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Corporate Groups are a common phenomenon in modern economic reality. Nearly all big international companies are organised as a group of companies made up of individual legal entities within one group managing parent or holding company. In such groups of incorporations, there is usually a separation between the management of the group - performed by the parent or holding company - and the everyday decisions of the subsidiaries. However, the parent company has managing power over its subsidiaries and the decisions of the subsidiaries are based often on a decision or an instruction from the parent company. In such case the subsidiaries do not only work exclusively for their own interests. The question arising is now: Who is liable for a suit against a subsidiary in such a Corporate Group?
European competition law has been changing for several years. The last major milestone of this development was the introduction of Directive 2014/104/EU on 27 December 2014, which focuses in particular on damages actions and, in a broader sense, on the private enforcement of European competition law and seeks to strengthen this in relation to public law enforcement.This work examines the legal theoretical basis of the relationship between private and public enforcement of competition law. Based on the two basic concepts of economic policy, Ordoliberalism and the Chicago School, the work focuses in particular on the relationship between eff ective law enforcement and individual justice.
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