Bøger i Circumpolar Research Series serien

Whaling for food has been a part of Faroese life for the past thousand years. Late in the 20th century, this community-based activity came under enormous pressure from international animal rights and environmental organisations. These organisations initiated an international boycott of Faroese fisheries and fish products to 'bring the Faroes to their knees' and end their whaling. With some 95% of the Faroese economy based on fisheries and fish products, this action clearly threatened the economic viability of the Faroes. This book examines the claims of the animal rights and environmental organisations and sets these against the reality of Faroese life. The book has three aims. First, to trace the development of the grindadr?p, the Faroese institution for managing whaling and distributing the products of the hunt, from settlements of the islands in the 10th century through to the present time. Second, to determine the institution's performance in terms of its ability to maintain itself and sustainably manage the resource on which it is based, the long-finned pilot whale. Third, using this assessment, respond to the claims of the animal rights and environmental organisations to determine if these claims have any basis.

In this intriguing study, Michael Heazle examines how International Whaling Commission (IWC) policy dramatically shifted from furthering the interests of whaling nations to eventually banning all commercial whaling. Focusing on the internal workings of a single organization, Heazle explores the impact of political and economic imperatives on the projection and interpretation of scientific research and advice. Central to his work are the epistemological problems encountered in the production of "truth." Science does not produce incontestable facts that can be expected to lead to consensus decisions; rather, the problematic nature of knowledge itself allows for various interpretations of data depending on the interests of those at the table. It is precisely the nature of scientific knowledge, Heazle argues, that has made uncertainty a tool in service of political objectives. When scientific advice to whaling nations could not with absolute certainty declare whaling practices a threat to stocks, those IWC members with substantial investments of political and economic capital used this uncertainty to reject a reduction in quotas. As perceptions of whaling changed-with the collapse of Antarctic whaling stocks, further diminishing economic returns, and public opinion turning against commercial whaling-uncertainty switched sides. Nonwhaling members in the IWC, a majority by the 1970s, claimed that because scientific data could not probe that commercial whaling was sustainable, hunting should stop. Uncertainty was used to protect the resource rather than the industry. That science cannot be an impartial determinant in policy-making decisions does not render it useless. But Heazle's analysis does suggest that without understanding the role of scientific uncertainty-and the political purposes for which it is used-international cooperation on wildlife management and broader issues will continue to become bogged down in arguments over whose science is correct.