Bøger i Law and Philosophy Library serien

This book of legal philosophy contends that positive law is better understood if it is not too easily equated with power, force, or command.

The aim of this book is to explore what it means to live a life under the law. The book explores these questions and in looking at the articulation of law and love touches upon debates in personal morality, aesthetics, epistemology, social and political organisation, institutional design and the form and substance of law.

Together these authors bring expertise from the areas of law, philosophy, history, economics, and law and economics to a new study of Adam Smith and his work.

In this work, lawyer and economist Klaus Mathis appraises Richard A. Posner's normative justification of the efficiency paradigm from the perspective of the philosophy of law. He points out the possibilities as well as the limits of economic analysis of law.

Race, Rights, and Justice explores questions of the nature of law and constitutional interpretation, international law and global justice, and the nature, function, and importance of rights each from a perspective that takes seriously the realities of race and racism.

The central question in legal philosophy is the relationship between law and morality. In Law, Order and Freedom, a historical overview is given pertaining to the question of the extent to which the modern Enlightenment values can serve as the universal foundation of law and society.

Certainly, to that minority of scholars whose conceptions of politics do include 'power' as an indispensable basic concept, the approaches of the vast majority of their colleagues for whom, as their answers in the survey reveal, 'power' does not play an eminent role must appear, in an 3 important sense, mistaken or perhaps even incomprehensible.

In modern days, however, this 'legal logic' is sometimes also connected with modern formal logic, as it has been developed in the works of G. Already in an early stage it appeared that, although traditional legal logic and modern symbolic logic both concern logic, this may not create the misapprehension that a similar matter is at issue.

This book - which is the result of several years of research, discussion, writing and re-writing - consists of three parts and eight chapters. The rst part is given by the two rst chapters introducing the issue of validity and facticity in law.

Planned as a celebration of MacCormick's work, this is an homage and salute in which contributors undertake a critical reconstruction, revealing the connections of his writings, and furthering his insights in post-sovereign legal and democratic theory.

This is the first comprehensive account of the modern international law of treaty interpretation expressed in 1969 Vienna Convention, Articles 31-33. The style of writing is clear and concise, and the organisation of the book meets the demands of scholars and practitioners alike.

In this book a theory of reasoning with evidence in the context of criminal cases is developed. The main subject of this study is not the law of evidence but rather the rational process of proof, which involves constructing, testing and justifying scenarios about what happened using evidence and commonsense knowledge.

The Market of Virtue - Morality and Commitment in a Liberal Society is a contribution to the present controversy between liberalism and communitarianism. This controversy is not only confined to academic circles but is becoming of increasing interest to a wider public. It has become popular again today to criticize a liberal market society as being a society in which morality and virtues are increasingly being displaced by egoism and utility maximization. According to this view the competition between individuals and the dissolution of community ties erode the respect for the interests of others and undermine the commitment to the common good. The present book, however, develops quite a different picture of a liberal society. An analysis of its fundamental principles shows that anonymous market-relations and competition are by no means the only traits of a liberal society. Such a society also provides the framework for freedom of cooperation and association. It gives its citizens the right to cooperate with other people in pursuit of their own interests. Just as the rivalry between competitors is a basic element of a liberal society so is the cooperation between partners. Thus not only self-centred individualism is rewarded. The main part of the book explains how the freedom to cooperate and to establish social ties lays the empirical foundation for the emergence of civil virtues and moral integrity. It is the basic insight of this analysis that it can no longer be maintained that a liberal society is incapable of producing moral attitudes and social commitment. If a civil society can develop under a liberal order, then one can reckon with citizens who voluntarily contribute to public goods and who commit themselves of their own accord to the society, its constitution and institutions. However this book not only develops further arguments for the current debate between liberalism and communitarianism by explaining the emergence of morality and virtue in a market society. It also provides new aspects for the present theoretical and methodological controversies over the fundaments of the social sciences and contributes to the advancement of the modern individualistic approach in social theory. In this context it aims especially at an improvement of a sociological model of behaviour.

Conklin's thesis is that the tradition of modern legal positivism, beginning with Thomas Hobbes, postulated different senses of the invisible as the authorising origin of humanly posited laws.

Conklin's thesis is that the tradition of modern legal positivism, beginning with Thomas Hobbes, postulated different senses of the invisible as the authorising origin of humanly posited laws.

This book - which is the result of several years of research, discussion, writing and re-writing - consists of three parts and eight chapters. The rst part is given by the two rst chapters introducing the issue of validity and facticity in law.

Ake Frandberg gives an overview of the many different uses of concepts in law and shows amongst others that concepts in the law should not be confused with the role of concepts in descriptions of the law.

This book offers an extensive analysis of the role of rules and principles in legal reasoning, which focuses on the close relationship between rules, principles, and reasons.

Since Professor Perelman's sudden and untimely death in January 1984, shortly after he had been singularly honored by being made a baron by King Baudouin, I have benefited greatly from my participation in the programs of the Perelman Foundation which was established through the generosity and efforts ofBaronne Fela Perelman;

Reason, Democracy, Society deals with basic points of legal theory and philosophy of law. Some of its claims are that we must sharply separate what the law is from, what the law ought to be, and that we can know what the law is without appealing to meta-legal considerations.

It gives me great pleasure to offer this foreword to the present work of my admired friend and respected colleague Ota Weinberger. Apart from the essays of his which were published in our joint work An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism in 1986, relatively little of Wein­ berger's work is available in English. This is the more to be regretted, since his is work of particular interest to jurists of the English-speaking world both in view of its origins and in respect of its content As to its origins, Weinberger war reared as a student of the Pure Theory of Law, a theory which in its Kelsenian form has aroused very great interest and has had considerable influence among anglophoone scholars -perhaps even more than in the Germanic countries. Less well known is the fact that the Pure Theory itself divided into two schools, that of Vienna and that of Brno. It was in the Brno school of Frantisek Weyr that Weinberger's legal theory found its early formation, and perhaps from that early influence one can trace his continuing insistence on the dual character of legal norms -both as genuinely normative and yet at the same time having real social existence.

Although its concern is jurisprudence, The Tapestry of the Law is intended to offer neither an original theory of or about law nor an account of other people's theories in textbook form. Equally, those engaged in exposition of the law may counter that legal theory fails to pay adequate attention to actual law.

Building on his contributions to institutional legal theory in Institutional Legal Facts of 1993 (Law and Philosophy Library, volume 18), the author presents a comprehensive theory of legal institutions.

THE CONSCIENCE OF JUDGES AND APPLICA nON OF LEGAL RULES The book is devoted to the problem of the influence of moral judgements on the result of judicial decision-making in the process of application of the established (positive) law.

How do social institutions exist? In his analysis he connects many traditional topics of the philosophy of law, social philosophy and the philosophy of social sciences in a new way. The book is written for legal theorists as well as for political and social philosophers, and theoretically oriented social scientists.

Critical Studies in Private Law discusses the prerequisites and possibilities for an alternative or critical legal dogmatics. The key for understanding how the contradictory concrete legal material may produce varying results on the level of legal decisions is the systematization, the general principles of the law.

The law persists because people have reasons to comply with its rules. What characterizes those reasons is their interdependence: each of us only has a reason to comply because he or she expects the others to comply for the same reasons. The rules may help us to solve coordination problems, but the interaction patterns regulated by them also include Prisoner's Dilemma games, Division problems and Assurance problems. In these "games" the rules can only persist if people can be expected to be moved by considerations of fidelity and fairness, not only of prudence.This book takes a fresh look at the perennial problems of legal philosophy - the source of obligation to obey the law, the nature of authority, the relationship between law and morality, and the nature of legal argument - from the perspective of this conventionalist understanding of social rules. It argues that, since the resilience of such rules depends on cooperative dispositions, conventionalism, properly understood, does not imply positivism.

In the second part, reasonableness is examined in the different fields of law like Public, Private and International Law. Here in more detail the practical consequences of reasonableness are worked out, making this work of interest to practitioners as well as legal theorists.

Methods of Legal Reasoning describes and criticizes four methods used in legal practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory: logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics.