateral and multilateral efforts toward a strategic partnership with Russia. It stresses, however, the requirement for a "confidence-building detour" on the road to an inclusive European security community.

The United States has no good options for resolving the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges. Incentives, pressures, and threats have not succeeded. A military strike would temporarily set back these programs, but at unacceptable human and diplomatic costs, and with a high risk of their reconstitution and acceleration. For some policymakers, therefore, the best option is to isolate these regimes until they collapse or pressures build to compel negotiations on U.S. terms. This option has the veneer of toughness sufficient to make it politically defensible in Washington. On closer scrutiny, however, it actually allows North Korea and Iran to continue their nuclear programs unrestrained. It also sacrifices more achievable short-term goals of improving transparency and securing vulnerable nuclear materials to the uncertain long-term goal of denuclearization. Yet these short-term goals are deemed critical to U.S. national security in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). North Korea and Iran are very different states that share at least one crucial similarity: decades of estrangement from Washington and U.S. efforts to isolate them from the international community. They also play destabilizing roles in the regions they inhabit, lack respect for basic democratic freedoms, and maintain policies antagonistic to the United States, its friends, and its allies. It is hardly surprising that the Washington consensus still supports isolation. What is striking, however, is the pronounced international consensus in favor of engagement, which sharply constrains an already limited U.S. policy arsenal. Assessing two decades of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea and nearly a decade of efforts with Iran, it is clear that Washington needs a more promising strategy. Nothing short of a paradigm shift away from denuclearization is required to alter the pattern of bad outcomes in both cases. The new paradigm, predicated on strong bipartisan support, would recognize the national security advantages of a negotiated nuclear pause as a prelude to denuclearization. Allowing North Korea and Iran to retain their current nuclear capability would give them an important incentive to cooperate with international monitoring aimed at improving the transparency of their nuclear programs and capabilities, and securing vulnerable nuclear materials-the goals identified by the NPR and QDR as vital to national security. Denuclearization would remain the publicly declared-and indeed desired-endstate of negotiations, but an outcome requiring a long time horizon to achieve. In the meantime, a nuclear pause diminishes the risk of further nuclear advances by these states and brings North Korea and Iran "inside the tent" through international monitoring. It also buys time to develop new policy mechanisms to further contain their programs. More crucially, it could open up political space in both states for moderation overall, including accommodation (vice defiance) of international demands, especially on the nuclear issue. This comparative study of U.S. nuclear diplomacy toward North Korea and Iran suggests that the North Korea case offers policymakers crucial lessons applicable to Iran. It provides policy recommendations based on four key conclusions: that a common paradigm (nuclear pause) must be applied to both states; that nuclear deals negotiated with international outliers like North Korea and Iran must draw on widely accepted policy or practice; that these deals should be linked to political/diplomatic strategies relevant to the domestic and regional policy context of each state; and that the success of a nuclear pause must be judged by whether it accomplishes nuclear policy goals, not broader policy goals. Time is of the essence. North Korea's leadership transition could prove destabilizing to the region, and Iran's enrichment capability is steadily advancing.

NATO expansion is a key issue both within NATO and in the context of alternative future security alignments in Europe involving NATO, the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). States in Central and Eastern Europe are seeking membership in NATO. NATO has responded with outreach programs, most recently the Partnership for Peach (FPF) Program. NATO leaders have said they expect and welcome NATO expansion as an evolutionary process in which FPF will play an important role. In the public debate, officials and scholars have made many arguments in favor of expansion, against it, and to defer it. There appears to be general support in Congress, the American and European publics, and the executive branches in NATO states for inviting Central and Eastern European states, particularly the four Visegrad states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, to join NATO, but no decisions have been made nor dates established. Russian officials have been ambivalent but often object to expansion of NATO to include Central and Eastern European states but not Russia. NATO is conducting a study to address how NATO might expand and what the implications would be. Among the issues that may be raised are: whether additional criteria for membership should be specified, which states should be invited, when and possibly in what sequence, if any, they should be invited, how to avoid dividing lines in Europe, the impact of enlargement on NATO effectiveness continuation of outreach programs with states not invited, and the relationship between NATO and Russia. Of six illustrative alternative future security alignments in Europe (three involving NATO expansion and three not), the first-NATO expansion to include Central and Eastern European states, adding from 1-11 new members, while continuing outreach programs with non-members and establishing a unique relationship with Russia and perhaps Ukraine may be the most supportable.

This work began for the author with a paper written in the spring of 1982 while as a student at the College of Command and Staff at the Naval War College. The author's professional and personal interest in the Law of War and Neutrality were nurtured throughout his studies and grew during his master's and doctoral work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. This chronology demonstrates that the United States found the requirements of strict neutrality less than useful for fulfilling its policy imperatives throughout the 20th century. The reasons for this are varied, but all involve departures from strict impartiality required of neutrals. The common thread running through them is that global interests make impartiality difficult to maintain and often counterproductive. It also becomes clear that this will continue for the future. Although the incidents explored stretch back over 100 years, history is not its focus. Incidents are cited only to show their relationship to the pattern of US behavior; historical details are not elaborated. Further, incidents are looked at in the context for what was known at the time, without the benefit of hindsight. The loss of the battleship MAINE, for example, is now believed to have resulted from an accident; at the time it was believed to have been an attack. The detailed behavior of other nations was also not examined except in response to that of the United States, because while this work is about international law, it is for the US naval force and unit commanders who must understand that law. The author's personal knowledge of an involvement in highly sensitive US policy implementation in Central American and Panama in the mid-1980s requires that those examples not be treated. This exclusion does not detract from the product and removes even the question of whether classified material was used in any way in the preparation of this work. Our grandfathers had to make decisions with much less information and, like today, the initial reports were sometimes flawed. In some ways, therefore, the imperfections obvious in the contemporary accounts recorded in newspapers provide a better context than the more thorough and better informed historical accounts. In other places, historians' work is used extensively to document the details of incidents. This is especially true for the period immediately preceding World War II because so many significant examples occurred then. With a focus on identifying a pattern of departures from the strict impartiality of neutrality, this account resists, as much as possible, the temptation to explore other fascinating aspect of the incidents dealt with.

Independent Russia is approaching the start of its third decade of post-Soviet existence. After the economic chaos of the Boris Yeltsin decade and the recovery and stabilization of the Vladimir Putin decade, Russia's leaders have high ambitions for a return to great power status in the years ahead. Their aspirations are tempered, however, by the realities of Russia's social, economic, and military shortcomings and vulnerabilities, laid painfully bare by the stress test of the recent global financial crisis. Looking ahead, some also calculate that Russia will be increasingly challenged in the Far East by a rising China and in the Middle East by an Iran that aspires to regional hegemony. With energy riches abundant enough to compensate for a multitude of governance and managerial shortcomings, the Russian economy will likely continue to grow in absolute terms in the years ahead. Indeed, if Russia wants to remain a mediocre power, it can do so without effort by not changing its current behavior patterns. But with growing corruption, business stifling political controls, and dependency on raw materials exports retarding the full potential of Russia's growth, the country is facing the prospect of decades of decline relative to other more dynamic regional and world powers. Russia will retain its nuclear weapons and permanent veto-empowered seat in the United Nations Security Council. But Russia will likely slip on many of the measures commonly used to assess great power status: size and vitality of its population, growth and vibrancy of its economy, and the ability of its armed forces to project conventional military power beyond its own borders. Russia will continue to be the preponderant influence across a large swath of former Soviet territory, but not beyond it. As a result, Moscow is already seeking to strengthen Russia's ties with Europe and the United States. The West is seen as crucial to Russia's modernization as well as a hedge against what may develop to Russia's east and south in coming decades. This process of Russia's anchoring itself more firmly in the West will proceed with lots of tactical hiccups and sporadic crises. Nevertheless, it will bring consequences and opportunities for U.S. diplomacy and strategic development, some of which the Barack Obama administration's policy of "reset" is already reaping. But Russian policy toward the United States is conditional on a U.S. approach that engages Russia in positive ways. If that policy were to change, it could push Russia and China closer together on some issues in an effort to constrain the United States.

In November 2010, heads of state and government at the Lisbon Summit called for a "streamlining" of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partnerships. In early 2011, the Alliance developed a more flexible and efficient partnership policy. It did so in accordance with the Lisbon tasking, and prepared simultaneously for a new mission, with contributions from several partner countries, as events unfolded in Libya. These developments involved significant NATO consultation with partner countries. This July 2011 paper highlights the synergy between the new policy and NATO's response to the Libyan crisis. It points to some of the challenges facing the Alliance in the context of Operation Unified Protector, and in further developing NATO partnerships with countries south of the Mediterranean. The paper, written well before fast-moving political and military events significantly altered the situation in Libya, offers recommendations in preparation for the next NATO summit so as to make best use of Alliance partnerships if the Allies decide to build on the Libyan operation and develop a new strategic direction in the face of the tumultuous political transition in the Arab world south of the Mediterranean.

Since 1989, French Defense and security policy has been undercut by changes in the external environment and domestic pressures to deal with the challenge of economic modernization. The Soviet revolution of 1989, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the soviet Union, and the experience of coalition warfare during the Gulf War - all have challenged the assumptions and realities underlying the Gaullist synthesis. Above all, the French position on security independence has been put into question. The main hope has been for a European Alliance to supplant the American one over time in the face of a gradual process of change within Europe - but change has not been gradual within Europe. The European Union is challenged by discontent within Western Europe. A new Central Europe has emerged that has yet to find its place in European or global politics. A new Russia is emergent in which nationalism is defining an assertive role for the Russians within Europe, but at the same time the economic weakness of Russia limits its ability to play such a role. Notably, the election of President Clinton has added another challenge. The French have grown used to an assertive American role within Europe and have defined their role in part as counterbalancing the challenge of the United States. Although this definition of the French role persists (the French press's treatment of the GATT debate is typical of this definition of the French role), many senior French government officials are more concerned about the withdrawal of the United States from active engagement within Europe than the mindless countermanding of US influence. For example, during the 1993 year end TV retrospective, General Moriollon was interviewed by a French journalist who asserted the following: "Isn't the US trying to assert its leadership through the UN?" Moriollon said, "No. The United States is reluctant to participate within UN missions and is very reluctant to become engaged in Bosnia." Clearly the young French journalist was shocked with this realistic response. Moriollon added: "I have just returned from the United States and know what I am talking about." In response to the changing environment, the Balladur Government has promoted the de facto policy of transition in French foreign and security policy. But the transition has been only partial in nature: the Balladur government is a cohabitation government. Power is shared between the President and the Prime Minister in the actual conduct of foreign and security policy. In addition, the Balladur government is itself a coalition among right and center right parties. There is no clear consensus on the definition of a new French synthesis of foreign and security policy. Perhaps the election of a new President of the Republique in 1995 will lead to an explicit redefinition of the Gaullist synthesis or its replacement by something new.

On December 7, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the United States was adding a military dimension to its fight to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new program, called the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI), provides funding to prepare for combating foes with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and missile weapons on future battlefields, improves monitoring for locating rival NBC/missile programs, improves theater defenses, and develops weapons capable of penetrating and destroying underground facilities. US efforts will include a diplomatic offensive to persuade US allies to take similar counter-proliferation steps. The central thrust of the CPI is to prepare US and allied forces for dealing with future enemies on the battlefield who are armed with weapons of mass destruction. An important secondary thrust of the CPI is to provide the Commander-in-Chief with the tools to disarm an adversary unilaterally if necessary, before the adversary can initiate the use of WMD in situations where we are on a collision course with such an enemy and no alternative course seems feasible. Numerous preemptive counter-proliferation strikes have taken place since 1940. Allied air forces and special operations forces destroyed German nuclear facilities and heavy water supplies that were an integral part of the Nazi A-bomb research effort. US bombers also destroyed the most important Japanese nuclear research laboratory in Tokyo at the end of WWII. Other raids include: Iran versus Iraq in 1980, Israel versus Iraq in 1981, Iraq versus Iran with seven raids from 1984 to 9188, and the US-led coalition versus Iraq in 1991. When deciding whether or not to use military action to remove a WMD capacity from a rival state, it is important that decision makers address a number of key questions, and ensure that answers to each are positive, before making PCP decisions: is the enemy undeterrable, violent, and a risk taker? Is the enemy on the WMD threshold or beyond it? Are vital US interest threatened? Are key enemy targets precisely located and vulnerable? Is surprise achievable? Does the US have a first strike capability? Is the US homeland safe from enemy WMD? Would the US and its allies be safe from retaliation from the WMD of third parties? Have all non-military options been exhausted before considering preemption? Does the US have clear objectives achievable by appropriate means? Is the US committing enough resources and is it taking all necessary steps to insure victory? Finally, a note of caution, PCP strikes against states armed with WMD had better work completely or they could spell disaster for the initiator.

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks, the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), known as the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile until March 2003, was an important component of the national medical response to a crisis, but one that had not yet been tested in a real emergency. That changed in the fall of 2001. Since the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center buildings and the Pentagon, and the later anthrax episodes, the cost of the SNS has grown from a roughly $50 million asset to one worth more than $600 million. The SNS is designed to supplement state and local public health agencies in the event of a biological or chemical terrorism incident anywhere and at any time in the United States or its territories. Federal authorities do not consider the stockpile a first response tool. Rather, its purpose is to bolster the response of a state or city government to a biological or chemical attack or other medical emergency that requires additional resources. The SNS is managed jointly by the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Health and Human Services (HHS). Its use is coordinated through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), one of the major operating components of HHS. The stockpile comprises 12 separate "push packages," each capable of reaching its designated destination within 12 hours of DHS authorization. Each push package includes caches of pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies designed to provide a broad spectrum of assets in the early hours of an event. The push packages are positioned in strategically located, secure warehouses and delivered by commercial, express carriers. Additional, specially tailored supplies known as vendor managed inventory (VMI) can follow within 24 to 36 hours of an event. This paper reviews the history and current status of the SNS, provides an overview of its role in incident response, and reports on the testing of SNS deployment in recent terrorism exercises. The paper also explores some of the regulatory and legal issues that surround the use of the SNS and examines the dependence of the U.S. military on SNS supplies during crisis and consequence management support to civilians in the United States.

The proposed lease of the KC-767 tanker aircraft was one of the most infamous procurement scandals of the post-Cold War era. Interactions within the military-industrial-congressional complex led to legislation permitting the Air Force to lease tankers from Boeing using an operating lease rather than standard procurement. Following the outcry from Congress, industry, the media, and numerous watchdog groups, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) launched a wave of investigations and hearings. During the lease debate, participants reached a number of compromises documented in congressional legislation. However, this was not sufficient to continue the lease process. After nearly 4 years, Congress cancelled the tanker lease and directed the Air Force to pursue a traditional procurement approach.

It is a thankless task to attempt to assess the stability of any country during a period when even liberal democracies are facing a crisis of governability. And the task is made more difficult when one is dealing with a country like Ukraine that is in the throes of a prolonged and difficult post-Communist transition. Nevertheless, an analysis that can shed some light on the complex factors affecting stability in Ukraine would be a useful, albeit modest, step forward. The issue of stability in Soviet successor states has attracted a great deal of attention in the West because of a continuing preoccupation with the Soviet legacy and fears that the region will remain a zone of unrest that may eventually require some form of significant Western intervention. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the most immediate concern was the fate of its ulcer weapons and accompanying production facilities. Ukraine attracted special attention because of fears that its leaders might attempt to gain operational control of the large number of nuclear weapons on its territory in 1991. That anxiety has now abated, but concerns remain that the deterioration of the physical and human infrastructure of the nuclear energy industry in Ukraine could lead to more Chernobyl-type accidents or the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials and technology. In the meantime, other concerns have arisen, including the prospect of continued economic decline and the spread of civil conflicts in Ukraine, either of which could lead to an influx of refugees into Western Europe or the need for greater Western involvement in the region. An American National Intelligence report (reflecting the view of the American intelligence community and the State Department), the details of which were leaked to the press at the end of January 1994, supports this concern, mentioning that Ukraine was the most likely former Soviet republic to precipitate a major continentwide crisis. Western commentaries frequently refer to a number of actual or potential threats to Ukraine stability. These include continuing economic decline, which has led to growing social distress and great dissatisfaction among the population; an increase in ethnic tensions and their potential transformation into communal conflict; centrifugal trends, sometimes linked to ethnic grievances, resulting in autonomist or separatist movements; weak and discredited political institutions and widespread political apathy, which could leave the country open to the rise of authoritarian rulers or outside interference in its internal affairs; and a growth in tensions between Ukraine and Russia. An examination of the factors influencing Ukraine's stability should also devote some attention to the behavior of institutions, such as the military and security forces, that can play an important role in deterring attempts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine or can themselves become destabilizing forces in certain circumstances.

Over the past decade, acts of international and domestic terrorism have demonstrated to government officials and policy makers the urgency of preparing systems to support the detection of atypical health events and the provision of preventive and interventional medical services in mass-care events. The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City resulted in 168 deaths and required the efforts of nearly 5,500 emergency responders dispatched to the scene over 17 days in chaotic and feverish attempts to rescue and facilitate subsequent medical and surgical interventions to save the lives of over 600 injured victims. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon resulted in over 3,000 deaths and nearly 2,400 injured. The lethality of the attacks averted strain on hospitals but, once again, required the coordinated efforts of emergency responders and medical providers. The anthrax attacks of 2001 resulted in relatively few victims. On March 11, 2004, terrorist bombings on several trains in Madrid resulted in nearly 200 deaths and about 1,800 injured.5 Madrid's hospitals were swamped with casualties as the hospitals appealed urgently for blood donations. Acts of terrorism upon civilian populations necessitate a robust response by health and medical care systems and present particular challenges to the United States' almost 5,000 acute care hospitals. As the locus of medical diagnosis and intervention for a wide array of routine activities ranging from the provision of primary care for the uninsured to the delivery of tertiary procedures for life-threatening diseases, hospitals face the quandary of terrorism preparedness and response with limited budgets and insufficient numbers of trained human resources. These needs are even more acutely experienced by the nation's approximately 2,000 rural hospitals, which have a comparatively smaller repertoire of medical resources yet face unique vulnerabilities. The spectrum of weapons of mass destruction demands a diverse set of response capabilities. The use of an explosive device necessitates an urgent and massive medical effort to save the lives of injured persons not immediately killed. Conversely, the deployment of a biological agent in most instances unleashes a communicable pathogen, the required response to which grows greater over time as the incidence of human infection increases. The resulting epidemic is workforce consuming, requiring voluminous amounts of human resources and medical equipment to interrupt disease transmission and reduce rates of mortality through disease tracking and monitoring, verification of exposure, administration of medical countermeasures where available (for example, vaccines and preventive antibiotics), and supportive care and clinical treatment. The case studies described herein offer a view of the challenges facing rural hospitals to meet these demands as they prepare for the threat of bioterrorism as well as non-intentional, naturally occurring epidemics of emerging contagious diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The findings are sobering and include a pervasive perception among study participants that major medical emergencies in America's rural areas and heartland would quickly overwhelm the capabilities of their small hospitals. A catastrophic event, or an act of bioterrorism, will require that rural hospitals receive outside assistance to sustain ongoing operations, intervene in the potentially unremitting flow of medical emergencies, and contain the epidemic sequelae of a deliberately deployed pathogen. The delivery of medical care to infected populations and the containment of disease epidemics require that hospitals occupy a central role in community-based bioterrorism preparedness planning. The author provides this report to inform future initiatives to prepare America's hospitals against threats to homeland security.

Despite the vital importance of the emerging area of biotechnology and its role in defense planning and policymaking, no definitive book has been written on the topic for the defense policymaker, the military student, and the private-sector bioscientist interested in the "emerging opportunities market" of national security. This edited volume is intended to help close this gap and provide the necessary backdrop for thinking strategically about biology in defense planning and policymaking. This volume is about applications of the biological sciences, here called "biologically inspired innovations," to the military. Rather than treating biology as a series of threats to be dealt with, such innovations generally approach the biological sciences as a set of opportunities for the military to gain strategic advantage over adversaries. These opportunities range from looking at everything from genes to brains, from enhancing human performance to creating renewable energy, from sensing the environment around us to harnessing its power.