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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics - Christopher Adolph - Bog

- The Myth of Neutrality

Bag om Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.

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  • Sprog:
  • Engelsk
  • ISBN:
  • 9781107032613
  • Indbinding:
  • Hardback
  • Sideantal:
  • 390
  • Udgivet:
  • 15. april 2013
  • Størrelse:
  • 163x238x26 mm.
  • Vægt:
  • 688 g.
  • 8-11 hverdage.
  • 10. december 2024
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  • BLACK WEEK

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Beskrivelse af Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics

Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.

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