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This book considers a relatively unknown series of actions of the victorious Hundred Days of 1918: the operations at the River Selle.

Since the late 1970s, anglophone and German military literature has been fascinated by the Wehrmacht's command system, especially the practice of Auftragstaktik. There have been many descriptions of the doctrine, and examinations of its historical origins, as well as unflattering comparisons with the approaches of the British and American armies prior to their adoption of Mission Command in the late 1980s. Almost none of these, however, have sought to understand the different approaches to command in the context of a fundamental characteristic of warfare - friction. This would be like trying to understand flight, without any reference to aerodynamics. Inherently flawed, yet this is the norm in the military literature.This book seeks to address that gap. First, the nature of friction, and the potential command responses to it, are considered. This allows the development of a typology of eight command approaches; each approach then being tested to identify its relative effectiveness and requirements for success. Second, the British and German armies' doctrines of command during the period are examined, in order to reveal similarities and differences in relation to their perspective on the nature of warfare and the most appropriate responses. The experience of Erwin Rommel, both as a young subaltern fighting the Italians in 1917, and then as a newly-appointed divisional commander against the French in 1940, is used to test the expression of the German doctrine in practice. Third, the interaction of these different command doctrines is explored in case studies of two key armored battles, Amiens in August 1918 and Arras in May 1940, allowing the strengths and weaknesses of each to be highlighted and the typology to be tested. The result is intended to offer a new and deeper understanding of both the nature of command as a response to friction, and the factors that need to be in place in order to allow a given command approach to achieve success. The book therefore in two ways represents a sequel to the author's earlier work, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Cass, 1995), in that it both takes the conceptual model of command developed there to a deeper level, and also takes the story from the climax of 1918 up to the end of the first phase of the Second World War.

On 22 August 1914, on a battlefield one hundred kilometers wide, stretching from Luxembourg to the River Meuse, two French and two German armies clashed in a series of encounters known collectively as the Battle of the Ardennes. On that day 27,000 young French soldiers died, the bloodiest day in the military history of France, most of them in the Ardennes, and yet it is almost unknown to English-speaking readers. There has never been an operational study of the Battle of the Ardennes, in any language, at best a single chapter in a history of greater scope, at least a monograph of an individual tactical encounter within the overall battle. This book fills a glaring gap in the study of the opening phase of the First World War the Battles of the Frontiers and provides fresh insight into both French and German plans for the prosecution of what was supposed to be a short war.At the center of this book lies a mystery. In a key encounter battle one French army corps led by a future Minister of War, General Pierre Roques, outnumbered its immediate opposition by nearly six-to-one and yet dismally failed to capitalize on that superiority. The question is how, and why. Intriguingly there is a six-hour gap in the war diaries of all General Roques' units, it smacks of a cover-up. By a thorough investigation of German sources, and through the discovery of three vital messages buried in the French archives, it is now possible to piece together what happened during those missing hours and show how Roques threw away an opportunity to break the German line and advance unopposed deep into the hinterland beyond. The chimera of a clean break and exploitation, that was to haunt the Allied High Command for the next four years in the trenches of the Western Front, was a brief and tantalizing opportunity for General Roques.The final part of this book seeks to answer the question "why?" The history of both French and German pre-war preparation reveals the political, economic and cultural differences that shaped the two opposing national armies. Those differences, in turn, predicated the behavior of General Roques and his men as well as that of his German opponent. With a clear understanding of those differences, the reader may now understand how the French lost their best opportunity not only to stymie the Schlieffen Plan, but to change the course of the rest of the war.The author's text is supported by a separate map book containing 60 newly-commissioned color maps.

"...an invaluable read for anyone interested in the Gallipoli operation, but also for those seeking to understand combat, in any conflict." -- The NYMAS ReviewThe Gallipoli Landing of 25 April 1915 is arguably Australia's best known battle. It is commemorated each year with a national holiday, services, parades and great media attention. 2015, the centenary of the Gallipoli Campaign, was marked by great publicity and the release of many books, articles, films, documentaries and television series. Despite this attention, the Landing is still a poorly understood battle, with the historiography colored by a century of misinformation, assumption, folklore and legend. The Landing in the Dawn: Dissecting a Legend - The Landing at Anzac, Gallipoli, 25 April 1915, re-examines and reconstructs the Anzac Landing by applying a new approach to an old topic - it uses the aggregate experience of a single, first-wave battalion over a single day, primarily through the investigation of veteran's letters and diaries, to create a body of evidence with which to construct a history of the battle. This approach might be expected to shed light on these men's experiences only, but their accounts surprisingly divulge sufficient detail to allow an unprecedented reconstruction and re-examination of the battle. Thus it effectively places much of the battlefield under a microscope. The use of veterans' accounts to re-tell the story of the Landing is not new. Anecdotes have for many years been layered over the known history, established in C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Australia in the War: The Story of ANZAC, Volume I, as the standard existing narrative. Here, detail extracted from an unprecedented range of primary and secondary sources, is used to reconstruct the history of the day, elevating participants' accounts from anecdote to eye-witness testimony. This shift in the way evidence is used to reinterpret the day, rather than simply painting it into the existing canvas, changes the way the battle is perceived. Even though more than 100 years have passed since the Landing, and well over 1,000 books have been written about the campaign, much can be learned by returning to the "primary source, the soldier." The Landing has not been previously studied at this level of detail. This work complements Bean's by providing new evidence and digging deeper than Bean had the opportunity to do. It potentially rewrites the history of the Landing. This is not an exclusive Australian story - for example, one third of the battalion examined were born in the British Isles. This volume, the most current and comprehensive study since Bean's, has been rightly described as a major contribution that will change the way the legendary amphibious operation is viewed.

There have been two major studies in recent years that have explored the roles and responsibilities of British generals at different levels within the British Expeditionary Force's command structure. Dr Simon Innes-Robbins has written about the generals at predominantly GHQ and Army levels while Dr Andy Simpson has explored the development of the role of corps commanders during the Great War. For the first time Dr Trevor Harvey's study provides an analysis of command at the level of the infantry brigade. His study is based on a critical period during the Great War, the period from late in the Battle of the Somme to the end of the Battle of Arras in mid-May 1917. Dr Harvey's analysis is based on the service records of 116 brigadier-generals whose brigades played some part in the Battle of Arras. He explores their roles, responsibilities and backgrounds, both in theory and in practice, in the lead-up to and during the battle to explain and illustrate the range and limitations of their commands. Based on this analysis, Dr Harvey presents case studies of five brigadier-generals, their staff officers and their battalion commanders. Each brigadier-general has been selected from one of the five corps that participated in the Battle of Arras which provides an operational backdrop to the exploration of their roles. The brigadier-generals exhibit, in different combinations, their different operational experiences, their different career paths and their different personal characteristics. In undertaking his research, Dr Harvey has drawn on a wide variety sources, including diaries, letters and personal papers privately held by descendants of his chosen subjects. From the evidence drawn from the case studies, Dr Harvey identifies a series of threads about the responsibilities and actions which these brigade commanders share. He argues that the application of these threads enables the orthodox 'administration and training' interpretation of the role of brigadier-generals to be successfully challenged as both unnecessarily narrow and unduly limited. Dr Harvey's study has been praised by his examiners because 'it provides unique and original insights on British operations on the Western Front in 1916-17 which will be of great interest to scholars interested in British generalship during the First World War'. This ground-breaking study is a significant addition to the historiography of generalship during the Great War.

The Shape of War stems from the need to bring together in one volume the diverse experiences of modern Western counterinsurgency thinking, which later developed into the more articulate counterinsurgency doctrine, also known as COIN. Although warfare generally does not admit pre-established patterns, since everything in it is subject to sudden change, it is possible within this jagged subject matter to identify specific lessons related to armed rebellion. Historical analysis is a tool for understanding insurgencies' continuity and very nature, depending on where and when they occurred.The theme of The Shape of War concerns the Western doctrine of counterinsurgency and its development over the centuries, from the late 17th century to the present. Case studies support each historical period covered.The Shape of War was born out of the need to collect all the essential testimonies in one book to make it easier to consult the reading materials and, above all, to understand such a complex topic. Failure to appreciate some basic principles of irregular warfare has produced the poor results in geopolitics that are there for all to see. Afghanistan is only the most emblematic example of a myriad of failures attributable to superficial interpretations of the insurgency phenomenon.The value of The Shape of War lies precisely in its originality, in that never before has anyone treated the subject so comprehensively, using a comparative methodology that will help the reader so much as they move through the centuries and different chessboards.

"Another splendid work of scholarship, beautifully written and brilliantly researched. There are few, if any, who know more about this topic than Dr. Linden, and this book will define the field for years to come." -- Simon Shorvon, Professor of Neurology, University College LondonShell shock was the great leveller of post-war experience. Beyond the Great Silence: The Legacy of Shell Shock in Britain and Germany 1918-1924 traces the stories of shell-shocked soldiers and civilians. Medical authorities were reluctant to accept the link between illness and war and thus deprived shell shock victims not only of war pensions but also of a much-needed explanation for their suffering.The rise of shell shock exemplifies the traumatic experience of the Great War. It has transcended its original meaning as a medical concept in historical and cultural discourse. Throughout the war military medicine of all combatant nations faced similar challenges and had to ensure the fighting strength of their forces in the face of increasing numbers of traumatized soldiers. Following the Armistice, the former Allied and Central Powers were in very different situations. Whereas London returned to a period of relative stability, Berlin was transformed into the chaotic center of a failed state. For the traumatized soldiers treated at the Berlin Charité or the London National Hospital, this did not make much of a difference - hospitals continued to operate in both capitols with surprising efficiency, and the trauma of war only knows victims, no victors. Beyond the suffering caused by shell shock, many veterans suffered further humiliation war pension denials because they had been relabeled with a neurological diagnosis that was unrelated to war service or were branded as 'psychopaths' with inherited mental weakness. The medical system was thus quick to cut the link between the illness of veterans and war experience. Therefore, many ex-servicemen were cut-off not only from pensions but also from an explanation for their suffering.Beyond the Great Silence combines the personal experience of the traumatized military and civilian patients with contemporary medical literature and press reports to provide the cultural background for the varying presentations of shell shock and responses of medical professionals and wider society. Shell shock was a deeply political concept, and its history can only be understood against the backdrop of the revolutionary changes to European society in the immediate aftermath of war.

A significant new contribution to the underrepresented historiography of the British campaign in Italy during 1917-1918.A Brilliant Little Victory is a history of the 48th (South Midland) during the First World War, including its successful defense of a critical position on the Asiago Plateau in June 1918. It charts the history of the division from establishment in 1908 to its initial deployment on the Western Front in March 1915. What followed was an introduction to the trenches at Ploegsteert Wood; participation in the Battle of the Somme where it assisted with the capture of Pozières in July-August 1916 and the pursuit of the German army to the Hindenburg Line the following spring. The role of the South Midland Division during the Third Ypres offensive in late summer and autumn of 1917 is also chronicled. Following this, the division entrained for Italy where it was part of the Franco-British force dispatched to reinforce the Italian Army following the Caporetto disaster.It was 48th Division's successful defense of the tactically important Asiago Plateau high above the Lombardy Plain on 15 June 1918 that contributed to the defeat of Austro-Hungarian attackers attempting to break into the rear of the main Italian position on the Piave with potentially disastrous results. Despite fighting an effective defensive action, subsequently described by one officer as 'a brilliant little victory', the Divisional Commander, Major General Sir Robert Fanshawe, was sacked and sent home much to the dismay of officers and men. In seeking to understand what lay behind the shocking removal of an apparently successful commander, A Brilliant Little Victory provides a detailed analysis of the battle and factors that may have contributed to this sacking before offering a conclusion about whether or not it was, given the standards of the era, justified.

The Battle of the Wastelands is an account and analysis of the offensive and defensive actions fought by British and German forces from the spring of 1917 to the late summer of 1918 in the areas between the eastern-most boundaries of the Somme campaign and the Hindenburg Line.The battles waged in the area roughly between Bapaume in the south and Croisilles in the north, and Achiet-le-Petit in the west to Hermies in the east, are often neglected by British visitors to the battlefields of the Great War. Within this zone, several British and one Dominion corps fought their way across terrain laid waste as the Germans withdrew to the Siegfried Stellung in March and April 1917.It was also the area of the at times chaotic retreat of IV, V, and VI Corps a year later, and of the open warfare experienced by the same three corps during the summer months of 1918. The important offensive and defensive tactical encounters by which the British and Dominion corps captured, lost, and recaptured villages such as Achiet-le-Petit, Gomiécourt, Ervillers, Mory, Croisilles, Frémicourt, Ytres, Lebucquière, Beaumetz, and Hermies are described and explained within the context of the BEF's learning process.Many of these operations fought in the spring of 1917 and in the summer of 1918 are not well known to British students of the war. Although generally not large set-piece battles the engagements were heavily contested and incurred substantial casualties. In addition to those lesser-known battles, the book also examines the defense of its front by the British Third Army as it staged its fighting withdrawal during Operation Michael.The area is one of undulating open fields, country roads, scattered copses, small villages, and the Canal du Nord. There are few physical remains of fortifications but there are dozens of CWGC cemeteries, many of which appear to receive no visitors for months at a time. The land is ideal for exploring either by car, bike, or on foot, and is within very easy and short traveling distance from the towns where most British visitors to the Somme and Arras stay.The Battle of the Wastelands offers both a practical touring guide as well as a reference volume for these little-appreciated but important engagements. It will inform those visitors who drive through these areas as they pass to and from the coast of their importance and significance to the eventual Allied victory on the Western Front.

Point of Failure is an innovative study that examines whether or how a select group of British Army officers - Brigadiers - survived two immediate strategic defeats due to their pre-war social, professional and military backgrounds and continued to serve and advance - or not - thereafter.By the early summer of 1940, the British Army had suffered two simultaneous operational failures in Europe, in France & Belgium from May to June and in Norway from April to May. Point of Failure considers a specific set of British Army officers, Brigadiers, who served there. In 1940, while the rank of Brigadier existed, it was more a holding rank for an officer occupying a post temporarily to fulfill a role, after which he would either revert to Colonel or be advanced to Major General. Therefore, Brigadiers were, in a sense, the Army's 'middle management' - heading for the top or making no further progress.Point of Failure aims to examine this set of officers and to see whether their professional survival and/or advancement after 1940 was influenced by factors prevailing before it.This is neither a study of combat effectiveness nor a campaign narrative. This would be a repetition of histories well known elsewhere. However, certain Brigadiers' performances in France brought them to the attention of senior officers. Issues such as the award of decorations and whether higher, successful commanders 'carried' their subordinate Brigadiers with them as they themselves were promoted are considered.Factors which may have contributed to the advancement of officers, be they professional, social or operational before 1940, are addressed. Also considered are those presumed to do so, but which this book shows were either ineffectual or less influential than prior presumptions arising from the literature on the British Army in the Second World War, such as the influence of patronage by senior officers, most notably Bernard Montgomery and Alan Brooke.By its nature, Point of Failure draws considerably on secondary sources, such as campaign narratives, biographies and biographical sources. Primary sources, such as war diaries, personal papers, and autobiographies, are used but are subject to limitations, which are discussed later. The main primary source, which would be profoundly informative on a personal level, namely officers' annual confidential reports throughout their careers, remain closed and inaccessible to researchers.To examine whether the factors discussed in this book prevailed or altered as a result of over three years of fighting, a later chapter compares those officers serving in fighting commands on D-Day and the initial stages of the Battle of Normandy in 1944 with their 1940 counterparts.Point of Failure does not seek to offer a general paradigm for the mechanics of advancement among all, particularly senior officers across the British Army in the Second World War. This would require a much broader work encompassing other theaters of operations and a much larger, even unwieldy, sample of officers. However, the method used does lend itself to broader application across such groups and lends itself to later works.

The Best of All Appointments? examines the evolution of infantry brigade command in the British Army during the First World War. Through a series of case studies, the author demonstrates that the response of brigade staff to the challenges of the Western Front reflected the army's capacity for organizational and tactical change. The Best of All Appointments? illustrates how the influence of the corps or division under which a brigade served was fundamental to its battlefield performance and success.In constituting a key component in the chain of command, the infantry brigade's role was subject to a progressive but irregular transformation in responding to the challenges of static warfare. The author first examines the identity, structure and principal roles of the brigadier general and his staff as it existed in 1914. The profiles of a new generation of brigade staff are then established to illustrate how an increased demand for tactically proficient commanders generated a process of renewal based on merit and experience. The author demonstrates that the reasons behind this process were varied, deliberate and otherwise.Two avenues of research were adopted in the writing of the book, reflecting the varied interrelated dimensions and conceptual planes within which brigade command operated. On a macro level, brigade operations were shaped by political, economic, topographical and technological factors. On a micro level, the influence of the brigade staff was largely determined by the irregularities of their brigade sector and its configuration with the enemy lines. In order to challenge the orthodox interpretation that the role of the brigadier and his staff was unduly narrow, the scope of the book addresses two fundamental questions. First, the author focuses on the extent to which brigade command's response to trench warfare reflected the British Army's capability for flexibility and innovation is assessed. Through an in depth analysis of brigade operations conducted during 1915-1918, it becomes evident that the measures implemented by brigade staff substantiated their role as agents of organizational and tactical change. These measures were manifested through various spheres of activity, the benefits of which were manifold.Fundamental to the army's learning effectiveness, was the influence of its pre-war ethos, which provided an enduring framework throughout the First World War. This ethos provided flexibility and enabled the army to recalibrate its approach to learning in response to its increasingly civilian soldier composition. The army displayed a willingness to reach and interact with those with expertise and as a result individuals were able to influence institutional behavior. The book illustrates the role played by brigade staff in the capture, dissemination and codification of knowledge and experience as an integral part of the army's operational and tactical learning process.The second question addresses the extent to which the organizational and tactical evolution of brigade command was shaped by the corps or division under which it served. Three key elements that influenced brigade battlefield performance are examined: unit cohesion as embodied within a stable staff structure, the scale of offensive action as governed by the pre-conditions for operational success and the degree of flexibility devolved to subordinate levels of command. Using comparative case studies, the author establishes the pre-conditions for operational success: appropriate training, time for preparation, realistic objectives, accurate reconnaissance, logistic support, sufficient artillery resources and good communications. Within a command culture where these conditions were sufficiently met, the prominent role of the brigade staff helped to ensure that preparations were thorough and training appropriate. By these means, the tactical initiative and managerial skills of the brigade staff were fully exploited. Where a command culture proved counterproductive, with woefully inadequate arrangements, poor communications and unrealistic objectives, the tactical influence of the brigadier general was diminished.Although brigade command had little control over the broad parameters in which they operated, given the establishment of the organizational and logistic pre-conditions for success, officers were able and willing to respond to the challenges of static warfare and the eventual transition to mobile operations. This process reflected the ethos of the pre-war British army officer class and its capacity for learning and adaptation. These values were sustained and applied to effect through the creation of new generation of brigade officers who possessed the intellectual capacity to control large -scale operations. This book is a lasting testament to their professionalism and courage.

The Battle of Megiddo was not only the last large cavalry offensive in world history, but also a tribute to combined arms operations fostered over the course of the First World War. Fought between 19-25 September 1918, it was the final Allied offensive of the Sinai and Palestine Campaign. The contending forces were the British Empire's EEF (Egyptian Expeditionary Force) of three infantry and one mounted corps pitted against the Ottoman-German Yildirim Army Group which numbered three weak armies with the approximate total strength of a single enemy corps. Comparable to what General Erich von Ludendorff called the 'Black Day' of the German Army (opening of the Battle of Amiens, 8 August 1918) on the Western Front, the complete Ottoman defeat would have been impossible without the application of superior logistics. Whilst Megiddo did not determine the outcome of the war in the Middle East, the ramifications of the victory decisively shaped the post-war world in the region.

This book is dedicated to the study of the Russian cavalry, and cavalry attacks, on the Eastern Front during the First World War 1914-16. The tactical application of Russian cavalry as well as specific accounts of cavalry operations and battles are included, the latter described in some detail. As one of the generals rightly noted, "What the infantry could not do, the cavalry will do". A mass of interesting and little-known material features in this book, including information about the exotic irregular cavalry units of the Russian Imperial Army. Some of the cavalry operations are reconstructed on the basis of documents from the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA), thus the information becomes available to readers for the first time. In addition to both operational-strategic and tactical combat descriptions, the author also pays attention to the armament and equipment of the cavalry. The text of the book is accompanied by many rare photographs from the time, as well as maps and diagrams.

This book demonstrates the significant role sea power played in shaping the Middle East. From the dawn of Islam, until the 21st Century - naval power profoundly impacted on national policy.

A new and detailed account of the battle of Gazala from 27 May-18 June 1942 which reconsiders the brigade battles for Eighth Army. It uses archival war diaries and reports, supported by numerous published memoirs, and regimental histories to provide a fresh voice for the men who fought there.

This narrative of the war in Ireland from October 1641 to September 1643 critically evaluates the performance of the Irish or Catholic armies and reveals the underlying shape of what would otherwise seem to be a shapeless sprawl of battles, sieges, skirmishes, massacres, and cattle raids.

This book is an in-depth analysis of the Arras August 1918 campaign that was the Canadian Corps' most important operational assignment. The Corps smashed through 15 kilometers of some of the strongest defenses on the Western Front that forced the Germans to fall back on a wide front.

Wedged between the Battles of the Somme and Passchendaele, the Battle of Arras has often been termed 'The Forgotten Battle' with little in the way of supporting literature.

The Dardanelles Campaign was initiated by Winston Churchill who convinced the British cabinet to sanction a naval assault to force the Dardanelles Straits and eliminate Turkey from the war.

The mechanization of British and Household Cavalry regiments took place between the two World Wars and on into 1942.

6th Airborne Division achieved its objectives on D-Day. It then held the line for three months during the Normandy Campaign - a task for which it was not adequately equipped. How did 'Windy' Gale and his troops accomplish this?

1916 was a pivotal year for the British Army. It was a year of intense combat that was defined by the Battle of the Somme and the appalling casualties of the 1st July 1916.

Between 1941 & 1945 the war in the Far East is occasionally referred to as the 'Forgotten War'. This book will analyse how the Allies lost air superiority during the initial exchanges, and then how technical and material difficulties were overcome before air superiority was won in 1944, and air supremacy was gained in 1945.

This book provides the first comprehensive study of the British Army's use of horses between 1875-1925, including their use in the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer and the Great War 1914-1918.

Early Modern Systems of Command explores the lives these individuals led on campaign and the nature of the apparatus of command they formed. Drawing upon a wealth of primary material it examines topics as diverse as corruption, logistics, military justice and intelligence-gathering.

Using a combination of new perspectives and new evidence, this book presents a reinterpretation of how 21st Army Group produced a successful combined arms doctrine by late 1944 and implemented this in early 1945.

Public schoolboys in the Great War were part of a nation in arms. This book explains how their involvement was far more than romantic idealism.