Bøger i Theory and Decision Library C serien

This textbook provides a comprehensive overview of noncooperative and cooperative dynamic games involving uncertain parameter values, with the stochastic process being described by an event tree. Primarily intended for graduate students of economics, management science and engineering, the book is self-contained, as it defines and illustrates all relevant concepts originally introduced in static games before extending them to a dynamic framework. It subsequently addresses the sustainability of cooperative contracts over time and introduces a range of mechanisms to help avoid such agreements breaking down before reaching maturity. To illustrate the concepts discussed, the book provides various examples of how dynamic games played over event trees can be applied to environmental economics, management science, and engineering.

Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort."Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College"Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is truly a world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games.

The book provides a thorough treatment of set functions, games and capacities as well as integrals with respect to capacities and games, in a mathematical rigorous presentation and in view of application to decision making.

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail.

Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the subsequent analysis by introducing the 'consistent preferences' approach, and by presenting ex amples and concepts that are revisited throughout the book. Chapters 3 and 4 present the decision-theoretic framework and the belief operators that are used in later chapters.

This book details standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. It covers the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential.

This book is organized on the basis of a simple guiding principle: The situation in which none of the parties involved in the negotiations has threats at its disposal is the natural benchmark for negotiations where the parties can make threats.

New models and techniques are developed in this text to analyse economic dynamics in an uncertain environment.

Finance is a coherent branch of applied economics that is designed to understand financial markets in order to give advice for practical financial decisions.

Social Networks and Trust discusses two possible explanations for the emergence of trust via social networks.

It begins with a historical overview of the discovery of Condorcet's Paradox in the 18th Century, reviews numerous studies conducted to find actual occurrences of the paradox, and compiles research that has been done to develop mathematical representations for the probability that the paradox will be observed.

The papers collected in this volume relate to game theory. (Aumann, 1985, Selten 1985) Normative game theory has the important task to explore the nature and the consequences of idealized full rationality in strategic interaction.

The study of the theory of games was started in Von Neumann (1928), but the development of the theory of games was accelerated after the publication of the classical book "Theory of games and economic behavior" by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).

This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications.

This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications.

This volume focuses on the social impact of the public sector on the performance of the private sector, especially in the long term. It presents a model of the formation of social ties by economic interaction and uses this to explore the relevance of social ties and their dynamics for economic performance.

The motivation for this monograph can be traced to a seminar on Simple Games given by Professor S.H. At the seminar given by Professor Tijs, I noticed the striking similarity between the concepts in reliability and simple games and this kindled my interest in simple games.

This book is about the interplay of theory and experimentation on group decision making in economics.

This book describes highly applicable mathematics without using calculus or limits in general. The rest of the book deals with new developments in mathematics such as linear and dynamic programming, the theory of networks and the theory of games.

This book tries to sort out the different meanings of uncertainty and to discover their foundations. It shows that uncertainty can be represented using various tools and mental guidelines. Behavior under uncertainty emerges from this book as something to base more on inquiry and reflection rather than on mere intuition.

Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games).

Computing Equilibria and Fixed Points is devoted to the computation of equilibria, fixed points and stationary points.

It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories.

Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games.

A central problem of prescriptive decision making is the mismatch between the elegant formal models of decision theory and the less elegant, informal thinking of decision makers, especially when dealing with ill-structured situations.