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  • - Counterinsurgency in American Strategy
    af Steven Metz
    213,95 kr.

    While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?

  • af Steven Metz
    180,95 kr.

    The U.S. military and national security community lost interest in insurgency after the end of the Cold War when other defense issues such as multinational peacekeeping and transformation seemed more pressing. With the onset of the Global War on Terror in 2001 and the ensuing involvement of the U.S. military in counterinsurgency support in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgency experienced renewed concern in both the defense and intelligence communities. The author argues that while exceptionally important, this relearning process focused on Cold War era nationalistic insurgencies rather than the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War security environment. To be successful at counterinsurgency, he contends, the U.S. military and defense community must rethink insurgency, which has profound implications for American strategy and military doctrine.

  • - Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability
    af Steven Metz
    163,95 kr.

    Counterinsurgency is seemingly not of great concern to the U.S. Army today. This may represent a period of remission rather than the apparent abandonment of the mission. It is possible that the U.S. military may again become engaged in counterinsurgency support in the future. In this study, Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult. Today, there is no pressing strategic rationale for U.S. engagement in counterinsurgency but history suggests that if the United States remains involved in the Global South, one may emerge. American counterinsurgency strategy has unfolded in a distinct pattern over the past 50 years. At times, policymakers saw a strategic rationale for engagement in counterinsurgency. When they did, the military and Department of Defense formed or reconstituted counterinsurgency doctrine, concepts, and organizations. When the strategic rationale faded, these capabilities atrophied. This pattern may be repeated in the future. During the last decade of the Cold War, the U.S. military developed an effective approach to insurgency and implemented it in El Salvador, but this focused on one particular type of insurgency: Maoist "people's war." The El Salvador model may not apply to post-Cold War forms of insurgency. Moreover, many of the basic assumptions of American counterinsurgency strategy appear obsolete. Trends such as ungovernability, the routinization of violence, and the mutation of insurgency change the costs/benefits calculus that undergirded Cold War-era strategy and doctrine. During the current period of remission in insurgency, the Army should use its intellectual resources to analyze ongoing mutations in insurgency and to open a debate on the nature of a cogent post-Cold War counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy should expand its conceptual framework and stress three principles: selectivity, multilateralism, and concentration on secondary support functions including indirect or second-tier engagement. Such efforts will pave the way for the reconstitution of American counterinsurgency should it be required.

  • - The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace
    af Steven Metz
    190,95 kr.

    Few if any American officers performed a wider array of strategic functions as Dwight D. Eisenhower--he was a staff planner in the War Department, wartime commander of a massive coalition force, peacetime Chief of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Eisenhower was directly involved in a number of major transitions including the building of the wartime American Army, its demobilization following the war, and the resuscitation of American military strength during the initial years of the cold war. This means that Eisenhower's career can provide important lessons on how a coherent strategy should and should not be built during times of strategic transition. That is what this monograph begins to do. It is not intended to be a biography in the usual sense and thus offers no new facts or insights into Eisenhower's life. Instead it uses that life as a backdrop for exploring the broader essence of strategic coherence and draws lessons from Eisenhower's career that can help guide the strategic transition which the U.S. military now faces.

  • af Steven Metz
    158,95 kr.

    Security professionals and strategists are discovering the post-cold war world is as rife with persistent, low-level violence as its predecessors. In fact, many regions are experiencing a rise in the amount of conflict in the absence of restraints previously imposed by the superpowers. Since frustration in many parts of the Third World is actually increasing, insurgency--the use of low-level, protracted violence to overthrow a political system or force some sort of fundamental change in the political and economic status quo--will be an enduring security problem. Unfortunately, most existing doctrine and strategy for dealing with insurgency are based on old forms of the phenomenon, especially rural, protracted, "people's war." But as this type of insurgency becomes obsolete, new forms will emerge. It is important to speculate on these future forms in order to assist in the evolution of counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Dr. Steven Metz uses a psychological method of analysis to argue that two forms of insurgency, which he calls the "spiritual" and the "commercial," will pose the greatest intellectual challenges to security professionals, military leaders, and strategists. The specific nature of such challenges will vary from region to region.

  • - Counterinsurgency in American Strategy - Scholar's Choice Edition
    af Steven Metz
    213,95 kr.

  • - The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace - War College Series
    af Steven Metz
    193,95 kr.

    This is a curated and comprehensive collection of the most important works covering matters related to national security, diplomacy, defense, war, strategy, and tactics. The collection spans centuries of thought and experience, and includes the latest analysis of international threats, both conventional and asymmetric. It also includes riveting first person accounts of historic battles and wars.Some of the books in this Series are reproductions of historical works preserved by some of the leading libraries in the world. As with any reproduction of a historical artifact, some of these books contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. We believe these books are essential to this collection and the study of war, and have therefore brought them back into print, despite these imperfections.We hope you enjoy the unmatched breadth and depth of this collection, from the historical to the just-published works.

  • af Steven Metz & Strategic Studies Institute
    198,95 kr.

  • af Steven Metz
    123,95 kr.

    In war, there are always differences between the opponents. At times these are insignificant, passing disparities with no bearing on the outcome. At other times, the differences between opponents are important, placing one in a position of advantage, the other at a disadvantage. This is a very simple observation, but from it flows one of the pressing issues faced by the United States today: strategic asymmetry. Strategic asymmetry is the use of some sort of difference to gain an advantage over an adversary. It is an idea as old as warfare itself, appearing under a number of guises. Among strategic theorists, Sun Tzu placed great stock in psychological and informational asymmetry, writing that: All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong. avoid him.

  • af Steven Metz, Raymond A. Millen & Strategic Studies Institute
    198,95 kr.

  • af Steven Metz & Strategic Studies Institute
    253,95 kr.

  • af Steven Metz & Strategic Studies Institute
    218,95 kr.

  • - The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace
    af Steven Metz
    253,95 kr.

    The facts of Dwight D. Eisenhower's military career are well-known. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing to be gained from a careful examination of his experience. Few if any American officers performed a wider array of strategic functions - he was a staff planner in the War Department, wartime commander of a massive coalition force, peacetime Chief of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Eisenhower was directly involved in a number of major transitions including the building of the wartime American Army, its demobilization following the war, and the resuscitation of American military strength during the initial years of the cold war. This means that Eisenhower's career can provide important lessons on how a coherent strategy should and should not be built during times of strategic transition. That is what this monograph begins to do. It is not intended to be a biography in the usual sense and thus offers no new facts or insights into Eisenhower's life. Instead it uses that life as a backdrop for exploring the broader essence of strategic coherence and draws lessons from Eisenhower's career that can help guide the strategic transition which the U.S. military now faces. WILLIAM A. STOFFT Major General, U.S. Army Commandant

  • - The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare
    af Steven Metz
    278,95 kr.

    Within the past decade, the U.S. military has implemented a number of programs to assess the changes underway in the global security environment and in the nature of warfare. Defense leaders and thinkers have concluded that revolutionary change is taking place and, if the United States develops appropriate technology, warfighting concepts, and military organizations, it can master or control this change, thus augmenting American security. In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz, who was one of the earliest analysts of the strategic dimension of the revolution in military affairs, suggests that official thinking within the U.S. military may be too narrow. The information revolution, he contends, will have far-reaching strategic effects. The transformation it brings will not only be technological, but political, social, ethical and strategic as well. As he explores the impact that the information revolution may have on the conduct of armed conflict, Dr. Metz introduces a number of ideas which need further analysis, including the potential for the emergence of nontraditional, networked enemies; multidimensional asymmetry; the privatization of security; and the potential impact of technologies like robotics, nonlethality, and nanotechnology. He concludes with an assessment of the features likely to characterize successful militaries in the 21st century. Because it deals with the future, this study is conceptual and speculative. But the issues and linkages it raises are directly relevant to today's strategic thinkers and leaders. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer it as a contribution to debate over the nature of the challenges that the U.S. military will face in coming decades. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Interim Director Strategic Studies Institute

  • - The Strategic Role of American Landpower
    af Steven Metz & Lieutenant Raymond A Millen
    128,95 kr.

    What design would I be forming if I were the enemy?"Y Frederick the Great The great difficulty in forecasting the future strategic environment and the force structure needed in response is the plethora of variables that change the calculus. Only hindsight reveals the failure of a Maginot Line or the brilliant success of a mechanized Blitzkrieg doctrine. In the final analysis, the reader must judge the line of reasoning. In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examine the trends in the strategic environment in their development of the Future War/Future Battlespace. One fact is clear. Traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The U.S. military must adapt or fail. There is no other recourse. Dr. Metz and LTC Millen have superbly framed the strategic environment into four strategic battlespaces and have examined the ways future adversaries will operate within them to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives. In this context, these variables influence the path that Transformation must take. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of debate concerning Transformation and the Objective Force. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director Strategic Studies Institute

  • af Steven Metz
    255,95 kr.

    Today the U.S. military is more nimble, mobile, and focused on rapid responses against smaller powers than ever before. One could argue that the Gulf War and the postwar standoff with Saddam Hussein hastened needed military transformation and strategic reassessments in the post-Cold War era.

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