Bøger i Theory and Decision Library C serien

This book aims to present, in a unified approach, a series of mathematical results con cerning triangular norm-based measures and a class of cooperative games with Juzzy coalitions.

This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications.

The study of the theory of games was started in Von Neumann (1928), but the development of the theory of games was accelerated after the publication of the classical book "Theory of games and economic behavior" by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).

In this book applications of cooperative game theory that arise from combinatorial optimization problems are described. For situations where more than one decision-maker is involved classical combinatorial optimization theory does not suffice and it is here that cooperative game theory can make an important contribution.

This book will be of interest to graduate students with some experience in game theory or mathematical programming and professional researchers in game theory, operational research and its applications in economic theory, and the political and social sciences.

It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories.

In six chapters this book introduces a micro-economic model where trade takes place through a stable structure of bilateral exchange institutions.The main problem in such models is that, for well-known equilibrium concepts, equilibrium may fail to exist in the corresponding game.

This book is about the interplay of theory and experimentation on group decision making in economics.

This book tries to sort out the different meanings of uncertainty and to discover their foundations. It shows that uncertainty can be represented using various tools and mental guidelines. Behavior under uncertainty emerges from this book as something to base more on inquiry and reflection rather than on mere intuition.

This book aims to develop an institutional approach to general economic equi librium. Traditionally finite economies have been assessed as the most natural represen tations of real life economies, in particular of market economies.

Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach.

TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT Investment expenditures of companies govern economic growth. Kriebel, 1989 notes that (already) in 1989 roughly 50 percent of new corporate capital expenditures by major United States companies was in information and communication technology.

Presents an overview of theoretical literature that studies the influence and formation of networks in social and economic situations in which the relations between participants who are not included in a particular participant's network are not of consequence to this participant.

Computing Equilibria and Fixed Points is devoted to the computation of equilibria, fixed points and stationary points.

This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications.

Finance is a coherent branch of applied economics that is designed to understand financial markets in order to give advice for practical financial decisions.

The purpose of this book is to report to the international readership on the sophisticated research by Russian game theorists during the two decades 1968 - 1988. The book includes a collection of contributions in game theory and the related field of equilibrium theory which never had been published in English before.

Provides a discussion of some relevant topics in game theory. This book contains several research topics and offers the basis for an advanced course in game theory. It also supplies some elementary versions of advanced topics of the field.

This Festschrift in honor ofChristian Seidl combines a group of prominent authors who are experts in areas like public economics, welfare economic, decision theory, and experimental economics in a unique volume.

This volume focuses on the social impact of the public sector on the performance of the private sector, especially in the long term. It presents a model of the formation of social ties by economic interaction and uses this to explore the relevance of social ties and their dynamics for economic performance.

Chapters in Game Theory has been written on the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who can be regarded as the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. games arising form linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games;

This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats.

New models and techniques are developed in this text to analyse economic dynamics in an uncertain environment.

Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games.

The convergence of game theory and epistemic logic has been in progress for years. This book considers the issues of knowledge, belief and strategic interaction. It focuses on epistemic logic and the representative topics of backward induction arguments and syntax/semantics and the logical omniscience problem.

Harrie de Swart is a Dutch logician and mathematician with a great and open int- est in applications of logic. Members of the group were, among o- ers, Thom Bezembinder (psychologist), Hans Peters (mathematician), Pieter Ruys (economist), Stef Tijs (mathematician and game theorist) and, of course, Harrie de Swart (logician and mathematician).

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail.

Harrie de Swart is a Dutch logician and mathematician with a great and open int- est in applications of logic. Members of the group were, among o- ers, Thom Bezembinder (psychologist), Hans Peters (mathematician), Pieter Ruys (economist), Stef Tijs (mathematician and game theorist) and, of course, Harrie de Swart (logician and mathematician).