Bøger af Rick Waddell

Wars are much different today than they were in years past, but much remains the same.On Monday, 8 December 1941, the cows got milked, the eggs got collected, steel was milled, and cars rolled off the assembly lines. The ships still smoked in Pearl Harbor, and the dead and missing were being counted, but the US economy and population, still heavily agricultural, did not stop. The enemy had crippled one of America's fleets, but did little else.In contrast, on Wednesday, 12 September 2001, the financial engine of the modern US economy was shuttered as the rescue crews picked vainly through the debris of the collapsed World Trade Center. The modern economy depends on near instant transfer of financial and equity instruments, and the ease of personal travel. The transfers and travel rely simply on trust, that planes fly on time and safely, that financial centers are secure places to work, that rules and contracts will be enforced, that transactions will take place from anywhere on the globe, that brokers and analysts will be at their desks covering all markets in any time zone, 24/7. The enemy in this new era turned the instruments of modern travel - the ease of access to airports and airplanes - into deadly effective weapons against the primary instruments of the financial and stock markets - human capital, the sense of safety, and trust. The enemy did not merely topple a couple of buildings or shut down a city, but shut down the American airline industry, the primary stock market of the world, and many of America's most prominent banks for several days. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the direct effects of 9-11 were not local, but nationwide in scope.Wars: Then & Now looks at this and offers insightful commentary on how things have changed in the waging of America's wars... and in some cases... how they have remained the same. It's a must read for anyone that wants to get a better understanding of the American (political, media and public) psyche during and after our various conflicts through the years.About the Author: Rick Waddell is a businessman currently living in Florida. A native of Arkansas, he graduated from West Point in 1982, and holds advanced degrees from Oxford, Webster, and Columbia. He continues to serve in the U.S. Army Reserve and has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan on seven separate occasions.

About the Book We are now two decades removed from the U.S. and allied victory in the Cold War, caused by the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. In Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan (for the Soviets) the Cold War became hot and bloody, rising to mid-intensity levels. For the most part, the Cold War was waged via standing forces and through the readiness of air defense and nuclear missile systems to defend or retaliate against any sudden attack. We tend to forget, though, that in the more than four decades of that conflict, the actions generally happened on the periphery away from the main front along the "inter-German border" in Europe, or the secondary front along the Demilitarized Zone in Korea. These actions often happened "in the shadows" along this periphery through intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and through U.S. and Soviet support for proxies in conflicts that might have begun over local or internal disputes. This support from both sides was generally both economic and military. The locations were in those areas of the world described variously as the Third World, the Lesser Developed Countries, or Developing Countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This book explores one of those "shadow" battlefronts. It was the edge of the Cold War and America's last stand against communism right at our very doorstep. On March 22, 1986, initial reports filtered in about the Nicaraguan incursion. The Sandinista forces, over two thousand strong, had crossed into Honduras in hot pursuit of a force of contra rebels. The new Honduran president, Jose Azcona Hoyo, wanted American support to move his troops and artillery to the battlefield. Palmerola Air Base was in good shape to support him. The Honduran plan was essentially to isolate the area of the incursion and allow the Sandinistas and the contras to slug it out. Using American airlift, they moved several hundred of their infantry and a few pieces of artillery into a cordon around the penetration. The Sandinistas were smart enough not to force the situation. Unfortunately, for the communists, the contras slipped a force in behind them, cutting them off from Nicaragua. The battle lasted several days. Far from being the ineffective force portrayed in the media, the contras were kicking butt. About the Author Rick Waddell is a businessman currently living in Sao Paulo, Brazil. A native of Arkansas, he graduated from West Point in 1982, and holds advanced degrees from Oxford, Webster, and Columbia. He continues to serve in the U.S. Army Reserve.