Bøger af Dmitry Shlapentokh

During the Cold War era, most states had gravitated to either one of the superpowers, the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). There were, of course, states that tried to play the independent or semi-independent role. Still, they usually were not challenging to one of the superpowers. Upon the collapse of the USSR, the United States had enjoyed absolute predominance until approximately the end of the Bush era, when a multipolar world started to develop. At that point, several centers of power emerged, providing the flexibility for small powers to move from the orbit of one center of power to the other. Moreover, the small powers could on occasion even challenge the bigger centers of power. This is the case with Belarus, at least from 2006 to the present. Belarus officially became an ally of Russia and formed a "union" state. Still, since 2006, Minsk's relationship with Moscow became extremely acrimonious, when Moscow abruptly increased the price of oil/gas delivered to Minsk. Minsk engaged in conflict with Moscow-a conflict that has been mixed with a peculiar detente and new tensions. The conflict with Russia coincided with the flirting by Belarus with the European Union (EU) and, even more so, with China and Iran. All of this indicated that Belarus would continue to exercise a "multi-vector" foreign policy, and this Belarusian policy reflects the general pattern of foreign policy in an emerging multipolar world. The absence of a single center of power or a few centers of power-as was the case during the Cold War-provides the opportunity even for small states, sandwiched between much stronger states, to move with comparative ease from one center to the other. Even when small states become finally attached to one of these centers, their attachment is not absolute, and freedom of action is still preserved. The following conclusions are drawn from this analysis: 1. There is an emerging post-unipolar world. Now the United States is not the only global center, as it was during the first years of the post-Cold War era. Nor do just two superpowers-the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-now define the course of global events. The new multipolarity implies the presence of several centers of power. This provides the opportunity for small states such as Belarus to move from one center of power to another or to engage in a sort of geopolitical gamesmanship. 2. During the last 10 years or so, Belarus moved from Russia to the European Union (EU) and back. At the same time, it engaged in relationships with Iran and China. While relationships with Russia and the EU have not been stable, this is not the case with China and Iran. Here, Belarus has always maintained a good relationship, especially in the case of China. This is demonstrated by the increasing role of Asia in the geopolitical arrangements of the present, and will be even more so in the future.

Since the late Soviet era, the presence of Iran has loomed large in the minds of the Russian elite. Soon after the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)-and even before-increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West, especially the United States, and looked for alternative geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world became one of the possible alternatives. Iran became especially important in the geopolitical construction of Eurasianists or neo-Eurasianists who believed that Russia's alliance with Iran is essential for Russia's rise to power. Yet, by the middle of Russian President Vladimir Putin's tenure, increasing tension with the Muslim community and the rise of Russian nationalism had led to more complicated views of the Russian elite on Iran. At present, the Russian elite does not mind using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the West, especially the United States, and as a market for Russian weapons and other goods and services. However, the dream of a Russian-Iran axis is apparently abandoned for good.

This book examines the interplay between key rulers and intellectuals in creating and sustaining popular discourses that often help keep rulers in power.

Vasily Yan (Vassily Grigoryevich Yanchevetsky, 1874¿1954) was a writer of historical novels whose popularity survives the test of time. He was widely read throughout the Soviet era and continues to be popular in the post-Soviet era. This book is not just a biographical sketch of an important Russian/Soviet writer basically unknown to the Western public. The focus on Yan and his work also impressively demonstrates the dominant role of ideology in a totalitarian society, which is not just a socio-economic and political system of the past, but could reemerge in the future as ISIS has demonstrated. Shlapentokh shows that ideology and the cultural and intellectual life in totalitarian regimes are more complex than is often assumed. Intellectuals often enough engaged in stressful, but¿in its literary outcome¿captivating ¿cat and mouse¿ games with censors, the powerful, and the government.

The political uncertainty following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rejection of the revolutionary model has brought Russian political thought full circle as democratic forces contend with authoritarian nationalism

Totalitarian rule is commonly thought to derive from specific ideologies that justify the complete control by the state of social, cultural, and political institutions. This volume seeks to show that totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes have their roots in a fear of disorder that may overtake both rulers and the society at large.

The interest of Russian intellectuals in the French Revolution demonstrates that some Russian thinkers of the 19th century had begun to question the concept of Russia's uniqueness. They saw, perhaps correctly, that the Western experience, with the French Revolution as its symbol, was foreign to Russian destiny.