Bøger i Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law serien

Arguing that judges sacrifice individual rights by using less than their full powers in order to appear democratically legitimate, Robert Leckey provides a detailed comparative account of how judges apply new bills of rights in Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom, and how their practices deny justice to individuals.

This examination of the ultimate foundations of Britain's customary constitution explores the past, present and possible future of parliamentary sovereignty, how recent constitutional developments have affected it, the relationship between Parliament, the courts and the protection of human rights, and how Parliament can effectively control its own sovereign authority.

This revisionary perspective on South Africa's celebrated Constitutional Court draws on historical and empirical sources alongside conventional legal analysis to show how support from the African National Congress (ANC) government and other political actors has underpinned the Court's landmark cases, which are often applauded too narrowly as merely judicial achievements. Standard accounts see the Court as overseer of a negotiated constitutional compromise and as the looked-to guardian of that constitution against the rising threat of the ANC. However, in reality South African successes have been built on broader and more admirable constitutional politics to a degree no previous account has described or acknowledged. The Court has responded to this context with a substantially consistent but widely misunderstood pattern of deference and intervention. Although a work in progress, this institutional self-understanding represents a powerful effort by an emerging court, as one constitutionally serious actor among others, to build a constitution.

Janet McLean explores how the common law has personified the state and how those personifications affect and reflect the state's relationship to bureaucracy, sovereignty and civil society, the development of public law norms, the expansion and contraction of the public sphere with nationalization and privatization, state responsibility and human rights. Treating legal thought as a variety of political thought, she discusses writers such as Austin, Maitland, Dicey, Laski, Robson, Hart, Griffith, Mitchell and Hayek in the context of both legal doctrine and broader intellectual movements.

Although the most important constitutional doctrine worldwide, a thorough cultural and historical examination of proportionality has not taken place until now. This comparison of proportionality with its counterpart in American constitutional law - balancing - shows how culture and history can create deep differences in seemingly similar doctrines. Owing to its historical origin in Germany, proportionality carries to this day a pro-rights association, while the opposite is the case for balancing. In addition, European legal and political culture has shaped proportionality as intrinsic to the state's role in realizing shared values, while in the United States a suspicion-based legal and political culture has shaped balancing in more pragmatic and instrumental terms. Although many argue that the USA should converge on proportionality, the book shows that a complex web of cultural associations make it an unlikely prospect.

Stephen Gardbaum argues that recent bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia are an experiment in a new third way of organizing basic institutional arrangements in a democracy. This 'new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism' promises both an alternative to the conventional dichotomy of legislative versus judicial supremacy and innovative techniques for protecting rights. As such, it is an intriguing and important development in constitutional design of relevance to drafters of bills of rights everywhere. In developing the theory and exploring the practice of this new model, the book analyses its novelty and normative appeal as a third general model of constitutionalism before presenting individual and comparative assessments of the operational stability, distinctness and success of its different versions in the various jurisdictions. It closes by proposing a set of general and specific reforms aimed at enhancing these practical outcomes.

Having identified proportionality as the main tool for limiting constitutional rights, Aharon Barak explores its four components (proper purpose, rational connection, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu) and discusses the relationships between proportionality and reasonableness and between courts and legislation. He goes on to analyse the concept of deference and to consider the main arguments against the use of proportionality (incommensurability and irrationality). Alternatives to proportionality are compared and future developments of proportionality are suggested.

The book will benefit public law scholars, political scientists, judges and lawyers interested in the six countries analysed in the book, as well as those from other countries in which proportionality is practiced or is emerging. The analyses of specific cases and the empirical data provide a rich basis for comparative insights.

This volume will interest academic audiences across the fields of human rights law, public law, constitutional theory, jurisprudence, political theory, and political science. It will appeal to lawyers and judges reviewing legislation for compliance with rights, and political scientists and legislators interested in institutional dialogue.

As the terminal crisis of the Weimar Republic intensified, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt debated whether the Weimar Constitution should be protected by a constitutional court or by presidential dictatorship. This volume provides the first translation of Kelsen's and Schmitt's famous and influential exchange on the 'Guardian of the Constitution'.