Bøger af Jaakko Hintikka

Aristotle thought of his logic and methodology as applications of the Socratic questioning method. In particular, logic was originally a study of answers necessitated by earlier answers. For Aristotle, thought-experiments were real experiments in the sense that by realizing forms in one's mind, one can read off their properties and interrelations. Treating forms as independent entities, knowable one by one, committed Aristotle to his mode of syllogistic explanation. He did not think of existence, predication and identity as separate senses of estin. Aristotle thus serves as an example of a thinker who did not rely on the distinction between the allegedly different Fregean senses, thereby shedding new light on our own conceptual presuppositions. This collection comprises several striking interpretations that Jaakko Hintikka has put forward over the years, constituting a challenge not only to Aristotelian scholars and historians of ideas, but to everyone interested in logic, epistemology or metaphysics and in their history.

I also find it strange that some of the same linguists as believe that we all possess innate ideas about general characteristics of humanly possible grammars assume that we can have access to them only via their particular consequences.

Some of the older papers in this collection, especially 'Quantification and Modality' and 'Modes of Modality', serve to clarify some of the main possibilities in the semantics of modal logics in general.

Wittgenstein was far too impatient to explain in his books and book drafts what his problems were, what it was that he was trying to get clear about. For one important instance, in The Brown Book, Wittgenstein had explained in some detail what name-object relationships amount to in his view.

As official sponsors of the First International Conference in the History and Philosophy of Science, the two Divisions of the International Union of the History and Philosophy of Science owe a great deal to the University of Jyvliskyla and the 1973 Jyvliskylli Summer Festival for the extra ordinarily generous hospitality they provided.

Knowledge and BeliefAn Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notionsby Jaakko HintikkaPrepared by Vincent F. Hendricks & John SymonsIn 1962 Jaakko Hintikka published Knowledge and Belief: An Introductionto the Logic of the Two Notions with Cornell University Press. Almostevery paper or a book on epistemic and doxastic logic that has appearedsince then has referred to this seminal work. Although many philosophersworking in logic, epistemology, game-theory, economics, computer scienceand linguistics mention the book, it is very likely that most have neverliterally had their hands on it, much less owned a copy. After a fourthprinting in 1969, Knowledge and Belief went out of print and as many ofus have found to our dismay, it has become increasingly difficult tofind used copies at our local shops or online. It is our pleasure toprovide the interdisciplinary community with this reprint edition ofKnowledge and Belief.Knowledge and Belief is a classic on which a generation - my generation- of epistemologists cut their teeth. This reissue is welcome. It willprovide something for the next generation to chew on. - Fred Dretske,Duke UniversityIt is wonderful to see this classic being reissued after so many yearsout of print. It was extremely influential in its day; its influencecontinues to this day, through the impact of epistemic logic in fieldsas diverse distributed computing, artificial intelligence, and gametheory. This reissue should make it possible for a new generation ofresearchers to appreciate Hintikka's groundbreaking work. - JosephHalpern, Cornell University

If he does not know in some detail what kind of pass Thermopylae is or on what sort of ridge the battle of Bussaco was fought, he has no business of discussing these battles, even if this topographical information alone does not yet amount to historical knowledge.

Since the first chapter of this book presents an intro duction to the present state of game-theoretical semantics (GTS), there is no point in giving a briefer survey here.

Aristotle thought of his logic and methodology as applications of the Socratic questioning method. Aristotle thus serves as an example of a thinker who did not rely on the distinction between the allegedly different Fregean senses, thereby shedding new light on our own conceptual presuppositions.

Is a genuine logic of scientific discovery possible? Using this new logic, Hintikka establishes a result that will undoubtedly be considered the fundamental theorem of all epistemology, viz., the virtual identity of optimal strategies of pure discovery with optimal deductive strategies.

Several of the basic ideas of current language theory are subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting, including the concept of scope, the hegemony of generative syntax, the Frege-Russell claim that verbs like `is' are ambiguous, and the assumptions underlying the so-called New Theory of Reference.

One can distinguish, roughly speaking, two different approaches to the philosophy of mathematics. On the other hand, some philosophers, logicians and mathematicians have tried or are trying to subject the very concepts which mathematicians are using in their work to critical scrutiny.

Collingwood saw one of the main tasks of philosophers and of historians of human thought in uncovering what he called the ultimate presuppositions of different thinkers, of different philosophical movements and of entire eras of intellectual history.

The leisure to do the thinking whose results are gathered here has largely been provided by the Academy of Finland, whose support has also made possible the help and co-operation of a group of younger logicians and philosophers.

Several of the basic ideas of current language theory are subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting, including the concept of scope, the hegemony of generative syntax, the Frege-Russell claim that verbs like `is' are ambiguous, and the assumptions underlying the so-called New Theory of Reference.

One can distinguish, roughly speaking, two different approaches to the philosophy of mathematics. On the other hand, some philosophers, logicians and mathematicians have tried or are trying to subject the very concepts which mathematicians are using in their work to critical scrutiny.

Collingwood saw one of the main tasks of philosophers and of historians of human thought in uncovering what he called the ultimate presuppositions of different thinkers, of different philosophical movements and of entire eras of intellectual history.

Is a genuine logic of scientific discovery possible? Using this new logic, Hintikka establishes a result that will undoubtedly be considered the fundamental theorem of all epistemology, viz., the virtual identity of optimal strategies of pure discovery with optimal deductive strategies.