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Non-proliferation assistance programs, including co-operative threat reduction, are being examined to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorisation Act, Congress authorised the Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. This book analyses the range of possibilities for applying CTR funds, what kinds of assistance may be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance. A key underlying issue is whether countries that pose particular risks are prepared to provide adequate co-operation to achieve CTR objectives. As many observers have noted, CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries. A common factor must be the willingness of such states to co-operate. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus additionally on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.
This report examines current U.S. regulation and industry practices regarding security measures and controls over natural uranium prior to enrichment.
Non-proliferation assistance programs are a tool in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these programs. This book surveys options for applying CTR programs to states that pose a WMD and terrorism threat.
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