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Talents play a central role in the way that we live our lives, and it is widelyassumed that identifying and developing one's talents is valuable, both for oneselfand for others. Despite this, the philosophical literature is seriously lacking in itsdiscussion of the nature and value of talent; the objective goodness of talent andits development is often assumed without an analysis of what a talent is, and thevalue that we place on it. This dissertation aims to provide such an analysis,offering a philosophical account of the nature and value of talent, and an accountof why we value its development. In doing so, I demonstrate how this can informand help us assess the debates and arguments that are made in the existingphilosophical literature on talent. I do not aim to provide an exhaustive overviewof all the philosophical issues that could be raised in relation to the value of talentand talent development, but instead I focus on three central issues that arise whenanalysing the nature of talents and the role that they play in our lives.The first issue is the nature of talent itself. Here I offer an account oftalent, understood as a high level of potential for a particular skill which isexpressed and manifested in the excellent acquisition of that skill. The secondissue is whether or not we have good prudential reasons or a moral obligation todevelop our talents. I begin by objecting to Kant's claim that there is a moral dutyto develop one's talents; I will argue that if there is such a duty, it will not begenerated by the commitments of Kant's moral theory. I then argue that whetheror not talent development is morally required, or prudentially good, is conditionalon one's endorsement of the commitments that are required to bring about thedevelopment of one's talent.
The present study examined disordered eating, sorority social norms regarding thebody and thinness, personal values regarding the body and thinness, body dissatisfaction,thin ideal internalization, fat talk, negative affect, and positive affect among sorority andnon-sorority women. The aims of this study were to discern the underlying factorstructures of the sorority/group social norms questionnaires and the personal valuesregarding the body and thinness questionnaire, investigate disordered eating amongsorority and non-sorority women over time, and further examine the impact of socialnorms on sorority women's body and eating attitudes and behaviors. The results of thisresearch illustrated three main findings. First, sorority women did not differ from nonsororitywomen on eating pathology. Second, fat talk, personal values regarding the bodyand thinness, and body mass index predicted increased disordered eating over time in thegeneral college population of women. Third, the sorority and group social norms scale, aswell as the personal values regarding the body and thinness measure, were all developedand showed evidence for validation in this research. Additionally, the sorority/groupsocial norms questionnaires and the personal values regarding the body and thinnessquestionnaire demonstrated evidence for validation.
We are going to examine the problem of the Overhuman [Übermensch] in the work of German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. TheOverhuman is a subject the notoriety of which far exceeds its careful treatment by Nietzsche's commentators. Nietzsche's mistreatment by theNazis, the simplistic association of the term with Hollywood phantasies, as well as the large number of issues that the term covers, are some of thereasons for the relative obscurity of the term. On our part, we are going to investigate our subject by examining a broad array of issues and problemsthat Nietzsche wishes to address through the use of the term Overhuman. We are going to argue that, following the demise of various humanist ideologies in the West (all united under the all-powerful signifier of a transcendent God), man faces the challenge of having to justify his existence on earth solely by the utilization of immanent reasons, an event perhaps unprecedented in human history. Nietzsche tries partly to exemplify and partly imagine an earth that is going to be man-made and the various challenges and problems that this process is going to entail. We will argue that the term Overhuman refers to a process whereby man rediscovers an immanent culture and the new rules according to which life on earth is to take place; we are also going to examine the new political order which is going to replace the old one, which for the most part produced man as a docile animal, unable to stand up for his own rights and demands.
Much of the current transitions-based research literature has investigated 'end points' (i.e., coming away from sport and the retirement stage) and not 'within transitions' (i.e., what happens more frequently whilst in the sport). More definitively in relation to football, there has tended to be a specific research focus on younger age groups such as academy players and academy environments. There is limited research which involves professional players and professional cultures. This has been largely in part due to the difficult nature of research access and confidentiality issues around professional sport. Therefore, the present thesis has extended knowledge of transitions by moving the research field into professional sport(football) and professional football culture. As well as the 'end points' of transition the thesis has investigated experiences that professional football players had more frequently and how these experiences threatened, disrupted and challenged identity.Across three studies utilising a pragmatic research philosophy, the thesis explored transitions, critical moments, athletic identity, and the culture of operating in a first team professional football environment. Study One used an evocative, analytic auto-ethnography whichprovided a rich, detailed account of personally lived experiences of the author. These experiences were charted around different transitional points spanning approximately 20 years in total and written using a monological narrative approach. Key moments were highlighted using a showing, not a telling approach. The narrative presented a range of issues within the journey of a professional footballer.
This seeks to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Wittgenstein's approach to the problem of freedom of the will, primarilyas expounded in his "Lectures on Freedom of the Will" (LFW). My overall aim is to show how Wittgenstein works to reconfigure the debatesabout freedom of the will so that it can be confronted as the kind of problem he thinks it ultimately is: an ethical and existential problem. Notpublished until 1989, the LFW have received scant critical attention. I argue that Wittgenstein's approach is highly distinctive in a way thatmakes it significantly less vulnerable than its closest cousins to certain powerful lines of critical attack. Chapter One brings out thedistinctiveness of the LFW, especially vis-à-vis a putatively Wittgensteinian form of compatibilism, exemplified by Kai Nielsen.Albeit in different ways, Wittgenstein and Nielsen are both concerned to show why being caused to act, e.g. by the laws of nature, does not equateto being compelled to act, e.g. against one's will. Unlike Nielsen, however, Wittgenstein further recognises that showing the compatibilityof freedom and natural laws establishes no more than the logical consistency of holding people responsible, given determinism, and socannot itself constitute a defence of our practices. Chapter Two introduces, as a still closer comparison with Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson'spractice-based defence of interpersonal, 'reactive' attitudes (e.g. feelings of resentment, gratitude, etc.).
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