Bøger af Nicolai Hartmann

Frontmatter -- EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION -- TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE -- FOREWORD -- CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- PART I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ETHICAL PHENOMENON -- SECTION I. CONTEMPLATIVE AND NORMATIVE ETHICS -- I. THE COMPETENCY OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY -- II. CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT? -- III. THE RIGHT MEANING OF THE NORMATIVE -- SECTION II. THE PLURALITY OF MORALS AND UNITY OF ETHICS -- IV. MULTIPLICITY AND UNITY IN MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS -- V. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL -- VI. THE PATHWAY TO THE DISCOVERY OF VALUES -- VII. THE VARIOUS DOMAINS OF THE MORAL PHENOMENON -- SECTION III. FALSE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS -- VIII. EGOISM AND ALTRUISM -- IX. EUDÆMONISM AND UTILITARIANISM -- X . CRITICISM AND THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EUDÆMONISM -- SECTION IV. THE KANTIAN ETHICS -- XI. THE SUBJECTIVISM OF THE PRACTICAL REASON -- XII. CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM -- XIII. CRITIQUE OF INTELLECTUALISM -- SECTION V. THE ESSENCE OF ETHICAL VALUES -- XIV. VALUES AS ESSENCES -- XV. THE RELATIVITY AND ABSOLUTENESS OF VALUES -- XVI. THE IDEAL SELF-EXISTENCE OF VALUES -- XVII. VALUES AS PRINCIPLES -- SECTION VI. THE ESSENCE OF THE OUGHT -- XVIII. THE RELATION OF VALUE AND THE OUGHT -- XIX. POSITION OF THE OUGHT TOWARDS THE SUBJECT -- XX. THE OUGHT AND THE FINALISTIC NEXUS -- XXI. THE TELEOLOGY OF VALUES AND THE METAPHYSIC OF MAN -- SECTION VII. METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVES -- XXII. TELEOLOGICAL ACTION AND REACTION -- XXIII. THE MODAL STRUCTURE OF THE OUGHT -- XXIV. THE METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALITY -- XXV. METAPHYSICAL PERSONALISM -- Backmatter

The book is the first English translation of Nicolai Hartmann's final book, published in 1953. It will be of value to graduate students in philosophy, scholars concerned with 20th century Continental philosophy, students of aesthetics and art history and criticism, and persons in and out of academic philosophy who wish to develop their aesthetic understanding and responsiveness to art and music. Aesthetics, Hartmann believes, centers on the phenomenon of beauty, and art "e;objectivates"e; beauty, but beauty exists only for a prepared observer. Part One explores the act of aesthetic appreciation and its relation to the aesthetic object. It discovers phenomenologically determinable levels of apprehension.Beauty appears when an observer peers through the physical foreground of the work into the strata upon which form has been bestowed by an artist in the process of expressing some theme. The theory of the stratification of aesthetic objects is perhaps Hartmann's most original and fundamental contribution to aesthetics. He makes useful and perceptive distinctions between the levels in which beauty is given to perception by nature, in the performing and the plastic arts, and in literature of all kinds. Part Two develops the phenomenology of beauty in each of the fine arts. Then Hartmann explores some traditional categories of European aesthetics, most centrally those of unity of value and of truth in art. Part Three discusses the forms of aesthetic values. Hartmann contrasts aesthetic values with moral values, and this exploration culminates in an extensive phenomenological exhibition of three specific aesthetic values, the sublime, the charming, and the comic. A brief appendix, never completed by the author, contains some reflections upon the ontological implications of aesthetics. Engaged in constant dialogue with thinkers of the past, especially with Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Hartmann corrects and develops their insights by reference to familiar phenomena of art, especially with Shakespeare, Rembrandt and Greek sculpture and architecture. In the course of his analysis, he considers truth in art (the true-to-life and the essential truth), the value of art, and the relation of art and morality. The workstands with other great 20th century contributors to art theory and philosophical aesthetics: Heidegger, Sartre, Croce, Adorno, Ingarden, and Benjamin, among others.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Section I PRELIMINARY CRITICAL QUESTIONS -- CHAPTER I (LXV) THE CONNECTIONS OF THE PROBLEM -- CHAPTER II (LXVI) HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER III (LXVII) ERRONEOUS CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM -- Section II THE CAUSAL ANTINOMY -- CHAPTER IV (LXVIII) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S SOLUTION -- CHAPTER V (LXIX) DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM -- CHAPTER VI (LXX) DETERMINISM, CAUSAL AND FINALISTIC -- CHAPTER VII (LXXI) ONTOLOGICAL REGULARITY AS THE BASIS OF FREEDOM -- Section III THE ANTINOMY OF THE OUGHT -- CHAPTER VIII (LXXII) CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER IX (LXXIII) FALSE WAYS OF PROVING THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL -- CHAPTER X (LXXIV) THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PROBLEM -- Section IV ETHICAL PHENOMENA, THEIR EFFICACY AS PROOFS -- CHAPTER XI (LXXV) "PROOFS" OF METAPHYSICAL OBJECTS -- CHAPTER XII (LXXVI) MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION -- CHAPTER XIII (LXXVII) RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY -- CHAPTER XIV (LXXVIII) THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT -- CHAPTER XV (LXXIX) SUPPLEMENTARY GROUPS OF FACTS -- CHAPTER XVI (LXXX) OUGHT AND THE WILL -- Section V ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL FREEDOM -- CHAPTER XVII (LXXXI) AUTONOMY OF THE PERSON AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES -- CHAPTER XVIII (LXXXII) SOLUTION OF THE OUGHT-ANTINOMY -- CHAPTER XIX (LXXXIII) PROBLEMS STILL UNSOLVED -- Section VI APPENDIX TO THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER XX (LXXXIV) APPARENT AND REAL DEFECTS OF THE THEORY -- INDEX

Frontmatter -- LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY. Introduction -- VOL. ONE: MORAL PHENOMENA -- VOL. TWO: MORAL VALUES -- VOL. THREE: MORAL FREEDOM -- CONTENTS -- PART II. THE REALM OF ETHICAL VALUES -- Section I. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE TABLE OF VALUES -- Section II. THE MOST GENERAL ANTITHESES -- Section III. THE VALUES WHICH CONDITION CONTENTS -- Section IV. FUNDAMENTAL MORAL VALUES -- Section V. SPECIAL MORAL VALUES (FIRST GROUP) -- Section VI. SPECIAL MORAL VALUES (SECOND GROUP) -- Section VII. SPECIAL MORAL VALUES (THIRD GROUP) -- Section VIII. THE ORDER OF THE REALM OF VALUES -- GLOSSARY OF GREEK TERMS AND PHRASES -- Backmatter

Nicolai Hartmann's Possibility and Actuality is the second volume of a four-part investigation of ontology. It deals with such questions as: How do we know that something is really possible? Is the possible only the actual? Is the actual only the possible? What is the difference between ideal and real possibility? This groundbreaking work of modal analysis describes the logical relations between possibility, actuality, and necessity, and it provides insight into the relations between modes of knowledge and modes of being. Hartmann reviews the history of philosophical concepts of possibility and necessity, from ancient Megarian philosophy to Aristotle, to Medieval Scholasticism, to Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. He explains the importance of modal analysis as a basic investigative tool, and he proposes an approach to understanding the nature of human existence that unifies the fields of ontology, modal logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. This brilliant and fascinating work is relevant to many topics of debate in contemporary philosophy, including the ontology of possible worlds, the metaphysics of modality, the logic of counterfactual conditionals, and modal epistemology. It illuminates the nature of real, ideal, logical, and epistemic possibility.

Since the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism

Ethics is Nicolai Hartmann's magnum opus on moral philosophy

The first part of the author's treatise "Ethics" looks at the structure of ethical phenomena and criticises utilitanarism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. The essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of "ought" are discussed.

Specifically describing fundamental moral values - such as goodness, nobility and vitality - and special moral values - such as justice, wisdom, courage, self-control, trustworthiness, and modesty - this work takes theoretical philosophy and brings it very much into the realm of the practical.

Contemporary philosophy has reasserted the belief that philosophy has practical tasks

"Ethics" is Nicolai Hartmann's magnum opus on moral philosophy. "Moral Phenomena" is concerned with the nature and structure of ethical phenomena. "Moral Values" describes all values as forming a complex and imperfectly known system. "Moral Freedom" deals with the individual's freedom of the will.